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This thesis is a philosophical study of New Public Management (NPM). NPM is a 
theme used within the mainstream public management literature to explain and critically 
evaluate the changes that occurred within the public sector since the 1990s. In this 
study, I aim to develop the argument that there is a crisis in the public sector that results 
from the NPM regime. To develop this argument, I draw upon the Aristotelian 
philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre and identify two distinct spheres of the public sector: 
practices and institutions. I then argue that NPM generates a certain type of conflict 
between these two spheres of the public sector. This is a conflict that is related, first, to 
different and rival presuppositions of practices and institutions, regarding the good of 
human beings, and then, to the power relationships that are introduced to the public 
sector through new management methods of NPM. These new management methods 
assert power over the practices through redefining the meaning of quality and good 
performance in a way that is contrary to the meanings attached to them by the 
practitioners. Practitioners in turn resist to this process and conflict with the institutions. 
The conflict turns into a crisis because the conflict can only be resolved, if either the 
NPM is removed from the public sector or practices cease to exist in the way that 
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Introduction: outlining the crisis 
 
This study argues that there has been a crisis in UK public sector since the early 
1990s. This crisis emerged out of a management regime introduced in the late 1980s 
that is often referred to as New Public Management (NPM) within the mainstream 
public management literature1. Although I will mainly focus on the theme of NPM 
throughout the study, it must be noted from the outset that this study goes beyond the 
public management literature to offer a particular kind of philosophical analysis of 
NPM.  
This analysis will be developed through the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Michel 
Foucault. Since MacIntyre is a self-proclaimed Aristotelian, I begin this study with an 
exposition of two central concepts of the Aristotelian philosophy: “goods” and 
“eudaimonia”. Every human action and decision, according to the Aristotelian 
philosophy, aims at some good (Aristotle NE 1094a). That is, whatever we do, we do 
for the sake of a good or a number of goods. No human action and decision can 
adequately be understood without reference to the kind of good it aims at.  
The other central concept of Aristotelian philosophy that I will elaborate on is the 
concept of eudaimonia. On an Aristotelian account, although there are varieties of 
goods we aim at, not all goods are of the same kind. Whereas many goods are pursued 
for the sake of other goods, there is a good that is not pursued for the sake of any 
other. This good is named as eudaimonia; it is the ultimate good for human beings. 
Eudaimonia is often translated into English as happiness, but for the reasons I will 
elaborate on in the first chapter, I will use another translation: wellbeing. We pursue 
goods like money, prestige, friendship and so on for the sake of our wellbeing, but we 
do not pursue wellbeing for the sake of money, friendship and so on. Wellbeing is 
pursued for the sake of itself.  
It follows from these two central concepts of the Aristotelian philosophy that if we 
want to understand public sector, we need to begin from asking the kind of goods, the 
                                                 
1 Throughout the study I will use the theme of mainstream literature. By this I will mean the literature 
that uses the theme of New Public Management in order to explain, promote or critically evaluate the 
transformation of public sector since the late 1980s.  
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actions and decisions (that constitute the public sector) aim at. I approach this 
Aristotelian question in the light of MacIntyre’s contribution to the Aristotelian 
philosophy. This approach helps to define two distinct aspects of the public sector that 
have not yet been adequately defined in the mainstream public management literature: 
“practices” and “institutions”. As I will explain in the first chapter, practices are 
cooperative activities that include arts, sciences, crafts, games, TV/radio programme 
making and medicine. Institutions, on the other hand, are organizations such as the 
NHS, the BBC, state schools, universities, art galleries and so on. Services that are 
produced within the public sector such as health care, education, and broadcasting are 
all produced by the practices.  
With MacIntyre, I argue that institutions and practices must coexist, but that they 
differ fundamentally in the kind of goods they pursue. As I will explain below and in 
the first chapter, whereas practices pursue goods internal to the practices, institutions 
pursue goods external to the practices. Despite their differences, there are various 
forms of possible relationships between them, explanation of which helps understand 
the changes in the public sector in a way that goes beyond the mainstream literature of 
public management.  
Now, the crisis of the public sector emerges out of a conflict between practices and 
institutions of the public sector. I take the word crisis to mean: the turning point of a 
disease that can result either in the death or the recovery of a patient.  This is what 
crisis meant for the ancient Greek physician Hippocrates. In this study, the 'disease' 
referred by Hippocrates will be used as a metaphor for the conflict between practices 
and institution. The ‘patient’ will be used as another metaphor for practices. Thus, the 
crisis of the public sector means that there is a conflict between practices and 
institution that reached a turning point, and will result either in the dissolution of 
practices understood as MacIntyre understand them or their survival and flourishing.  
The conflict between practices and institutions stems from the management methods 
adopted by the institutions of the public sector and have been applied to the practices 
since the 1990s. Among these methods, auditing, “Total Quality Management” (TQM) 
and performance indicators are the most notable. Through analysing these 
management methods, and the policies which generate them, we will see how this 
conflict ultimately turns into the crisis the resolution of which requires either practice 
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to cease to be practices or institutions cease to be under the effect of NPM regime. 
This conclusion is developed through a number of sub-arguments.  
Once I analyse practices and institutions through the work of MacIntyre, it becomes 
clear that practices and the management methods of institutions involve two different 
and rival presuppositions about the ultimate aim of human beings. One presupposes 
human beings as aiming at wellbeing the achievement of which requires cultivation of 
habits and intellectual abilities, the other, presupposing human beings as aiming at 
preference maximisation. These presuppositions, in turn, entail different and rival 
ethoi2 regarding the relationship between what is produced within the public sector 
and the users of those produced goods or services. Once human beings are considered 
as preference maximisers by institutions, practices are required by their managers to 
aim at maximising preferences of users of their services. That is, preference 
maximisation is considered as the overriding aim of public services under NPM 
regimes.  
I argue that in opposition to the institutions (and hence the management regimes) of 
the public sector, practices presuppose that there is such a thing as the human good the 
achievement of which requires cultivation of habits and intellectual abilities. As I 
illustrate in the first chapter, this good does not equate to preference maximisation. 
Indeed, it necessitates preferring certain goods over others through transforming 
preferences. Such transformation requires the cultivation of our habits and intellectual 
abilities. In order to achieve such progress and transformation, it is necessary to 
recognise the existence of objective goods and standards that extend beyond individual 
subjective preferences. Thus, whereas practices tend to be conceived by the 
practitioners as aiming at wellbeing, institutions envisage practices as productive 
activities aiming the preference maximisation of the consumers. It is these different 
and rival ethoi (that follow from the two rival presuppositions) that lead practices to 
conflict with institutions. 
To make the argument just sketched more precise, I need to briefly refer again to 
Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia and MacIntyre’s notions of goods and practices early 
on in the thesis. Aristotle claims that wellbeing is the good for human beings because 
all other goods we pursue in our activities are related to wellbeing in an instrumental 
                                                 
2 Ethoi is the plural for ethos.  
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way. Wellbeing is, therefore, presupposed in our activities as the ultimate aim, even if 
we are not always aware of it. Although I will explain this in the first chapter, I need to 
note now that regardless of what one understands from wellbeing, it is presupposed to 
be the telos of practices in two ways: first, in relation to the practitioners, and second, 
in relation to those who are engaged with the practice but are not considered as 
practitioner such as students, viewers and patients. Practices help practitioners to 
achieve their wellbeing by cultivating their habits and intellectual abilities in pursuit of 
what MacIntyre names as goods internal to practices. He defines practices as 
“cooperative forms of activity whose participants jointly pursue goods internal to 
those form of activity and jointly value excellence in achieving those goods” 
(MacIntyre 1998a:140). MacIntyre names these goods as goods internal to practices 
as they are goods which cannot be achieved other than through participation in the 
practice. Curing and diagnosing illnesses, for example, is a good internal to the 
practice of medicine because it is through participating in the practice of medicine that 
illnesses and diseases can be treated and diagnosed in a systematic way. If goods 
internal to practices are to be achieved, the preferences of both the practitioners of the 
practices and the users of these goods must adjust their subjective preferences to 
standards of excellence peculiar to the activities of practices.  
Also important to note is that the standards of excellence are peculiar to the activities 
related to practices. Such standards are developed and extended over time and history 
of particular practices through experience and education (Beadle 2013; Knight 2007: 
152-4). The quality of the goods and services produced within the practices should be 
judged on the bases of accumulated knowledge and experience rather than preferences 
of individuals, if goods internal to practices are to be achieved. Practitioners' 
performance needs also to be evaluated with reference to standards of excellence, 
which, develop over time through accumulation of knowledge and experience. 
The second way in which wellbeing is presupposed by the practices is related to the 
relationship between practices and the users of their services. Although MacIntyre 
does not pay sufficient attention to the relationship between practices and those who 
use the products or services of the practices, I argue that the relationship presupposes 
wellbeing as the ultimate good. That is, achieving goods that are internal to a practice 
like medicine also contributes to the wellbeing of patients (i.e. serves their good). This 
connection, I argue, is presupposed by the practices such medicine, TV programme 
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making and practices situated within educational institutions. Even though a maths or 
a philosophy student might not become a practitioner of maths or philosophy after 
school, it is presupposed by those practices that teaching arts and maths to people 
contributed to the wellbeing of the students. This, in turn, indicates that those practices 
presuppose that human beings aim at wellbeing the achievement of which requires 
cultivation of habits and intellectual abilities. 
Therefore, with reference to MacIntyre and NPM methods of management, I 
demonstrate that there are two different presuppositions, about the ways in which 
human beings are motivated in their activities, coexisting within the public sector. 
These rival presuppositions entail two very different ethoi regarding the relationship 
between practices and users of the services they produce: one is the ethos of aiming at 
preference maximisation, and the other aiming at wellbeing through striving for goods 
and standards of excellence internal to practices. The former ethos manifest itself in 
the management methods of NPM (and hence in the institutions of public sector) and 
the latter, in practices such as sciences, arts, TV programme making, medicine and 
practices that are situated within educational institutions. These ethoi, as mentioned 
above, also imply different apprehensions of the quality of services and performance 
of practitioners in areas such as health, education and broadcasting.  
As mentioned above, I argue that the crisis of the public sector emerges out of a 
conflict between practices and institutions. Thus, mere differences between 
presuppositions and ethoi that follow from these presuppositions are not sufficient to 
demonstrate the existence of crisis in the public sector. There must be some other 
factors that lead to such conflict. I argue that public sector is in crisis because the rival 
ethoi that follow from different and rival presuppositions are not merely ethoi. Such 
ethoi are accompanied by power relationships between individuals or groups that hold 
them. That is, institutions, which have adopted the management methods of NPM, 
have tried to implement the ethos of preference maximisation through introducing new 
power relationships to the public sector.  
More specifically, I will argue that NPM is a regime that controls quality of services 
and goods produced by practices and performance of practitioners through new power 
relationships. However, as I demonstrate in the second chapter with reference to 
Foucault’s theory of power, NPM does not control in a conventional way. The 
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management regime of NPM, that is to say, is not a regime that uses power in an 
oppressive and violent way in order to introduce a new ethos to the relationship 
between practice and the users of their services. The management regime of the public 
sector uses methods and tools that are quite different to the conventional methods of 
power such as legal coercion and oppression. To elucidate this I focus on Foucault’s 
understanding of power and particularly on his notions of governmentality and 
disciplinary power.  
Foucault understands power beyond that of structures and methods such as violence, 
legal coercion, exploitation and oppression. Although Foucault uses various concepts 
to illustrate his understanding of power, governmentality and disciplinary power are 
the two main and most influential ones that I will draw upon in this study. With these 
concepts, he argues that power is often a productive network that creates norms and 
self-understandings through various techniques of management. In being creative in 
this way, power becomes effective without the need for exploitation, coercion and 
oppression.  
Foucault developed his notion of governmentality with reference to the concepts of 
‘government’ and ‘mentality’. For Foucault, it means the kind of self-understanding 
and rationality that is required for political power to be exercised in an effective way 
and without the use of coercion and oppression. On his account there is always a 
certain form of governmentality that accompanies liberal political and institutional 
power. Without such governmentality political and institutional power of modern 
society cannot work. It follows from this that in order to understand political and 
institutional power one has to understand the governmentality of such forms of power.  
Approached in this way, NPM and its management methods turn out to be part of a 
larger governmentality of our time. That is the neoliberal governmentality. 
Neoliberalism, Foucault contends, is the main form of governmentality that can be 
observed within modern liberal societies. However, it must be noted from the outset 
that neoliberalism is understood very differently from that of the mainstream critical 
accounts when analysed with the concept of governmentality (for these critical 
accounts see Gamble 2001; Harvey 2005; Aldo Gindin and Panitch 2010; Piketty 
2014). Unlike these accounts, Foucault does not interpret neoliberalism only in terms 
of changes in the economic and political structures of the society. Instead, he considers 
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it as construction of norms and rationalities through certain “technologies of power” 
such as “surveillance”, “examination” and “normalization”.  
As will be explained in the second chapter, there is a certain type of self-understanding 
promoted by neoliberalism. Foucault names this self-understanding as that of homo 
economicus. As I illustrate in the second chapter, homo economicus amounts to a 
human being who understand himself as essentially aiming at preference 
maximisation. Thus, neoliberal governmentality enforces a particular conception of 
what human beings are like, through certain techniques of power such as surveillance 
and normalization. Having said that NPM presupposes preference maximisation, it 
follows that the new management regime of the public sector is an instantiation of 
neoliberal governmentality whereby homo economicus is constructed as an ideal self. 
But through what kind of power is homo economicus enforced as an ideal form of 
self? Simply put, through disciplinary power. I argue that such management methods 
as auditing, TQM and performance indicators that are introduced to the public sector 
by NPM can be identified as forms of disciplinary power. 
By disciplinary power, Foucault means exercise of a number of techniques and 
methods such as surveillance, examination and normalization within specific 
organizations. What differentiates disciplinary power from those other forms of power, 
according to Foucault, is the use of these methods instead of violence, oppression and 
exploitation. Although these methods have distinctive meanings that will be explained 
in the second chapter, I only note now that, NPM uses them extensively and in doing 
so enforces preference maximisation as an ethos for practices.  
Therefore, through neoliberal governmentality and disciplinary power, NPM becomes 
a management regime that controls practices in a way that such services aim at 
preference maximisation rather than the human good understood as wellbeing. What 
needs also to be noted at this stage is that this approach to NPM allows us to 
understand what is problematic with the mainstream expositions of NPM and how the 
MacIntyrean and Foucauldian analysis goes beyond such approaches.  
In particular, what is claimed to be new with respect to NPM within the mainstream 
literature is problematic. The reason for this is not that new policies, structures and 
methods are not well defined or outlined. They are indeed very well-articulated within 
the mainstream accounts. However, there is lack of emphasis (if not ignorance) given 
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to presuppositions of practices and institutions and to how power relationships that 
aim to realize the expectations that follow from those presuppositions. Due to this 
insufficiency, both critics and proponents of NPM understand the old-style public 
sector in terms of bureaucracy.  
Once we approach public sector from an Aristotelian point of view in conjunction with 
Foucault’s understanding of power, it will be clear that NPM is neither a radical 
departure from bureaucracy nor is it liberation from bureaucracy. Instead, it is a certain 
type of intensification of bureaucracy whereby practices and institution conflict. In 
fact, I argue that NPM is an intensification of bureaucracy and it is through this 
intensification that preference maximization is enforced as the motive for practical 
rationality. While institutions assert power over the practices on the basis of the ethos 
that follow from their presupposition, practices resist such mechanisms of control. 
This resistance is vital to the crisis of the public sector.  
Many studies critically evaluate NPM and demonstrate that it generates conflict (for 
those critical accounts see Pollitt 1993: 9; Exworthy and Halford 1999; Lapsley 1999; 
Broadbent and Laughlin 2002: 99; Farrel and Morris 2003: 136; Dent and Barry 2004: 
8; Ackroyd et al 2007; Lorenz 2012). However, these studies do not explain the 
conflict with reference to goods, practices, institutions, presuppositions and power 
relationships. As a result, they fail to conceptualize the conflict in terms of practices 
and institutions and their presuppositions. Conceptualizing conflict within the public 
sector in a MacIntyrean way, as this study aims to show, helps to develop a new and 
alternative understanding of NPM and its problematic nature.  
Before I move on, one specific study that uses MacIntyre’s work to develop a similar 
critical evaluation of NPM needs also to be mentioned. Overeem and Tholen (2011) 
propose MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism as an alternative way to critically analyse public 
administration in general and NPM in particular. They also propose MacIntyre’s 
Aristotelianism as an alternative source to be used in understanding and managing 
public organizations. They develop a critique of NPM (and its variants) on the basis of 
MacIntyre’s critique of modernity and the role MacIntyre assigns to managerialism 
within modernity. They claim that NPM is an instantiation of managerialism whereby 




Overeem and Tholen (2011) also claim, with MacIntyre that in modernity there is the 
dominant belief that objective moral values and standards do not exist. In fact, it is 
believed that moral values are feelings, and just like any other feeling they cannot be 
based on any objective standards and judgement. As I will explain in the third chapter 
of this thesis, MacIntyre interprets this dominant belief with reference to what he 
names as the emotivist culture of modernity (MacIntyre, 2007: 12-3). Overeem and 
Tholen (2011: 727) argue that NPM shares this aspect of modernity, and as a result it 
bears no fundamental consideration of ends. What turns out to be important is the 
effective achievement of given ends; that is, managerialism. In such a context, 
Overeem and Tholen argues, goods internal to practices becomes subordinate to the 
goods external to practices. NPM, in short, neglects goods internal to practices.  
This study agrees with the above claims of Overeem and Tholen (2011) with some 
important contributions. First of all, this study extends the argument that NPM 
subordinates goods internal to practices to the external ones. It does this with a more 
detailed analysis of NPM than developed by Overeem and Tholen. In particular, the 
analysis I do with reference to presuppositions regarding the management methods of 
NPM such as internal markets, auditing, TQM and performance indicators, illustrates 
the subordination of internal goods to the external ones by the NPM in a more detailed 
and extensive way than the study by Overeem and Tholen (2011). Secondly, and more 
importantly, this study extends Overeem’s and Tholen’s argument that MacIntyre’s 
Aristotelianism can be a viable alternative to the mainstream public administration 
studies. It makes this extension on the basis of the main argument of this study. As 
mentioned above, the argument regarding the crisis of the public sector is developed 
through focusing on the kind of tensions and conflicts evolved within the NPM with 
reference to the concepts of presupposition, goods, practices and institutions. That is, 
this study, unlike Overeem and Tholen (2011), focuses on the presuppositions of 
practices and institutions and the conflicts that emerge between them within new 
power relations and claims that there is a crisis that results from such conflict.  
The study uses Foucault’s theory of power too in understanding the conflict within the 
public sector, but Foucault’s theory alone is not sufficient to fully understand the 
nature of the conflict within the public sector. This is because neither Foucault nor his 
main commentators have a theory of presuppositions and goods. It needs to be 
mentioned from the outset that Foucault refers to practice(s) in his various work, but in 
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a very different way than MacIntyre refers to them. Foucault’s latter period (known as 
his genealogical period) is thought to be concerned with practices, whereas his early 
period focused on discourses. Indeed, practices in Foucault’s work are interpreted as 
areas of social life that falls outside of discourse (Rabinow, 1984:10-11; Veyne, 2010). 
That is, in Foucault’s famous Discipline and Punish, practices are considered in a 
more specific way, but in a very different way than MacIntyre understand them. That 
is, practices are thought as equivalent to techniques of power such as examination and 
surveillance (Foucault, 1977: 146-7). There, and elsewhere, practices are thought 
without any reference to goods and actors that take part in practices. They are 
considered to be techniques and mechanism of power, whereas for MacIntyre, power 
and its techniques is part of institutions rather than of practices. This entails that 
whereas they would not necessarily differ in their understanding of institutions, they 
differ fundamentally in their understanding of practices and how they are related to 
institutions.  
Thus, Foucault’s understanding of practices conflicts with MacIntyre’s 
conceptualization of them. However, as I will explain in more detail in the following 
chapters of this study, MacIntyre’s understanding of practices can extend our 
understanding of resistance, and hence, conflict within the public sector that goes 
beyond Foucault’s theory – but does not necessary dismiss Foucault. As others also 
recognized, Foucault considered resistance as important, but never developed a 
satisfactory explanation of it (Taylor, 1984; Habermas, 1994; Fraser, 1981). In 
particular, Foucauldian approaches fail to help us understand the motivation of 
resistance towards certain techniques of power and how such motivation is related to 
other types of governmentalities, goods and presuppositions in the case of the public 
sector. MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism, on the other hand, helps us to develop such an 
account of resistance. This, however, does not entail that Foucault’s methodology 
regarding power cannot be used within a MacIntyrean framework.  
What is state above entails that while developing the main argument of this thesis, a 
certain limitation of Foucault’s work is also overcome. In particular, I do this through 
returning to MacIntyre’s philosophy once again in the third chapter and focusing on 
MacIntyre’s view of the conditions of flourishing practices. On this account practices 
either flourish or fail to flourish. Flourishing of practices means that the practitioners 
are able achieve goods internal to their practices. For example, flourishing of a 
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practice such as medicine depends upon the achievement of goods such as curing and 
diagnosing illnesses by the practitioners. On the Foucauldian accounts of practices 
there are no accounts of different goods of practices and hence, no account of 
flourishing and failure to flourish.  
According to MacIntyre, there are a number of conditions necessary for practitioners 
to achieve goods internal to their practices and hence to enable their practices to 
flourish. One of these conditions is important to note from the outset: virtues. Without 
virtues one cannot achieve the goods internal to practices. Thus, by participating into 
the practices, practitioners need to be habituated in a way that they can become 
virtuous persons. Practices, in other words, need to be formed in a way that they can 
serve as what Knight calls ‘schools of virtue’ (2007: 152). In such schools, what is 
important for the practitioners (as well as for the ones who are using the services of 
practices) is that they transform their habits and intellectual abilities so that they can 
become just, generous and honest persons. That is, without justice, honesty and 
generosity practices cannot flourish. Practices need goods external to practices too as 
without such goods they cannot survive for long periods of time. As explained above 
external goods are not specific to a practice in the way that internal goods are. They 
are named as external to the practices because they can be achieved in variety of ways. 
These are goods such as money, power and status. One can achieve money, status and 
power without taking part in the practice of medicine, but diagnosing and curing 
illnesses in an accurate way cannot be achieved without taking part in the practice of 
medicine.  
On MacIntyre’s account, one of the main roles of the institutions is to achieve goods 
external to practices. However, it is important to note that unless these goods serve the 
achievement of internal goods, institutions will not help practices to flourish. This is to 
say that even if institutions aim to achieve external goods, they should be careful about 
not preventing practice from flourishing. That is, they should regulate the finances, 
power relations and statues in a way that they enable practice to flourish. Therefore, 
external and internal goods of practices need to be ordered in such a way that external 
goods are instrumental to the achievement of internal ones. Unless they are ordered in 
this way, practices will fail to flourish.  
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Now, whereas for practices to flourish it is necessary that practitioners are habituated 
in a way that they become virtuous persons, NPM does not require this. In fact, as 
mentioned above, NPM presupposes preference maximisation as the main aim both for 
practitioners and for what they produce. And presupposing preference maximization 
as the main motivation is not conductive to the flourishing of practices. This is 
because practices require a different type of presupposition about human being and a 
different type of ethos regarding the relationship between their services and users in 
order to flourish. They need to presuppose that practices are oriented towards the 
achievement of goods internal to practices rather than towards preference 
maximisation. They need to become schools in which practitioners can learn to 
become virtuous persons. Once they are enforced to abandon their presupposition, 
then flourishing of practices will be prevented. By only aiming at preference 
maximisation, no practice can become the school of virtues. This entails that 
institutions need to allow practices and practitioners to work on the bases of their own 
presuppositions, if practices are to flourish. That is, practitioners need to be free from 
institutional interference in taking wellbeing (understood as cultivation of habits and 
intellectual abilities) as their main motivation, and producing services in a way that 
they helps individuals achieve wellbeing.  
I argue and illustrate throughout this thesis that the disciplinary power of NPM and of 
neoliberal governmentality do not allow the freedom to the practices to work on their 
own presupposition and ethos. Under the NPM regimes and its disciplinary power, the 
meaning and evaluation of quality of services and performance of practitioners 
changed significantly within the institutional constraints. Practices and practitioners, in 
turn, resist change. It is this resistance that leads practices and institutions of the public 
sector into an unresolvable conflict: a conflict between TV programme-making and 
the BBC management, between NHS management and medicine, and between 
university management and academy. This is a conflict regarding the enforcement of 
different understandings about the purpose of the practices, their relations with the 
users of services and institutions. Although this conflict can take different forms and 
be experienced in varying degrees relative to the context of different organizations, it 
has been an ongoing conflict since the 1980s. However, I conclude that this conflict 
itself is not the crisis of the public sector. This conflict turns into a crisis because, in 
the present condition of the public sector, neither practices can be successful in their 
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resistance nor institutions can fully control practices on the basis of their 
presuppositions. That is, neither neoliberal governmentality (and disciplinary power) 
nor the tradition of practitioners, who are concerned with the flourishing of their 
practices, can succeed.  
Practices cannot be successful in their resistance because of the absence of the 
necessary political structures for their flourishing. To elucidate this, I need to briefly 
outline the kind of politics that MacIntyre thinks is necessary for the flourishing of 
practices. For practices to flourish (or in the case of public sector, to become 
successful in their resistance to the disciplinary power of NPM), a politics of common 
good is necessary. As I explain in the third chapter, this kind of politics is a practice 
itself that goes beyond the particular practices such as medicine and TV programme 
making. Such politics is a practice the aim of which is “the achievement of a form of 
life which is the highest good” (MacIntyre 1998b:123). Such good, in turn, “provides a 
telos above and beyond those internal to practices” (MacIntyre 1998b:123). That is a 
telos appealing to which practices can also be governed. On MacIntyre’s account, this 
would be a politics of common good as it would aim at a good that is the highest good 
for all members of a community. It is, however, not a politics of centralized nation-
state, but a politics of local communities. Not because local communities are good as 
such but because they are capable of establishing institutions of ‘shared rational 
deliberation’ whereby individuals can participate and agree on the highest and 
common good.  
Without such politics, institutions (including the institutions of the public sector) will 
tend to make different presuppositions from that of the practices and as a result, they 
would tend to envisage different ethoi for practices. This is partly the reason why 
institutions enforce a certain type of ethos over the practices and conflict with 
practices. Thus, without a politics of local community, in which there are functioning 
institutions of shared rational deliberation, practices will fail to flourish. However, as 
stated above, institutions cannot be fully successful in their aim to control practices 
too, because practices are traditionally and naturally distinct from their institutions, 
and even if they are prevented from flourishing, they would still aim at goods internal 
to practices. This is because practice exists insofar as at least some practitioners 
achieve goods internal to their practices. The level of resistance would, of course, 
change depending on the context, but resistance will not cease to exist unless practices 
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themselves diminish. Thus, the conflict will be resolved only if practices or NPM 
cease to exist. And this is why the public sector is currently in a state of crisis.  
Outline of the study 
How then does this study proceed? I develop the argument in four stages, each of 
which corresponds to a chapter. I begin the first chapter with an exposition of 
MacIntyre’s philosophy and focus on his notions of goods, practices and institutions. 
This establishes the general philosophical outlook of the study through which NPM 
and public goods and services will be analysed. I will then move on to explain what I 
mean by the concept of ‘presupposition’. As explained above, presuppositions have a 
central role in developing the argument of this thesis. At this stage of the study I refer 
to another philosopher than MacIntyre and Foucault: R. G. Collingwood.  
Collingwood’s view of metaphysics helps to elaborate the ways in which the concept 
of presupposition will be used throughout this study. With the help of Collingwood 
and MacIntyre, I will identify two types of presuppositions; one peculiar to practices, 
and the other, to institutions. As mentioned above, practices and practitioners 
presuppose that human beings aim at wellbeing. It will be explained in the first chapter 
that practices related to health and education are different and older than the modern 
institutions in which they are presently housed. Hence their presuppositions are 
different and older than the presuppositions of these institutions. I will then move on 
to explain the set of presuppositions peculiar to the NPM. I will illustrate the ways in 
which presupposing human being as preference maximisers is inherited from 
neoclassical (or as often referred to neoliberal) economics. Following this, I will 
analyse certain policies and enactments as well as the management methods that 
follow from such policies and enactments. Through such analysis, I will demonstrate 
that early NPM policies and enactments presuppose human beings as preference 
maximisers.  
Once this is demonstrated, I will move on to exploring what those presuppositions 
indicate with respect to public services and goods. As briefly mentioned above, it will 
be illustrated that two rival expectations from the public services and goods follow 
from the two presuppositions. The first chapter ends with noting that expectations do 
not remain as mere expectations but turn into power relationships. This bring us to the 
next stage of the study whereby I develop an exposition of the kind of power 
15 
 
relationships introduced to the public sector through NPM and how these relationships 
lead practices and institutions into conflict.  
The second chapter begins with a detailed exposition of Foucault’s theory of power. 
First, his notions of governmentality and disciplinary power are explained. I will then 
move on to reconsider NPM policies and enactments through these concepts of 
Foucault. This kind of analysis will reveal the ways in which NPM is related to 
neoliberalism and to power beyond that of economic structures and policies. Such an 
analysis will not only reveal this, but also help extend our understanding of the 
conflict between practices and institutions and hence the crisis of the public sector.  
In the following stage of the second chapter, I also elaborate on the ways in which the 
argument of the study – as it has been developed so far – adds to mainstream accounts 
of NPM. To do this, I point out the main aspect of the mainstream literature that I find 
to be problematic. It will be argued that the mainstream accounts fail to understand 
what is new about NPM. It will be illustrated in the second chapter that whereas 
proponents consider NPM as liberation from bureaucracy, critiques consider it as an 
unsuccessful attack on bureaucracy. It is argued in the second chapter that this is a 
mistaken view. With reference to Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power, I 
demonstrate that NPM is an intensification of bureaucracy rather than an attack on or 
liberation from it. It is in fact through intensifying bureaucracy that NPM introduced 
the neoliberal governmentality to the public sector, which has then led practices and 
institution into conflict.   
In the final stage of the second chapter, I elaborate on the difficulties of the 
Foucauldian account with regard to the purposes of the study. I end the second chapter 
by arguing that Foucault’s philosophy falls short of explaining resistance to power. 
Although his philosophy is helpful in understanding power and NPM beyond that of 
political and economic structures, he is not that helpful particularly in explaining 
resistance of practices towards that of institutions. I argue at the last stage of the 
second chapter that this failure is due to Foucault’s lack of a theory of practice and 
goods. As I demonstrate, Foucault does not consider the role of different goods and 
practices within our social affairs to be important in any way. For this reason, if we 
analyse the public sector through the work of Foucault alone, we will not be able to 
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fully understand the motivation(s) behind resistance. This difficulty in Foucault’s 
philosophy brings me to the third chapter of the thesis.  
In the third chapter, in order to overcome the insufficiencies of the Foucauldian 
account in general, I turn to MacIntyre's account of ‘flourishing practices’. Such an 
account will not only help overcome the failures of the Foucauldian approach to NPM 
but also to conclude the account of the conflict between practices and institutions. The 
notion of ‘flourishing practices’ allows me to develop a normative account of practices 
and their relations to institutions. Such a normative account, I go on to argue, helps 
explain the resistance of practices towards disciplinary power and neoliberal 
governmentality in a way that neither Foucauldian nor the mainstream accounts of 
NPM can do. Once this is done, I will conclude the chapter with an account of the kind 
of politics that is considered to be necessary for the flourishing of practices by 
MacIntyre and some of his commentators. I begin elaborating on this with what I 
claim to be a different governmentality of the public sector than that of the 
neoliberalism: New Liberalism.  
New Liberalism is formally defined as a political ideology that had emerged in the UK 
by the end of 19th century. New Liberalism initiated the modern welfare state whereby 
free and quality education, healthcare and social security believed to be the chief 
responsibility of the state. I argue New Liberalism to be also a form of 
governmentality just like neoliberalism. That is, it aims to enforce a certain form of 
subjectivity and rationality that renders individual conduct into governable conduct. 
This governmentality has been dominant in the pre-NPM era of the public sector and 
had been related to the institutions and practices of the public sector quite differently 
than that of neoliberal governmentality. I demonstrate in the third chapter that New 
Liberalism presupposes that human beings conform to objective moral standards that 
are shared by other members of the society. This governmentality and its 
presupposition regarding human beings had been more in concord with the 
presupposition of practices. Such a condition entails that the expectations of 
institutions and practices from public goods and services has been to some extent more 
similar, so that they did not conflict.  
For the same reason, practices, in the old public management, had more autonomy in 
terms of defining quality, performance and the ways in which public goods and 
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services were going to be produced. This condition is changed through the neoliberal 
governmentality and disciplinary power of NPM and the result is resistance from 
practices. In the third chapter two dimensions of the crisis of the public sector 
becomes clear: One is the change from New Liberal to neoliberal governmentality and 
introduction of disciplinary power to the public sector, and the other is the resistance 
from practices towards such governmentality and power.  
The source of this resistance is the presupposition of practices and the expectations 
from public goods and services that follow from such presupposition. However, to 
understand such resistance one has to turn back to MacIntyre. Unlike Foucault, his 
notions of practices, institutions and goods explain why practices tend to resist 
institutional power that works on the bases of different presuppositions and 
expectations regarding individuals and public services. At this stage of the study it 
becomes clear that the conflict between practices and institutions emerges out of 
practices resisting producing on the bases of a different apprehension of what is good, 
and resisting being subjected to the power relationships that enforce such 
apprehensions.  
The chapter ends with noting that this conflict needs to be considered as a crisis 
because practices cannot become successful in their resistance, nor can institutions 
fully control practices, on the bases of their own presuppositions. This argument is 
again developed with reference to MacIntyre. In particular, at this last stage of the 
third chapter, I provide an exposition of MacIntyre’s understanding of politics. On the 
basis of this understanding I claim that practices cannot be successful in their 
resistance because the kind of politics (or governmentality) that is necessary for this is 
not available in today’s nation state politics. Likewise, the kind of politics that is 
available cannot fully control the practices on the basis of preference maximisation as 
they cannot possibly erode practices and their standards of excellence and internal 
goods. Thus, the third chapter ends with claiming that unless there is a new type of 
politics, practices and institutions are bound to conflict and hence the public sector is 
bound to remain in crisis too.  
In the last chapter, apart from various other empirical studies, I will mainly refer to the 
two most authoritative ethnographic studies of the BBC, namely, The BBC: Public 
Institution and Private World (Burns 1977) and Uncertain Vision: Birt, Dyke and the 
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Reinvention of the BBC (Born 2004), in order to illustrate the main argument of this 
study with a particular case. I show in the last chapter that ethnographic studies of the 
BBC support my argument once they are rethought with reference to the theoretical 
framework I develop in this study. However, I should note from the outset that since 
the study itself is not an empirical study, this chapter only provides a more focussed 
approach to the main theoretical argument of the study by referring to empirical work. 
Nevertheless, the chapter is not a simple restatement of empirical data, but a 
reinterpretation from the theoretical approach developed in the first three chapters. 
With reference to the early history of the BBC, I argue that whereas TV and radio 
programme making is a practice, the BBC is an institution in the way that MacIntyre 
understands practices and institutions. Following the arguments set out by Beadle 
(2008; 2013) about the ways in which cooperative activities can be ascribed the status 
of practice, I first show that programme making has goods internal to it. Second, I 
demonstrate that such goods constitute an important part of the life of programme 
makers. Once programme making is defined as a practice and the BBC as an 
institution, I will move on to develop the argument that programme making 
presupposes that human beings aim at wellbeing the achievement of which requires 
cultivation of habits and intellectual abilities. This presupposition is followed by the 
expectation that programme making should contribute to the wellbeing of both the 
practitioners and the viewers. In other words, programme making presupposes that 
viewers aim at wellbeing and programme making can help viewers achieve this aim.  
The BBC, as it will be clear from the final chapter, shared this presupposition and 
expectation with that of the practice up to a certain point. It is shared the 
presupposition through what has been considered as the Reithian ethos. John Reith, as 
the founder of the organization and its first Director General, thought like New 
Liberals and considered the aim of the BBC to be that of informing, educating and 
entertaining the public. He thought that individuals aim at a moral good and 
achievement of this good is only possible through development on one’s moral 
character (Seaton 1997: 151-2). Further, he shared with New Liberals the view that 
this good cannot be distinguished from the good of society. That is, Reith (together 
with early programme makers) thought that a good society is only possible through 
establishing public institutions that aim to help individuals cultivate their moral 
character, and hence achieve their good. This is why they developed the mission of the 
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BBC as the responsibility for informing, educating and entertaining the public. 
Although this mission has survived up until today, the BBC as an institution no longer 
consider the mission as the ethos of the relationship between the practice and the 
viewers of programmes.  
I show in the final chapter that as a result of the neoliberal governmentality and the 
NPM, BBC began to understand viewers in terms of preference maximisers. That is, 
the institution began to make a different presupposition about practitioners and 
viewers. In so doing it also began to implement intensive Auditing, Quality 
Management and Performance Indicators methods over the practice. These 
management methods were not neutral acts of management but instead, a form of 
disciplinary power through which an understanding of viewers and practitioners as 
homo economicus is enforced over the practices. This enforcement reflected largely 
through the quantification of quality and performance in terms of ratings and audience 
expectation. As I will be clear from this final chapter, ratings and audience expectation 
became the main justification for the management of the organization to interfere with 
the content of the programmes that was almost impossible before NPM penetrated to 
the BBC.   Since the enforcement of homo economicus as an ideal understanding of 
viewers is rival to the presupposition of the practice and their following expectation 
from the programmes, the result has been a conflict between practices and institutions. 
The result was a conflict because practice began also to resist this enforcement. 
I conclude the chapter with noting that the conflict turns into a crisis in the BBC, 
because neither can the institution achieve its aim of controlling programme making 
nor can the practice succeed in flourishing within the institution. However, this does 
not mean that excellent programmes cannot be made within the BBC.  Excellent 
programmes are produced, but only as a result of resistance towards the institutional 
power of NPM. Unless this context changes the BBC will remain in a state of crisis, 






Chapter I: Goods, Practices and Institutions: two 
rival presuppositions and ethoi 
 
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and 
choice, is thought to aim at some good 
Aristotle NE, 1094a 
 
 
As stated in the Introduction, the main argument of this thesis is that there is a crisis in 
the public sector that emerges out of a conflict between practices and institutions. I 
have pointed out in the Introduction that those institutions which adopt the new 
management methods of NPM instigate this conflict. First, then, I need to elaborate on 
what I mean by practices and institutions. As I take these concepts from MacIntyre’s 
philosophy, let me begin with him.   
MacIntyre is a self-proclaimed Aristotelian. For this reason, in order to understand his 
philosophy and how this philosophy can help us to evaluate the management regime of 
the public sector, it is reasonable to begin from Aristotle and particularly from 
Aristotle’s ethics. Aristotle understands human action in a teleological way. That is, 
human action, practices and institutions need to be understood with reference to their 
telos according to Aristotle. The word telos means end or purpose. Ends and purposes 
of activities, practices and institutions, it follows, should have a crucial place within 
our explanations or accounts of social affairs. A craft like shoemaking, for instance, 
consists of various components. In order to fully understand such craft, one has to 
know its telos. To use the same example again, whether the end of such a craft is to 
make good shoes or to make money entails an important difference with regard to the 
nature of the shoemaking. The same applies to all other human activities for Aristotle.  
Let me also note that Aristotle claims, in his Nicomachean Ethics, that: “Every art and 
every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good” 
(NE 1094a). It follows that practices and institutions (insofar as they consist of human 
action) aim to some good. It also follows from this that human actions, practices and 
institutions need to be understood with reference to goods on an Aristotelian account.  
21 
 
It should also be noted that ends or goods, for Aristotle, are not homogeneous. For 
him, there are varieties of ends we can pursue in our social affairs. Nevertheless, these 
ends can be categorized into two main categories and in understanding our social 
affairs one has to take these two categories of goods into account. Goods can be either 
instrumental or can be pursued for the sake of themselves (NE 1096b3). According to 
Aristotle, among those goods one stands as the ultimate good. Eudemonia is the good 
human beings pursue for the sake of itself. It is important to note from the outset that 
this argument of Aristotle will have an important place in the argument of this study. 
Eudaimonia will be considered as the most important aspect of the presupposition 
underlying practices. Although I will explain this in the following sections of the 
chapter in more details, I need to note now that regardless of what one understands 
from eudaimonia, it can be thought as the telos of all our activities. Human action and 
practices, that is to say, can be understood as ultimately aiming at a good that is 
pursued for the sake of itself rather than for the sake of some other goods. But what is 
eudemonia? 
Although eudemonia has been translated into English as ‘happiness’, such translation 
is not satisfactory. This is mainly because whereas happiness implies a psychological 
state in our modern societies, for Aristotle, eudemonia is rather a permanent state of 
character achievement of which requires cultivation of habits and intellectual abilities 
(NE 1179b2-31). On the Aristotelian account, one can only achieve eudemonia 
through exercising virtues in the practical life. Eudemonia, therefore, is the life lived 
in accordance with virtues and for this reason it is a permanent state of character rather 
than a temporary psychological state. Wellbeing would be a better English word for 
eudemonia.3 Wellbeing is the good for human beings because all other goods we 
pursue in our activities are related to wellbeing in an instrumental way. That is, we 
pursue goods like money, success, health and friendship for the sake of wellbeing, but 
do not pursue wellbeing for the sake of health, money and so on. This is why 
wellbeing the ultimate end.  
It is important to note that Aristotle is not making only a descriptive claim here. That 
is, he is not describing how people always act. Instead, he is describing how certain 
                                                 
3 Eudemonia is also translated as flourishing. This is also an appropriate translation but I will use 
wellbeing instead. This is because the concept of flourishing will also be used with reference to 
practices and might cause some confusion if it is also used for Eudemonia.  
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people act, as well as how certain others should act. So, as a moral philosopher, he is 
also developing a normative account of human action and goods. From this point of 
view, eudemonia is a type of good that can or cannot be attained by an individual. Its 
achievement requires the achievement of many other goods too. Such goods vary from 
material goods such as health and money to moral goods such as a good character. If 
one fails to achieve those goods, he will also fail to achieve eudemonia. It is for this 
reason that Aristotle suggests and outlines a certain type of an education through 
which human beings can be habituated towards eudemonia (NE 1103a). Achieving 
wellbeing depends heavily on cultivation of desires, passions, intellectual abilities and 
preferences of individuals. Central to such cultivation, for Aristotle, is learning to 
order goods in one’s practical life. An individual who cannot order goods in a certain 
way will fail to achieve wellbeing. In order not to experience such failure one has to 
be habituated into the life of virtues. That is, the virtues are just those character traits 
that help us to achieve eudemonia.   
MacIntyre’s philosophy developed in accordance with these elements of Aristotelian 
philosophy that I have very briefly outlined above (MacIntyre 2007: 148; 1988: 103-
24). That is, MacIntyre considers teleology to be an important tool to understand 
human actions, practices and institutions (MacIntyre 1999)4. Goods, therefore, play a 
special role in MacIntyre’s theory. It is in fact, this dimension of MacIntyre’s 
philosophy that helps us to go beyond the mainstream accounts of NPM – as does the 
Foucauldian account I will develop in the following chapter.  
Following Aristotle, MacIntyre too, suggests goods should be classified into two main 
categories: goods which are instrumental to the achievement of other goods, and goods 
which are pursued for the sake of themselves (NE 1096b3; MacIntyre 1999: 66). But 
MacIntyre’s classification, unlike Aristotle’s, relies largely on his notion of a 
“practice” (Knight 2008). He develops this notion in his cardinal work After Virtue.5 
Let us see how he defines it. By a practice he means:  
 
                                                 
4 As we will show in the following section, virtues, practices and institutions are also important to 
understand organizations, but since we will deal with each of them one by one, we are only mentioning 
goods here.   
5 This notion of a practice and his differentiation of goods within the practices have influenced many 




any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in 
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the 
result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of 
the goods and ends involved are systematically extended (MacIntyre 2007: 
187).  
 
This relatively long description becomes clearer in the light of various examples. 
Farming, architecture, philosophy, scientific inquiry, games, crafts, arts and medicine 
are all examples of practices. For instance, drawing a picture could be an activity 
related to the practice of painting, but it cannot be the practice itself. That is, paining is 
a practice though drawing a picture might be participating in a practice. This is mainly 
because practices develop historically and collectively. They develop through 
accumulation of knowledge and experience that is transferred from one generation of 
practitioners to another through education and cultivation of one’s moral character and 
skills (MacIntyre 1998b: 121). Thus, practices require one to be part of them through 
education and experience. This is why drawing a picture in an art class is an activity 
related to the practice of art, but it is not the practice of painting itself.  
To have a better understanding of MacIntyre’s notion of a practice, one has to know 
how he relates practices to goods. MacIntyre contends that practices should be 
understood with reference to goods. There are two types of goods relevant to all 
activities involved in practices. He names one class of goods as goods internal to 
practices and the other as goods external to practices (2007: 188-190). Certain goods 
are named as ‘internal’ because they are goods achievable only through participating 
in the relevant practices and through aiming to achieve the standards of excellence 
peculiar to the activities of that practice (MacIntyre 2007: 188-9). For example making 
an excellent TV programme is a good that can only be achieved through the practice 
of programme making, but the money made from releasing the programme is an 
external good because it can be achieved in a number of alternative ways. To give 
another example, curing and diagnosing illness and injury in a systematic way is a 
good internal to medicine. One cannot achieve such good without being an educated 
and experienced doctor or a nurse in the practice of medicine.  
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We can now understand why MacIntyre names certain types of goods as external too. 
Goods external to a practice are goods such as money, status, power and prestige 
(MacIntyre 2007: 188). Goods external to practices are not specific to a practice in the 
way that internal goods are. For instance, making the land fruitful, in a sustainable 
way, is a good internal and specific to farming. Land can be made fruitful in a 
sustainable through the practice of farming. It requires knowledge, experience and 
virtues of a specific type for farmers to make land fruitful in a sustainable way. 
Money, power and status, on the other hand, can be achieved in variety of ways than 
farming. One does not have to be a farmer to earn money, power and status, but one 
has to be a farmer in order to make land fruitful in a sustainable way. As MacIntyre 
puts it “there are always alternative ways of achieving such [external] goods, and their 
achievement is never to be had only by engaging in some particular kind of practice” 
(2007: 188).  
Another feature of external goods should also be noted here. Goods external to a 
practice are always some individual’s property and possession, and for this reason, 
they are objects of a specific type of competition (MacIntyre 2007: 190). Such 
competition is based on winning and scarcity rather than excelling in the activities of 
the practice. Since external goods are always possessions of some individual, the more 
external goods an individual wins through competition, the less there are left for other 
individuals. Internal goods, on the other hand, are quite different. Their achievement is 
not subjected to scarcity. On the contrary, their achievement enables the possibility of 
others achieving them too. As MacIntyre notes “internal goods are indeed the outcome 
of competition to excel, but it is characteristic of them that their achievement is a good 
for the whole community who participate in the practice” (MacIntyre 2007: 190-1). To 
be sure, this does not mean that every practitioner can become equally good in terms 
of excellence. There will always be differences, but there is no scarcity of excellence; 
it is a possibility – however idealistic it is – that all the practitioners of a practice 
becomes excellent in their activities. Despite the degree of variations in the 
achievement of the standards of excellence, they do not run out. The same cannot be 
said of the goods external to practices.  
For instance, when Picasso developed Cubism, he achieved certain goods internal to 
the practice of painting through making certain changes to the standards of excellence. 
Once Picasso achieved such goods, they became available to other practitioners too. 
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That is, practitioners after Picasso can also be influenced by Cubism and aim to do 
Cubist paintings. Indeed, they can even do those paintings better than Picasso himself, 
and develop Cubism to a further stage. Picasso, however, did not only strive for the 
standards of excellences and goods internal to art, but he also gained prestige, status 
and money. That is, he also achieved goods external to the practice. In so doing, he 
reduced the chances of other painters’ getting the same amount of money, status and 
prestige. But this is not the case with respect to the goods internal to painting.  
It is also important to note that goods internal to practices are contextual and 
historical. Internal goods develop over time and through accumulation of knowledge 
and experience and transfer of such knowledge and experience from one generation of 
practitioners to others (for a detailed account of this see Beadle 2013; Beadle and 
Könyöt 2006). For this reason achievement of goods internal to practices requires 
practitioners to be educated and experienced into this accumulated knowledge and 
experience of the practice. Practices, therefore, have an educative dimension.  
Within such education practitioners not only learn contextual and particular skills and 
knowledge related to their practices, but also virtues such as justice, generosity, and 
prudence. Without virtues, one cannot achieve goods internal to practices according to 
MacIntyre. To be able to express virtues practitioners has to go through a process of 
transformation of their preferences, desires and passions. Goods internal to practices 
provide grounds for such transformation as they are goods that can be strived for and 
understood apart from the satisfaction of subjective wants, preferences, desires, and 
pleasures (MacIntyre 2006a: 48; MacIntyre 1998b: 121). Without such goods, being 
virtuous is not possible. This is to say that, just like Aristotle, MacIntyre thinks that 
virtuous actions are based on objective reasons rather than subjective preferences. 
Goods internal to practices are ground for these types of reasons for action.  
From this point of view, “practices are the shared activities within which individuals 
may find goods apart from and greater than those valued by their untutored desires and 
passions” (Knight 2007: 152). Striving to achieve standards of excellence provides 
practitioners with grounds that they can rely on in reasoning and transforming their 
preferences. By going through such kind of transformation, practitioners develop 
virtues that would enable them to achieve those goods internal to practices. As 
MacIntyre puts it, “a virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise 
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of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices” 
(MacIntyre 2007: 191).  
Another important element of MacIntyre’s understandings of practices is, of course, 
practitioners. Within practices there are always practitioners who cooperatively work 
(or fail to work) towards the standards of excellence and the development of those 
standards. Practitioners need first to be part of the cooperative environment of the 
practice and second, they need to be educated and become experienced so that they 
come to possess the necessary knowledge, experience and virtues related to the 
practice. Unless this condition is met, one cannot be considered as a good practitioner.  
Let us reconsider what has been stated above through a specific example. Medicine, 
for instance, is a practice, which has goods internal and external to it. Doctors and 
nurses can be considered as practitioners of the practice of medicine. They become 
practitioners by becoming part of the practice of medicine, which requires a certain 
type of education and experience. Through experience and education they learn the 
standards of excellence and the skills and knowledge necessary to strive for and 
develop those standards. Practitioners achieve goods internal to the practice of 
medicine – or fail to do so – through striving towards the standards of excellence. 
Diagnosing and treatment of diseases in an excellent way, for instance, is one of the 
main goods internal to the practice of medicine. It is only through becoming a doctor 
or a nurse that one can achieve this good internal to medicine. That is, it is only though 
becoming a doctor or a nurse that one can cure and diagnose diseases in an excellent 
way.   
MacIntyre makes it clear that his understanding of goods does not entail that external 
goods are irrelevant or unimportant to practices. External goods are essential for 
practices because without external goods practices cannot survive (MacIntyre 2007: 
194). Goods such as money, status and power, that is to say, are necessary for 
practices to be sustained in long periods of time.  
 
1.2. Practices and institutions 
In light of the understanding of goods external to practices, the institutional setting of 
practices and the differences between practices and institutions become clear. 
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According to MacIntyre, it is institutions which are necessarily concerned with 
external goods, not practices.  
 
[Institutions] are involved in acquiring money and other material goods; 
they are structures in terms of power and status as rewards. Nor could they 
do otherwise if they are to sustain not only themselves, but also the 
practices of which they are the bearers. For no practices can survive for any 
length of time unsustained by institutions. Indeed so intimate is the 
relationship of practices to institutions … that institutions and practices 
characteristically form a single causal order in which ideals and the 
creativity of the practices are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of 
the institutions, in which the cooperative care for the common goods of the 
practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution 
(MacIntyre 2007: 194).  
 
As institutions are concerned with external goods, and as external goods are necessary 
for the survival of practices, MacIntyre’s contention is that without institutional 
governance practices can hardly survive. Such a contention has implications with 
respect to effectiveness and efficiency. On MacIntyre’s account, effectiveness and 
efficiency are institutional attributes. This is because effectiveness consists of 
qualities, which would enable the acquisition and distribution of external goods in an 
effective and efficient way (MacIntyre 1988: 32; see also Knight 2008a: 115; Knight 
2009). Effectiveness and efficiency of institutions are, therefore, important for the 
survival of practices.  
Although I will elaborate on this issue in detail in the third chapter let me note now 
that, just like Aristotle, MacIntyre is also developing a normative account here – but 
unlike Aristotle he is also developing a normative account of practices. MacIntyre is 
not only describing what is actually occurring in certain cases of social life, but also 
something that is a potential that should be actualized (Knight 2008: 40). Whether 
practitioners will achieve the goods internal to practices or not depends on the ways in 
which practitioners order the goods in their practices and how practices are related to 
the institutions. This is to say that practices do not only survive, but also flourish or 
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fail to do so, on MacIntyre’s account. There is an important difference between 
survival and flourishing.  
Flourishing of practices means the achievement of goods internal to practices.6 Failure 
with respect to flourishing does not imply that the practice in question cannot survive. 
Architecture, sciences, medicine, games and various practices can be found within the 
history of almost every civilization. However their mere existence does not mean that 
they are flourishing. Survival of practices requires effective and efficient institutional 
settings, whereas flourishing of practices requires more than effectiveness and 
efficiency of institutions. Having said that flourishing means achievement of goods 
internal to practices which requires education, experience and, above all, possession 
and exercise of virtue, it follows that flourishing practices requires virtues, knowledge 
and experience relevant to the practices. Practitioners, MacIntyre argues, cannot 
realize internal goods without such virtues as justice, courage and honesty (MacIntyre 
1998a: 226). Thus, for practices to flourish practitioners need be cultivated in a way 
that they express virtues in their practices.  
To be sure much more could be written on MacIntyre’s philosophy, but what has been 
stated so far is enough to clarify what I will mean by institutions and practices in the 
remaining parts of this study – I will refer to further aspects of MacIntyre’s philosophy 
later on in the thesis.  
Now, I can come back to the issue of the crisis of the public sector. As stated in the 
introduction, the crisis results from NPM and the conflict it generates between 
practices and institutions. I have also stated in the introduction that this crisis becomes 
apparent, when practices and institutions are analysed with reference to their 
presuppositions. Practices and institutions, that is to say, are not only structures of 
management and production (of services and goods), but they are also presuppositions 
that have important implications regarding the ethos of what is produced within the 
public sector. Thus, in this chapter, I also need elaborate on what I mean by 
presuppositions and how they are related to the practices and institutions of the public 
sector in order to develop my argument. I do this by considering the views of another 
philosopher, other than MacIntyre and Foucault: R. G. Collingwood. I begin from 
                                                 
6 This notion of flourishing practices (and the normative dimension of MacIntyre’s account of practices) 
is important for the argument of the thesis. However, I will only mention it here and develop a more 
detailed explanation in the third chapter, when it will become necessary for developing the argument of 
the thesis.  
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Collingwood because, as will be clear from the below, his philosophy and particularly 




Collingwood, of course, wrote in a completely different context and with vastly 
different intentions than this study. Nevertheless, his An Essay on Metaphysics and his 
philosophy of history can shed some light on how I am going to use the concept of 
presupposition in this study. Collingwood had a very different idea of metaphysics 
than many of his contemporaries and I argue this understanding to be quite useful in 
understanding what I mean by presuppositions. Unlike many, he thought that 
metaphysics does not and should not try to justify certain statements or claims related 
to issues like the existence of God, knowledge, nature of moral values and so on. 
Rather, metaphysics should aim to investigate “presuppositions”, made within a field 
of study, or by a certain group of people at a certain time in the history. He thought 
that metaphysics “is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions7 have been 
made by this or that person or group of persons, in the course of this or that piece of 
thinking” (Collingwood 1940: 47). Understood in this way, metaphysics is a method 
of inquiry instead of an ontology. That is, contrary to the common view, metaphysics 
does not and should not try to understand the nature of being. It should not ask 
questions such “as how do we know that things exist?”, “does God exist or what is it 
for something to be an actual entity?”. Metaphysics, instead, should be an inquiry into 
the main presuppositions of a certain discipline, literature or a group of people.  
This understanding of metaphysics would help us to approach the post-1970s 
transformation of the public sector not only in a different way than the mainstream 
literature does, but also in a more productive and novel way. A metaphysics of the 
public sector, would try to understand the absolute presuppositions and how they are 
related to the historical context. First of all, according to Collingwood, every statement 
is somehow connected to a presupposition. This is to say that, whenever we say or 
write something we are at the same time presupposing. This claim relies on another 
argument Collingwood makes in his influential work, An Essay on Metaphysics. His 
                                                 
7 I will explain what absolute presupposition means in the following paragraphs.  
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contention is that every sound statement is an answer to a question.  When I say that 
“this is a computer” I am, at the same time, answering the question of “what is this?” 
Likewise, when I say “I like walking”, I am also answering the question of “do you 
like walking?”.  
To be sure, he does not mean that we are answering these questions in a conscious 
way whenever we make a statement. What he is suggesting is that whenever we make 
a statement, that statement can be formulated as an answer to a question or a number 
of questions. Although at first this might not appear to entail anything with regard to 
presuppositions, when we consider this in relation with another claim of Collingwood, 
its relevance becomes more apparent: “every question involves a presupposition”. For 
instance, when we ask questions such as ‘what is the meaning of public sector?’, ‘what 
is the nature of human psychology?’ and so on, we are presupposing that public sector 
has a meaning and human psychology has a nature. Likewise, when I ask to someone 
‘do you like walking?’ or ‘what are you reading nowadays?’ I am presupposing that 
the addressee knows what it means to walk or read. Hence, it is a central claim of 
Collingwood that without presuppositions questions do not arise.  
However, on Collingwood’s account, not all presuppositions are of the same nature. 
He makes a distinction between relative and absolute presuppositions (Collingwood 
1940). It is important to elaborate on this distinction to understand what Collingwood 
means by metaphysics and how his understanding can help illustrate what I mean by 
presuppositions. It is also crucial for our inquiry to explain the differences he points 
out about absolute and relative presuppositions. Relative presuppositions are those that 
are answers to further questions. For instance, when I ask someone whether he wants 
to have a beer, I am presupposing that he is at least occasionally drinking beer. This 
presupposition in turn, like other presuppositions, can be formulated as an answer to a 
question. That is, when I ask such questions, I am at the same giving a positive answer 
to the question, “do you drink beer at all?”. Likewise, when I say that “there is a 
computer on the table”, I am presupposing that the addressee of this statement knows 
what a computer is and what it looks like. So, when I state to someone that “there is a 
computer on the table”, I am at the same time answering the question “do you know 
what a computer is and how it looks like?”.  
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Furthermore, relative presuppositions might turn out to be right or wrong. To follow 
the example above, the person might not like to drink beer for a number of reasons. He 
might be a religious Muslim or have some health problems and I might not be aware 
of these before asking the question. The addressee might reply by saying that he does 
not drink beer at all due to religious reasons and hence my presupposition would be 
refuted. Accordingly, the addressee of the second statement, I have mentioned above, 
might not have an idea about computers. This would again refute my presupposition 
that addressee knows what a computer is. Likewise, if the addresses drinks beers at 
least occasionally or knows what a computer is my presuppositions would be verified.  
To give another example, I can ask someone whether he has a smartphone or not and 
in so asking I am presupposing that the addressee knows what a smartphone is. If the 
addressee provides a positive or a negative answer to such a question, then my 
presupposition is verified – unless the addressee does not just make up random 
answers to the question. That is, any positive or negative answer would verify that the 
addressee know what a smartphone is. The fact that such presuppositions are answers 
to further questions and they can be refuted or verified indicates that they are relative 
presuppositions.  
There are, however, other types of presuppositions for Collingwood; namely, absolute 
presuppositions. These presuppositions cannot be verified or refuted; nor are they 
answers to further questions. They are just presuppositions. On this account, absolute 
presuppositions are the precondition, upon which a certain type of science, discipline 
or even a mode of thought can develop (Collingwood 1940: 44-5). Without absolute 
presuppositions, that is to say, a tradition in science such as that of Newtonian physics 
is not possible. For Collingwood, if we are to do science or research, or even careful 
thinking, we need to begin from certain absolute presuppositions. Collingwood’s has a 
simple example here: 
 
If you were talking to a pathologist about a certain disease and asked him 
'What is the cause of the event E which you say sometimes happens in this 
disease?' he will reply 'The cause of E is C'; and if he were in 
communicative mood he might go on to say 'That was established by So-
and-so, in a piece of research that is now graded as classical.' You might go 
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on to ask: 'I suppose before So-and-so found out what the cause of E was, 
he was quite sure it had a cause?' The answer would be 'Quite sure, of 
course'. If you now say 'Why?' he will probably answer 'Because 
everything that happens has a cause'. If you are importunate enough to ask 
'But how do you know that everything that happens has a cause?' he will 
probably blow up right in your face, because you put your finger on one of 
his absolute presuppositions... But if he keeps his temper and gives you a 
civil and candid answer, it will be the following effect. ‘That is a thing we 
take for granted in my job. We don't question it. We don't try to verify it’ 
(Collingwood 1940:31).  
 
Thus, for the pathologist in the example, presupposing that ‘everything that happens 
has a cause’ is the basis of his initial statement about the disease. This implies that for 
any pathologist to do his science it has to presuppose in an absolute way. Absolute 
presuppositions, however, often takes an unconscious form. That is, although we need 
to begin from absolute presuppositions in our thinking, we are often not aware of such 
presuppositions. It is often through questioning, like it is in the example I have given 
above, that absolute presuppositions become apparent. This is why Collingwood 
thinks that investigating and identifying absolute presuppositions is a distinctive task 
of its own. He assigns this task of investigating absolute presuppositions to philosophy 
or metaphysics. It is the business of the philosopher to find out what absolute 
presuppositions are employed within a piece of thinking.   
This, however, is not to say that metaphysics is a deductive science detached from 
history and sociology (Collingwood 1940: 192-200; see also D’Oro 2002: 108-9). It is 
important to note that on Collingwood’s account, metaphysics has to identify 
‘constellations’ of absolute presuppositions and the ‘strains’ that exist between and 
within them (Collingwood 1940: 72-77). That is, for Collingwood, one absolute 
presupposition does not exist in isolation from other presuppositions. Absolute 
presuppositions are pragmatic presuppositions that are employed within social life 
together with other presuppositions that might or might not fall into conflict with each 
other. This is to say that presuppositions are used in everyday practices by human 
agents. Presuppositions thus have an important role to play in our social and historical 
settings and for this reason they are social and historical.  
33 
 
To understand why Collıngwood argues for this, we need to briefly explore his 
understanding of history too. For Collingwood, “history is the history of thoughts”. 
This might appear to be a traditional idealist approach to history but he does not make 
this statement in a conventional way. He does not propose history to be a mere study 
of what has been done and thought in the past. What he means is that when historians 
study a certain period in the history, they do not study random or natural events. They 
study events or occurrences which results from rational actions and decisions. That is, 
historical change, for Collingwood, is the expression of intelligent behaviour or action 
(D’Oro 2002: 106). Indeed, the main difference between social and natural sciences, 
for Collingwood, relies on this idea of history. Natural events are not the results of 
actions based on human decisions, whereas historical events are. This is why historical 
events are studied, explained and understood through appealing to decisions, 
motivations and deeds. When Collingwood says that history is the history of thoughts, 
he means that when a certain deed taking place in a given period of history is analysed 
by historians, this analysis is at the same time a latent analysis of thought, because 
without thoughts there are no deeds. Therefore, in so far as history is about human 
action rather than natural processes, it is also about human thought, decisions, reasons 
and motivations.  
Now, having said that every thought or statement is somehow related to a 
presupposition, and that history is the history of thought, it follows that 
presuppositions are strictly related to history. Thus, as constellations of absolute 
presuppositions change, historical processes also change and vice versa. Likewise, 
strains between constellations of presuppositions amounts to strains in history and 
society. This brings us to the point that metaphysics, contrary to the common view, is 
a historical study. That is, metaphysics, in studying absolute presuppositions, also 
studies the shifts and changes with respect to historical and social context. Historical 
change, then, can be understood with reference to absolute presuppositions. To put this 
in a somewhat different way, what makes a certain period of science or a set thoughts 
or phase in history different from another is the differences, changes and strains that 
occur with respect to constellations of absolute presuppositions. This is why 
Collingwood says that “different sets of absolute presuppositions correspond not only 
with differences in the structure of what is generally called scientific thought but with 
differences in the entire fabric of civilization” (1940: 72). That is, differences or 
34 
 
changes with respect to absolute presuppositions reflect social, historical and political 
changes.  
It is essential to note again that Collingwood did not consider metaphysics as an 
analysis of whether presuppositions are true or false. This is a statement he partly 
shares with positivists of his time and specifically with that of Ayer’s verification 
principle (Connelly 2003: 97). However, although he shares this with Ayer, he 
strongly disagrees with the inference positivists make about metaphysics. That is, 
Collingwood disagrees that metaphysics is a meaningless endeavour.  
According to Ayer, there are two types of types of propositions. Firstly, there are 
propositions that are analytically true. Secondly, there are empirically verifiable 
propositions, such as those of propositions in Newtonian physics (Ayer 1936). 
Propositions that fall outside the scope of these two categories are meaningless for 
Ayer and positivist thought in general. More to the point, metaphysics consists of 
propositions that are not verifiable and for this reason it turns out to be meaningless on 
this account. Collingwood seems to agree with Ayer that metaphysics is not verifiable, 
as absolute presuppositions are neither true nor false. However, he disagrees with Ayer 
that this implies the meaninglessness of metaphysics. For Collingwood, metaphysics is 
meaningful even if it is not verifiable and not analytical. This is because metaphysics 
is not about propositions and Ayer (and positivism in general) fails to grasp this.  
On Collingwood’s account positivists fail to understand that there is an important 
difference between propositions and absolute presuppositions (see also Connelly 2003: 
97-105). Whereas propositions are answers to questions either in a conscious or 
unconscious way, absolute presuppositions are not answers to questions. Within 
science for instance, scientists ask questions and answer them through propositions 
that are empirically verifiable. If they fail to do this, they, at the same time, fail to 
propose scientifically meaningful propositions. Collingwood shares this with Ayer. 
But he thinks that in order to be able to propose such meaningful propositions, 
scientists need to presuppose in an absolute way. That is, they need constellations of 
absolute presuppositions that are not answers to any further questions and that can 
neither be refuted nor verified empirically.  
Ayer in particular and positivists in general ignore this dimension of scientific thought, 
and in so doing they not only fail to understand science, but also philosophy. They fail 
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to comprehend that without absolute presuppositions it is not possible to do science. 
As a result of this failure positivists also fail to understand the role of metaphysics. 
Collingwood advocates metaphysics in the sense of exploring and identifying 
constellations of absolute presuppositions. This is why metaphysics is meaningful, not 
because it is empirically verifiable or because it deductively true or false.  
1.4. Practices and their presuppositions 
To turn back to the main argument I would like to develop in this study, what I am 
going to mean by the concept of ‘presupposition’ now becomes clear. I will use the 
concept of presupposition in a very similar vein to Collingwood’s understanding of the 
concept. However, I still need to go beyond Collingwood in order to develop my 
argument. This is because although Collingwood states that presuppositions are social 
and historical, he does not investigate the ways in which presuppositions are employed 
in social affairs. He only provides us with limited examples from sciences such as 
‘everything has a cause’ being an absolute presupposition of scientific enquiry 
(Collingwood 1940: 31-3). But even those are not directly related to the social side of 
science as a practice. 
As is clear from the introduction, I aim to go beyond the mainstream literature of 
public management not only by defining practices and institution in a MacIntyrean 
way, but also by arguing that practices and institutions rely on absolute 
presuppositions. But Collingwood has no theory of practices and goods. For this 
reason, Collingwood’s notion of presupposition need to be used with MacIntyre’s 
notions of goods, practices and institutions and with Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia  
in order to understand how they are related to the crisis of the public sector.  
I argue that wellbeing can be reconsidered as an absolute presupposition in the way 
that Collingwood understood presuppositions. That is, even if we are not always aware 
of it, in our actions we presuppose wellbeing. This means that all questioning about 
human action will halt at a point when we encounter an answer in the following form: 
‘for the sake of wellbeing’. Consider an action like John buying a new car and 
someone asking John, ‘why are you buying a new car?’. Some responses from John, 
among many, could be ‘because it will make life easier for me’ or ‘because I want my 
car to be new’. Then, we can also ask ‘why do you want to make life easier for 
yourself?’ or ‘why do want your car to be new’. Then, we will come across to an 
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answer like the following: ‘because an easier life would contribute to my wellbeing’ or 
‘doing things that I like contributes to my wellbeing’. If we were also to ask ‘why 
would you like any contribution to your wellbeing?’ there is no answer to such 
question. This is because there is no aim to which wellbeing can be a means. This is to 
say that wellbeing is an absolute presupposition8. I argue that in practices too this is 
the case. That is, there is no answer to the question of why there is such a thing as the 
human good and why practices aim at this9. If we were to ask a practitioner why you 
aim at goods internal to practices instead of only at external goods, the answer would 
be because achievement of such goods contributes more to my good (wellbeing) than 
the external goods. Although (from an Aristotelian point of view) it would be a moral 
mistake, prioritizing goods external to practices over the internal ones, could be 
understood in terms of wellbeing. That is, one would prioritize external goods over the 
internal ones because he would (mistakenly) assume that such prioritization would 
contribute to his or her wellbeing. Therefore, even if not all practitioners are aware of 
this presupposition, I argue that their actions and decisions can be made intelligible 
with reference to wellbeing as an absolute presupposition.  
To develop this argument, however, I also need to go beyond MacIntyre to some 
extent and focus on a certain aspect of practices that MacIntyre has not paid sufficient 
attention: the relation between practices and their beneficiaries. That is, the 
relationship between patients and medicine, between TV programmes and viewers and 
so on, need special attention. This is not to say that MacIntyre has not drawn upon this 
issue at all. He has provided some comments on the subject matter that needs further 
elaboration. It is helpful to begin this elaboration through one commentator, namely, 
David Miller (1994). Miller argues that MacIntyre ignores the ends, to which certain 
practices strive for, beyond that of internal goods. He claims that MacIntyre needs to 
make a distinction between two types of practices: ‘self-contained’ and ‘purposive’ 
practices. Purposive practices, he argues “exist to serve social ends beyond 
themselves”, whereas ‘self-contained’ practices, serve ends internal to them (1994: 
250). Miller makes this distinction on the basis of the ways in which certain practices 
                                                 
8 Note that this is neither Atistotle’s nor MacIntyre’s argument. By using Collingwood’s concept I am 
making this additional claim to Aristotle’s notion of wellbeing. However, although it is not Aristotle’s 
own argument, it does not contradict his notion of wellbeing in any way.  
9 Note that this is not to say that practice only aim at this. Practices essentially aim at good internal to 
practices, but as I will demonstrate below in so doing they also aim at wellbeing of practitioners and 
users of the services or goods produced by practices.  
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are evaluated. ‘Self-contained’ practices, he claims, are evaluated merely by those 
standards which are internal to practices and developed historically by the 
practitioners of the same practice. Games are the prime examples according to Miller. 
Excellence of a football player is judged according to the standards of football 
developed historically and internally. ‘Purposive practices’, however, are judged on 
the basis of the ends they are supposed to serve with respect to the communities or 
societies in which they operate. Medicine, according to Miller, is one example. It is 
evaluated with reference to its external purpose, which is curing the sick (1994: 250). 
Miller criticises MacIntyre for not making such distinction between practices and 
considering all of them in terms of ‘self-contained’ practices. He claims that once 
practices are considered as such virtues, and especially the virtue of justice, lose their 
meaning. Justice, with respect to medicine, for instance, becomes meaningful only 
when it is understood with respect to the external purpose of medicine; that is, curing 
the ill.  
MacIntyre, in his partial reply to Miller, argued that the purpose of the productive 
practices such as farming and fishing is not only to catch fish and produce food, but 
also to do all these in a way that practitioners, in producing excellent products, also 
perfect themselves (1994: 284). Thus, for MacIntyre, such practices cannot be 
evaluated solely through their external ends. It is important to note, however, that 
perfecting oneself as a practitioner includes, according to MacIntyre, not only 
achieving the standards of excellence with respect to the goods produced, but also the 
standards of excellence in playing one’s role in the community of practitioners (1994: 
285). MacIntyre portrays this as being concerned or caring for other practitioners. That 
is, being a good practitioner does not only require one to achieve standards of 
excellence peculiar to the practice, but also being concerned and caring for other 
practitioners. This concern in turn extends, for MacIntyre, to those others who might 
not be practitioners themselves but part of the community in which practice is taking 
place. However, in his reply to Miller, MacIntyre is still not elaborating on the 
relationship between goods internal to practices and possible beneficiaries of such 
goods other than the practitioners. He does rightly argue that in achieving goods 
internal to practices, practitioners begin to develop a virtuous and caring character for 
others within the community, but he does not say much about the ways in which the 
achievement of goods internal to practices contribute to the beneficiaries of the 
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practices such as patients, students and viewers. Nevertheless, it could still be argued, 
with reference to his other writings, that achievement of goods internal to practices 
serves the good of those who are engaged with the practice without being a 
practitioner (e.g. MacIntyre, 1977; 1999). And for this reason, Miller’s distinction 
between different kinds of practices is not necessary.  
In order to elaborate on this, I need to draw upon the notion of internal goods once 
again. As stated above, goods internal to practices can only be achieved through 
participating in the practices. However, this does not preclude the possibility of those, 
who are not practitioners, benefiting from such achievement. For instance, when goods 
internal to medicine are achieved this is also a contribution to the wellbeing of the 
patients too. Miller, without any illustration of goods internal to medicine considers 
curing the ill as an end external to medicine. However, as stated above this is not at all 
an external good, because it can be achieved in an accurate way only through the 
practice of medicine. That is, one cannot cure an illness properly without the practice 
of medicine and without being a practitioner such as a doctor or a nurse. Internal 
goods are not internal because they only contribute to the practitioners. They are 
internal because they can only be achieved through participating in the practice.  
This equally applies to what Miller calls ‘self-contained’ practices such as games. 
Goods internal to football for instance are internal to the game because they can only 
be achieved through being a football player. Playing 90 minutes, in coordination with 
the team and with excellent tackles and passes are goods internal to football, as they 
can only be achieved through experience, skills and virtues peculiar to football 
players.  But achieving such goods does not mean that there is no contribution to the 
fans. On the contrary, when goods internal to football are achieved, fans (who are not 
practitioners themselves) enjoy and became proud of their team. Thus, when doctors, 
teachers, football players achieve goods internal to their practices, they also contribute 
to those who are engaged with the practice.  
The same applies to education too. When a maths teacher achieves a good internal to 
maths, such as finding a new way to teach a formula, this would also contribute to the 
wellbeing of students to a certain extent. This again indicates that internal goods are 
internal not because they are isolated from the wider society, but because they are 
achievable only through practices. One cannot find new ways of teaching 
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mathematical formulas, unless he or she accumulates knowledge and experience in the 
practice of mathematics first. And teaching formulas to students contributes also to the 
good of the students. This entails that unless one is a practitioner of mathematics; he 
cannot be a good teacher and contribute to the good of the students.  
However, it needs to be pointed out that, on MacIntyre’s account, practitioners 
traditionally have a certain type of authority within the practices. In the case of 
medicine, for instance, to become a patient involves inviting a doctor or a nurse to take 
responsibility of you (1977: 205). In the case of education too, students and their 
families, assume that teachers have responsibility for students’ intellectual and moral 
wellbeing. This allows teachers (just like it allows doctors) to have authority over the 
patients and student; an authority based on the accumulated knowledge and experience 
of the relevant practice. It follows that (although MacIntyre does put this in the 
following words, it can easily be argued, from his point of view) in achieving the 
goods internal to practices; practitioners establish authority and contribute to the 
wellbeing of those who are engaged with the practices.  
A similar argument (with some differences) is developed by Russell Keat (2000). Keat 
reconsiders practices in terms of ‘cultural practices’ in order to specify his argument to 
practices such as arts, broadcasting and to those practices situated within educational 
institutions10. Keat argues that when goods internal to cultural practices are achieved, 
such achievement contributes to the wellbeing of those who are not practitioners but 
related to the practices (2000: 46). The reason for this is the assumed incapacity of 
those who engage in these kinds of practices. As MacIntyre notes, it is a certain 
incapacity that relates us to practices related to education and medicine (MacIntyre, 
1977). In the case of medicine, it is incapacities related to health that directs us to a 
doctor for help. In the case of education, it is the incapacity related to knowledge, 
skills, intellectual and moral development that directs us to teachers for help. This 
assumed incapacity is also an assumed authority of the practitioners. Following what 
is stated above, it can be argued that for individuals to achieve wellbeing both the 
practitioners and those who use services of the practice need to cultivate their habit 
                                                 
10 As will be clear from the section 1.6, I am deliberately using the phrase ‘practices in the educational 
institutions’, because for MacIntyre education itself is not a practice, but instead it is an essential part of 
all practices. However, this does not entail that schools and universities cannot be evaluated in 
MacIntyrean terms. Schools and universities house various practices such as sciences, arts, philosophy, 
history and so on. For this reason, although education itself is not a practice, in the institutions where 
education takes place, there are always practices of various types.  
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and intellectual abilities in line with the standards of excellence and goods internal to 
practices (see also Keat 47-8). That is, the preferences of an individual need to be 
judged and changed with reference to objective standards of excellence and goods 
internal to practices (below I will illustrate this through examples from medicine and 
education).  
What I add to the argument developed by Keat is that this is not only an argument 
Keat himself develops, but also a presupposition of practices. That is, Keat develops 
an argument that is already presupposed by the nature of the practices such as arts, 
sciences and TV programmes. I develop three main sub-arguments below in order to 
illustrate this relationship between practices, practitioners, their presuppositions, and 
users of what they produce. First, I argue that an important segment of public sector 
houses practices with standards of excellence and goods internal to them. That is, 
MacIntyre's notion of a practice, I argue, finds practical expression within public 
services related to health, education and broadcasting. In health we find the practice of 
medicine. In education we find various practices such as maths, arts, philosophy, 
history and so on. In the BBC, we find the practice of programme making.  
My second argument is that within these practices the presupposition I have just 
mentioned is made and used, and this has implications regarding what is produced by 
those practices. One of the main implications is that practices, in the public sector, 
presuppose that they need to produce goods and services in order to help individuals 
achieve their wellbeing. Wellbeing that is to say is conveyed as the ethos of the 
relationship between the practices and the users of their services.  
The final sub-argument I would like to develop in this chapter is that institutions of the 
public sector are based on a different presupposition due to NPM regime. They 
presuppose human beings as preference maximisers and in so doing they convey a 
different ethos regarding the relationship between practices and the users of their 
services than the ethos conveyed by the practices. Such a presupposition and ethos, 
manifests itself in the new management methods of NPM. As stated in the 
introduction, this is the initial point where we can begin understanding the crisis of the 
public sector.  
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1.5. Medicine as a practice 
Certain commentators on MacIntyre suggest that whether an institution bears practices 
in it or not is an empirical question which requires direct academic empirical 
investigation (Beadle and Moore 2006; Beadle and Coe 2008; Beadle 2013). With 
reference to these studies too, I argue that certain areas of the public sector contain 
practices, in the sense that MacIntyre understands them, and one can recognize these 
practices on the basis of common empirical and historical observations. Medicine is a 
prime example here11.  
In response to Moore's (2002) attribution of the status of 'practice' to business, Beadle 
(2008) sets out the ways in which we can attribute such status to a cooperative activity. 
He argues that to identify a practice bearing institution, one has to explore whether 
there are goods specific and internal to the forms of activities conducted in a 
cooperative way (Beadle 2008: 230-1). Further, Beadle also suggests that a specific 
type of life, to which such goods are essentially related, is also important to understand 
whether the status of practice can be ascribed to a cooperative activity. I argue below 
that both of these features can be found in health and education segments of the public 
sector.  
Let me begin with the health segment. First of all, as already argued medicine 
throughout its history has been aiming at the diagnoses and treatment of disease and 
injuries. To do this in an excellent way is the main good internal to the practice as 
without being an educated nurse and doctor one cannot achieve such good. Beadle 
(2013; see also Beadle and Coe 2008; Beadle and Könyöt 2006; Beadle and Moore 
2006) also suggests that the difference between the practice and the institution with 
reference to the types of goods they pursue need to be identified if we are to apply 
MacIntyre to a particular social entity. We can make this differentiation with reference 
to the history of medicine.  
Medicine is one of the oldest practices and its social context is also far larger than that 
of the UK. Medicine has existed in the civilizations of ancient Egypt and Greek and it 
now exists in almost all societies. Hippocrates (the most famous physician of the 
ancient Greek) together with his colleagues and students established the initial 
standards of excellence regarding diagnoses and treatment of diseases and injuries. 
                                                 
11 As I will deal with broadcasting separately in the next chapter, I will not use it here as an example.  
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Hippocrates also developed the medical school of Kos where students of medicine can 
learn, enhance and develop those standards of excellence. These basic historical facts 
indicate that there exists something apart from the ways in which activities related to 
medicine are institutionalized within the recent public sector. That is, since medicine is 
historically much older and wider than the institutions in which it is conducted today, 
it can be considered as a social entity separate from institutions.  
Can we then name medicine as a practice in a MacIntyrean way on the basis of this? 
Not just by appealing to this. We also need to show that there are standards of 
excellence peculiar to the activities of practitioners and while practitioners strive 
towards those standards also achieves goods internal to medicine. It also needs to be 
demonstrated that those standards of excellence are extended and transcended over 
time within the cooperative activity of the practitıoners (Beadle 2013; Beadle and 
Könyöt 2006). It is obvious that certain agents throughout the history of civilizations 
have aimed at diagnosis and treatment of disease and injury. These agents are named 
as physicians and researchers and, in the course of history, they have developed 
certain standards of excellence related their activities. Medicine today is possible only 
through the totality of accumulated knowledge and experience that is transferred from 
one generation of practitioners to another through various forms of education, research 
and practice throughout history. It is through this accumulated knowledge and 
experience that the standards of excellence peculiar to activities relating to medicine 
changed, developed and known to the practitioners. Achievement of such standards 
would lead to the achievement of goods internal to medicine. That is, when physicians 
and nurses strive for the standards of excellence within medicine, they also achieve 
goods such as diagnosing and curing illnesses.12  
I have also pointed out above that for MacIntyre achievement of goods internal to 
practices requires experienced and educated practitioners. In other words, from a 
MacIntyrean point of view, it is through education and experience that doctors and 
nurses become aware of the standards of excellence and develop the necessary skills 
and virtues to strive for them and hence achieve the goods internal to medicine. Yet 
again, medicine has been working in this way throughout its history. To become a 
                                                 
12 It is worth to note again that these are goods internal to the practice of medicine, because it is often (if 
not only) through the practice of medicine that diseases and injuries can be diagnosed and treated well. 




doctor or a nurse, one has to go through a certain kind of an education which requires 
both practical experience and theoretical knowledge. Likewise, one has to have 
enough experience in the practice in order to become a good practitioner. He has to 
have certain amount of experience and education to become so. This again resembles 
one of the fundamental elements MacIntyre attributes to practices: that experience and 
education are essential to participate in them. 
Moreover, just as MacIntyre stresses that practices in general are cooperative 
activities, the same is true for medicine in particular. Doctors and nurses cannot 
diagnose and cure illnesses either in isolation from their patients, or from other doctors 
and nurses. There are of course cases where doctors work in isolation, but only 
because they have been trained within a cooperative practice. Medicine, therefore, is 
essentially a cooperative activity and this again reflects the extent to which it can be 
considered as a practice in a MacIntyrean way. This indicates that we can also define 
doctors and nurses as practitioners too. That is, there are practitioners in the public 
sector, who, to a varying degree, strive for those standards of excellence and goods 
internal to the practice of medicine. Therefore, a large portion of the public sector 
professionals (doctors and nurses) can be considered as practitioners.  
From a MacIntyrean perspective, institutions such as NHS hospitals, clinics and the 
NHS as a whole, on the other hand, are not the same as medicine. This is an important 
distinction that needs to be made. The NHS is an institution within which the practice 
of medicine flourishes or fails to do so, but it is not the practice of medicine itself. 
NHS hospitals or management structures are mainly concerned with goods external to 
the practice of medicine. That is, their business is to regulate and distribute power, 
money and prestige among and within the GP clinics and hospitals. Thus, there is an 
apparent distinction between medicine as a practice and NHS as an institution.  
This is not to say that institutions of medicine are not important. In order for medicine 
to sustain itself and to flourish there needs to be hospitals and GP clinics or some form 
of institutional setting. However, as mentioned previously, institutions (of medicine) 
and (medicine as a) practice need to be related to each other in a special way, if 
medicine is to flourish. That is, institutions need to allow practices and practitioners to 
express and share the necessary knowledge, skills and virtues within the practice. If 
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institutions fail to do this in their activities, they will also fail to help practices to 
flourish.  
Following the argument of the study, if medicine is a practice, then the practice must 
be based on a presupposition: individuals aim at wellbeing the achievement of which 
requires cultivation of preferences, habits and intellectual abilities and the practice of 
medicine plays a certain role in this. This presupposition has a twofold implication; 
one about the practitioners’ and another one about the patients’ relation to the practice. 
Regarding the former, doctors and nurses need to become a good doctor or a nurse to 
achieve wellbeing through medicine – note that this is not to say this is the only and 
sufficient way in which doctors and nurses can achieve wellbeing. To become a good 
doctor or a nurse, however, necessitates cultivation of habits and intellectual abilities 
through experience and education in medicine. About the later implication, patients 
must also change their preferences and habits in light of the prescriptions of their 
doctors in order for medicine to contribute to their wellbeing. To be sure, this is of a 
different kind of cultivation then the doctors and nurses have to go through, but it too 
requires changing preferences rather than satisfying them. Almost in all treatments, 
doctors and nurses advise their patients to change their preferences regarding their 
diet, daily activities and decisions. It follows from this that, as noted earlier, for 
medicine to contribute to the wellbeing of the patients, practitioners’ authority has to 
be assumed. This is because in education and health it is the practitioners who are 
responsible for the students and patients (and their development with regard to health, 
knowledge, skills and morality). If we take this responsibility, and the following 
authority of the practitioners out of the practices, they will dissolve as practices in a 
MacIntyrean way. And NPM, I argue, attempts to do this within the public sector.  
1.6. Education and practices 
Since education is also an important part of public sector, in order to develop the 
argument of the thesis, it is important to illustrate that the cooperative activities within 
the education sector can be ascribed the status of practice. I argue that education like 
medicine can also be thought within MacIntyre’s theory. Although MacIntyre does not 
consider education itself as a practice (see MacIntyre 2002), his contention is that 
educational institutions such as universities and school involve a variety of practices 
such as sciences, arts, literature and philosophy. Just like medicine, education too is a 
socially established cooperative human activity that exists in almost all societies and 
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civilizations. Teachers and lecturers as practitioners of various practices, require 
students and other teachers in order to strive for the standards of excellence as 
teaching is a necessarily collective activity.  
Education, like medicine, also develops historically in relation to specific practices 
like maths, literature, arts and sciences (Smith 1999). An arts teacher, for instance, is 
an important part of the practice of arts. Likewise, a science teacher or a lecturer is an 
important part of the practice of science. Thus, teachers are also practitioners who 
strive for the standards of excellence and goods internal to practices they belong to. A 
maths teacher strives for the standards of excellence and in so doing he may achieve 
goods internal to the practice of maths. Likewise, a music teacher strives for the same 
goods and standards peculiar and internal to music. It follows that education, with its 
variety of practices, is another area of the public sector where a number of practices 
with goods internal to them and standards of excellences, exist. 
More importantly, in education, wellbeing is also presupposed to be the good to which 
individuals aim. In education too, this presupposition has a twofold implication; one 
about the teachers’ relation to the practices and the other about the students’ 
relationship to those practices. Through being practitioners of a practice in education, 
teachers themselves are educated and experienced with regard to the standards of 
excellence peculiar to practices such as philosophy, arts and sciences. Teachers can 
achieve their telos by achieving goods internal to their practice within education. Such 
achievement requires the cultivation of habits and intellectual abilities of the teachers. 
As noted earlier, achievement of goods internal to practices is related to the standards 
of excellence in becoming a member of the community of practitioners (MacIntyre, 
1994). This is to say that practitioners need to learn to care for other practitioners and 
for the students if they are to achieve the goods internal to the practices they are part 
of. That is, teachers need to take responsibility of the students’ development with 
respect to their skills, moral character and intellectual capacities. Such a responsibility 
requires that practitioners have authority and the capacity to transform the preferences 
of students as well as their own preferences. That is, as Keat (2000: 41-5; 48) also 
illustrates, whether teachers will be successful, from this point of view, depends upon 
the realization of goods internal to the practices involved in the educational 
institutions, and, to do this, students need to cultivate their preferences on the basis of 
the authority of teachers rather than maximising their preferences.  
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My intention here is not to suggest that teachers and doctors always strive for 
standards of excellence and thus always achieve goods internal to practices. What I am 
claiming is that teaching and medicine are related to variety of practices, whereby it is 
possible to strive for standards of excellence and achieve goods internal to those 
practices. Practitioners may fail to do this either because they lack the necessary 
virtues, skills and experience or because of the institutional settings surrounding their 
practice, but what is important to underline here is that health and education services 
do involve practices in which standards of excellence are formed historically and 
known to those practitioners who are experienced and educated enough. What is also 
crucial to note is that such practices presuppose that human beings aim at wellbeing in 
their activities and public goods and services aim to help them achieve this aim. This, 
as demonstrated above, requires practitioners (and patients and students) to transform 
their preferences and desires in accordance with goods and standards of excellence 
peculiar to the activities of the practices. A teacher cannot be successful in achieving 
the goods internal to his or her practice, unless he or she is able to transform the 
students’ preferences on the basis of the knowledge and experience she has. Therefore, 
practices within the educational institutions are expected to progress through 
cultivation of desires and preferences of the practitioners as well as the students.  
In the case of medicine, however, progress can occur only when practitioners improve 
the incapacities of the patients again on the basis of their experience and knowledge 
(in other words, on the basis of their authority). This entails that while students and 
patients pursue their wellbeing in engaging with medicine and education, they, at the 
same time, need to assume the authority of the practitioners over what will contribute 
to their own wellbeing. This is why achievement of goods internal to practices is 
interminably linked to the wellbeing of the beneficiaries of the practices such as 
students and patients.  
So far, I have explored MacIntyre’s philosophy of practices, institutions and goods. I 
have also explained what I mean by presuppositions and argued that practices 
presuppose that there is such a thing as the human good and we are oriented towards 
such good in our activities. This good, I have argued, is wellbeing and its achievement 
requires achievement of goods internal to practices. Furthermore, I have also argued 
that cultivation of preferences, on the bases of goods internal to practices and 
standards of excellence, is essential for such achievement. I have illustrated that public 
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services and goods in areas of education and health are largely produced through 
presupposing that human beings aim at wellbeing the achievement of which requires 
cultivation of preferences on the basis of standards and goods peculiar to the practices. 
For those who are not related to the practices as practitioners but as patients and 
students, their achievement of wellbeing also depends upon the achievement of goods 
internal to practices. This is because they are engaged with the practices initially due 
to certain incapacities development of which requires help from practitioners such as 
doctors and teachers. Overcoming these varying types of incapacities helps students 
and patients achieve their wellbeing on the basis of the authority of practitioners.  
1.7. Institutions and their presuppositions 
The account I have developed so far is only helpful for understanding one dimension 
of the public sector: the dimension related to practices. But as pointed out in the 
introduction, the crisis of the public sector emerges out of a conflict between practices 
and institutions. The crisis, I have stated in the introduction, is strictly related to the 
new management regime adopted by the institutions of the public sector (known as 
NPM). I have not yet drawn upon this aspect of the issue. Just as practices are not only 
structures, but also presuppositions relating to goods and human action, the new 
management regime of the public sector also has specific presuppositions. Thus, to 
develop the main argument of the thesis I need also to elaborate on the presuppositions 
of these institutions and how such presuppositions are related to the conflict between 
practices and institutions.  
Practices are often embedded in various types of institutions, but they are not 
necessarily dependent on political power. Although practices are affected by politics, 
they can have more autonomy from politics of the state than institutions. Modern 
institutions of the public sector, on the other hand, depend largely on the kind of 
politics pursued at the level of state. For this reason, in order to understand institutions 
of the public sector, one needs to begin from politics and policies that are related to the 
public institutions such as the NHS, the BBC, state schools and universities.  
Emergence of NPM coincides with what is often referred to as the era of New Right 
(Pollitt 1993; Gruening 2001; Deem and Brehony 2005). To be sure, there are plenty 
of studies that elaborate on the New Right in the UK and I do not intent to repeat them 
here. What needs to be added to these studies however is the kind of presuppositions 
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certain policies of New Right possess with respect to public services and goods and 
how these are transmitted to the management methods that are still widely used by the 
institutions of the public sector. To do this, I focus on particular policies regarding the 
public services and goods that emerged during the era of New Right. One of these 
policies is the Citizens’ Charter (CC) developed in the late 1980s and put into effect in 
the early 1990s. The others are the enactments followed the CC such as the 1992 Local 
Government Act and Education (Schools) Act (1992). In the final chapter I will also 
refer to some other enactments and policies related to the BBC. As I demonstrate 
below, these policies presuppose that human beings are preference maximisers and 
more importantly, the management methods and tools that are introduced to the public 
sector through these policies also make the same presupposition.  
What follows from this is that public sector institutions which adopt these policies and 
management methods expect public services and goods to be produced in such a way 
that they aim at preference maximisation. In other words, institutions started to expect 
practices and practitioners to aim at preference maximisation. In fact, as I will show, 
they not only expected but also aimed to control practices so that they meet their 
expectations. Understanding this aim with respect to practices, goods, institutions and 
presuppositions is crucial in developing an analysis of the crisis of the public sector.   
1.7:1 Competition and The Citizen’s Charter 
Margaret Thatcher, as the leader of the New Right in the early 1980s said that “there is 
no such thing as public money; there is only taxpayers' money… Protecting the 
taxpayer's purse, protecting the public services — these are our two great tasks, and 
their demands have to be reconciled” (Conservative Party Conference, 1983). Tax 
payers’ money and public services are for her essentially linked. But they are not 
linked simply because public services need finances from citizens. They are linked 
because citizens are considered as consumers who pay for their services. Citizens, in 
the era of New Right, were understood as consumers of these services (see Clarke et al 
2007: 27-9). Public services and goods, within this new framework, are about how to 
spend the money owned by the citizens. It is no longer about wellbeing, as understood 
by the practitioners such as science teachers, academics and doctors.  
To be sure, there are some important and useful studies that clearly demonstrate this 
shift from citizens to consumers in the era of New Right and the New Labour (Clarke 
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et al 2007; Trentmann and Soper 2008). However, these studies do not draw upon 
what is presupposed about the consumer and what kind of expectations such 
presuppositions entail with respect to public goods and services. Likewise, such 
studies do not compare this presupposition with that of the presupposition of practices 
I have outlined above. They do not do this because they have no theory of practices 
and hence they do not distinguish practices from institutions.  
I argue that once citizens are understood as consumers, they are at the same time 
presupposed to be preference maximisers. Further, such understanding and 
presupposition has been made by the institutions of the public sector not practices. 
Thatcher, and the New Right in general, inherits this presupposition from the 
neoclassical (or as sometimes referred to, neoliberal) economists such as F. A. Hayek, 
Milton Freeman and Gary Becker. For Hayek, it is essential to understand that 
individuals pursue different aims and objectives and it is neither realistic nor desirable 
for them to pursue common aims and objectives (Hayek 2007: 85-6). They essentially 
pursue different ends, this is the nature of human beings. In fact, for the neoliberal 
economists, this is also a good in itself. That is, there is no greater good or end than 
that of a preference of an individual. The only limit or judgement on a preference is 
the preference of other individuals (Hayek 1948: 15-6). Preference, therefore, is 
presupposed in an absolute way – absolute in the sense that Collingwood understand 
absolute presuppositions. That is, there is no further explanation as to why preference 
and preference maximisation are taken as the ultimate human good.   
This is especially apparent in Hayek’s understanding of moral rationality. Hayek’s 
model for moral reasoning is based on the individuals’ plans to achieve his personal 
aims and objectives – that is, preference maximisation. Reasoning within the limit of 
preference maximisation is sufficient for a good individual life on this account. The 
only limit to this motive is the motive of another person. That is, unless while pursuing 
our preference we do not coercively prevent others doing the same, our preferences 
cannot be subjected to scrutiny; preferences are good in themselves. Moreover, if we 
reason in the context of preference maximisation, this would benefit the market and, 
therefore, the common good of the society (Hayek 1948: 17). As long as we do not use 
coercion in pursing our preferences, there can be no judgement on those preferences.  
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In the context of this study, what has been stated above implies that neither the 
practitioners nor the institutions need to reason beyond the boundaries of preference 
maximisation. Although I will come back to this issue in the latter stages of this 
chapter, let me note now that this indicates that the kind of practical rationality 
required for practices to flourish is not accepted by neoliberal economics. Since 
preferences cannot be judged on the basis of any goods other than the prevention of 
other preferences, goods internal to practices and standards of excellence cannot be the 
bases of rationality. The basis of rationality is thought of as preference maximisation 
both for institutions and practices.  
A similar approach to rationality can be observed in another important scholar of the 
Chicago School, Gary Becker. According to Becker, “individuals maximize welfare as 
they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic” 
(1993: 385). Common to any form of practical reasoning, on this account, is a kind of 
cost and benefit analysis by the individual in maximising his preferences. Any form of 
human action can be analysed within this framework including actions relating to 
marriage, crime and education. On Becker’s account, actions such as committing a 
crime, getting married, or having a child each share an aim: they all aim at preference 
maximisation. What makes an act bad is that it infringes upon others’ preference 
maximisation efforts. That is, preference satisfaction is the only good upon which a 
decision or action can be judged. Other than this, any judgement or evaluation fails to 
be based on a good reason. Thus, preference maximisation as the main motive of 
human beings should be the basis of rationality. It should be the basis of rationality 
both for practices and institutions.  
Assuming the effect of neoliberal economics on the New Right, it is not surprising that 
they too make this presupposition in considering citizens as consumers. However, in 
order to understand the ways in which they make this presupposition and how it is 
reflected in public sector institutions, I need to evaluate specific policies developed 
within New Right policy circles. One of the most important and far-reaching of these 
policies is the Citizen’s Charter and internal markets. As I illustrate below, Citizen’s 
Charter together with the establishment of internal markets helped introduce new 
management methods to the public sector: it increased auditing and introduced Total 
Quality Management and Performance Indicators to the public sector. These methods 
constitute a large part of NPM from the time they were introduced to the public sector 
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to now. When analysed, they also presuppose users of the services and practitioners as 
preference maximisers and more importantly expect public services and goods to aim 
at this.  
I argue that it was The Citizen’s Charter and internal markets that allowed the shift 
from citizens to consumers to occur and hence to introduced the presupposition of 
preference maximising to the public sector. Thus, let me continue developing my 
argument with an analysis of internal markets and the Citizen’s Charter.  
NPM policies aiming to establish internal markets to the public sector were largely 
based on the belief that competition assures wider choices and more satisfaction to the 
consumer (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 80-4; Grand, 2007: 45). So, if preference 
maximisation is going to be the chief aim of public organizations (and practices), as is 
claimed, competition needed to be another chief element of public sector alone with 
consumer satisfaction. Advocates of NPM, that is to say, believe that unless 
competition is injected, there is no other way to satisfy the consumer and hence ensure 
preference maximisation as the chief aim of practices. This view has led to certain 
policies that are usually associated with NPM. Among these, introducing internal 
markets through which ‘purchasers’ and ‘providers’ distinction is also introduced to 
the public sector is of particular importance. With this specific policy, certain public 
institutions were no longer going to be responsible for both the policy-making and the 
provision of the services (Hood, 1991; Lane, 2000: 307-8; Harlow and Rawlings, 
2009: 58-9; Lapsley, 2009). The state, together with certain public institutions, in the 
view of the protagonists of NPM, need to focus on making policies, for the 
implementation of which other public (and private) organizations need to compete. 
That is, internal markets allow hospitals and schools to compete with each other for 
getting better contracts from health and education authorities on the bases of their 
ability to maximise consumer preferences. In the internal markets, the criterion upon 
which organizations are judged is of essential importance to note for the purposes of 
this study (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993: 17-8). Organizations compete for contracts on 
the basis of maximising consumer preferences. That is, the more consumers are 
satisfied in their preferences, the more the organizations in question become 
successful. Le Grand and Bartlett, as important proponents of NPM, summarize the 




there are independent institutions (schools, universities, hospitals, 
residential homes, housing associations, private landlords) 
competing for customers. However, in contrast to conventional 
markets, all these organisations are not necessarily out to 
maximise their profits; nor are they necessarily privately owned… 
On the demand side, consumer purchasing power is not expressed 
in money terms in a quasi-market. Instead either it takes the form 
of an earmarked budget or 'voucher' confined to the purchase of a 
specific service allocated to users, or it is centralised in a single 
state purchasing agency (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993: 10).  
 
Thus, internal markets, in the view of the protagonists of NPM, established market 
relations to the public sector without altering the ownership status and the non-profit 
nature of public organisations. It established such relations by bringing about 
competition and preference maximisation as the main aim of organizations.  
Not only organizations are to compete on the basis of preference maximization, but 
also employees. This is mainly because within the internal markets, relationship 
between employees and organizations are to be based on short term contracts (Harlow 
and Rawlings, 2009: 60). This would also bring competition into the employees’ 
relationship with their organizations and between themselves – they would compete 
for jobs and positions. To be sure, this is not to say that competition does not exist in 
anywhere else than the market relations. MacIntyre, for instance, claims that it does 
exist in the practices too. Nevertheless, in practices, it is not based on preference 
maximization. Rather it is based on excellence or achievement of goods internal to 
practices. Market relations, however, are based on a particular type of competition 
between the employees and public organizations: a type of competition that 
presupposes human beings as preference maximisers (Hood, et al, 1998; Exworthy and 
Halford, 1999).  
As I will explain in more details in the remaining parts of this study, performance and 
the quality of products or services attempted to be evaluated in close relation to 
preference maximisation within the internal markets. That is, good performance and 
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the ways in which performance is itself evaluated begun to be redefined with reference 
to preference maximisation. Performing well and the quality of performance begun to 
be judged with reference to preference maximisation. However, it was not possible to 
implement this solely by policies regarding internal markets. Citizen’s Charter is the 
other dimension through which this was attempted to be achieved.  
The Citizen’s Charter was a political initiative designed and supported by Prime 
Minister John Major. Promotion of the charter began in 1991, and implementation 
began in 1992.. The Citizen’s Charter is well known for being one of the main policies 
aiming to increase audit, competition and performance measures for schools, 
universities and many other public organizations. It is also known to be the main 
policy of NPM. Major (1991) himself states the aims of The Citizen’s Charter as 
follows:  
 
We will seek to extend the principle of performance-related pay. And, 
where necessary, look for ways of introducing financial sanctions, 
involving direct compensation to the public or direct loss to the budgets of 
those that fall down on the job. We will also look to public bodies to 
publish clear contracts of service -contracts that mean something - against 
which performance can be judged.  
 
Here, Major renounced the coming of a new regime based on harsh evaluations and 
inspections of quality and performance. William Waldegrave, cabinet minister of the 
time (1992) also makes this clear: 
 
The Citizen's Charter aims to provide better quality service, greater 
customer choice, published standards of service and accessible means of 
redress, to all users of public services. Published, measurable standards 
ensure the public know what quality of service they can expect to receive, 
compare this with other service providers, and measure performance in 





This indicates that with the CC a new regime of quality and performance management 
was on the way. What we argue is that within this new regime and hence with the CC 
human beings are presupposed to be preference maximisers and public goods and 
services are expected to aim at that. Within and with the CC, that is to say, citizens are 
no longer considered as aiming at wellbeing, which requires cultivation of preferences.  
To be sure, this is still an argument through inference, as even the most enthusiastic 
advocates of NPM do not directly suggest that they consider citizens as consumers in a 
literal way, although they use the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘consumer’ equivocally (see 
Osborne and Geabler 1992; Kettle 2005; Le Grand 2007). Hence one might find what 
has been argued above as an exaggerated inference. In order to demonstrate this 
inference in a more accurate way, I need to begin with a specific institution that was 
influential on the formulation of the CC as well as NPM as a whole: the Adam Smith 
Institute. This institute and in particular its president Madsen Pirie is of special 
importance. Pirie and the Adam Smith Institute are known to be one of the originators 
of the CC (Pearce 1993) and also a strong supporter of the view that the public sector 
fails because of lack of preference maximisation as the main motivation. Pirie claims 
that the CC’s main target is to implement this motivation in the public sector. As he 
puts it, 
 
the problem with the remaining public services13 is to make them consumer 
directed in the absence of a private market in which customers pay with 
their own cash, or an internal market in which customers pay with state 
monies. The answer in Britain has been the Citizen's Charter. It represents 
the attempt to make the public services required by statute to do what the 
private sector does for commercial reasons (Pirie 1992:60).  
 
As Pirie thinks, CC aimed to introduce a consumer-oriented approach to the public 
sector. What is important to note here is the ways in which CC envisaged 
implementing this orientation within practices. Maximising the preferences of 
consumers with the lowest amount of costs is envisaged as the main aim for the public 
services and goods.  
                                                 
13 By the remaining public services, he means the ones that were not privatized.  
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Advocates of NPM as a whole and the CC specifically suggested that the public 
organizations needed to place the notion of consumer sovereignty at the centre of their 
activities (Osborne and Gaebler 1992: 80-4; Kettl 2005: 17; Le Grand 2007: 38-9). 
Consumer sovereignty basically means that the final authority in the evaluation of a 
service or a product is the consumer preferences. This entails that, within the NPM 
framework, the authority can no longer be standards of excellence known to 
practitioners through accumulated knowledge and experience (Pollitt 1993: 180; 
Osborne and Geabler 1992: 169-72; Pirie 1992; Kettl 2005: 61-7; Diefenbach 2009: 
896; Lapsley 2009). That is, according to the proponents of NPM, if an organization 
satisfies its consumers with the least possible amount of costs, then the organization in 
question could be considered as successful. If the service users are not happy with the 
outcomes and the organization is not cost-effective, then such an organization should 
be downgraded.  
This indicates that the products or services of the public sector need to be evaluated on 
the basis of consumer preferences. However, as I illustrate below, such evaluation 
amounts to lack of any objective criterion apart from the preferences themselves in 
evaluating the quality of public goods and services. That is, for the advocates of NPM 
and particularly for the CC, as long as the preferences of individuals do not prevent 
others pursuing their own preferences, they can be a reliable ground for evaluating 
public services and goods. However, this is not sufficient to demonstrate the role of 
presupposing individuals as preference maximisers in the conflict between institutions 
and practices. To do this I need to elaborate on another dimension of NPM too.  
Proponents of NPM were aware that positioning preference maximisation as the main 
aim of the public services and goods could not be implemented only through CC type 
policies and structural changes. Many well-known management gurus of the time (that 
is, in the 1980s and 1990s), who were also influential on the proponents of NPM, were 
of the view that organizational change, which would lead to effectiveness and 
efficiency, requires cultural or normative changes within organizations as well as 
structural ones (see Peters and Waterman 1982; Drucker 1969; Handy 1989). 
According to these management gurus, the importance of organizational culture has 
long been neglected by the management and business scholars, whereas it one of the 
main factors leading to success or failure.  
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What is meant by organizational culture is the set of norms and values that are 
dominant within an organization. For the management thinkers such as Peters and 
Waterman (1982), there are unwritten rules and regulation that are based on certain 
values within organizations. Such rules, regulations and values are of prime important 
for the present and future success of an organization. This view has been quite 
influential in the organizational studies and following such rising importance of 
culture, proponents of NPM also through this as a fundamental part of public 
organization. They then claimed that preference maximisation needs to be part of the 
culture of the public sector (Exworthy and Halford 1999). Understanding how this 
cultural change was attempted sheds some light on the ways in which public goods 
and services are expected to aim at preference maximisation. As will be demonstrated 
below, this cultural change was attempted largely through Total Quality Management 
(hereafter, TQM) and Performance Indicator techniques. As mentioned in the 
introduction, analysing this aspect of NPM from a MacIntyrean point of view and with 
reference to the notion of presupposition, advances the argument of Overeem and 
Tholen (2011) that NPM neglects goods internal to practices through overemphasising 
effectiveness and external goods. TQM and performance indicator techniques as we 
will see below, reinforces preference maximisation as the basis of performance and 
quality within the public sector. In so doing, they neglect the importance of the 
presupposition of practices and goods internal to them.  
1.7:2 Quality management 
In the tradition of practices, as understood by MacIntyre, quality has always been 
related to standards of excellence and goods internal to practices. That is, quality of a 
good or service depends upon the standards of excellence that is peculiar and specific 
to the relevant practice. Nevertheless, with the emergence of NPM and particularly 
with Total Quality Management (TQM), quality began to be redefined. This 
redefinition has been done once again on the basis of the presupposition that human 
beings are preference maximisers. Indeed, this redefinition had an impact on conflict 
between practices and institutions. For this reason I give special attention to the ways 
in which the concept of quality has been changed through TQM.  
TQM gained considerable influence within the public sector during the 1990s (right 
after the CC was introduced) and it has promised a ‘new’ way of approaching quality. 
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In so doing, it aimed to establish preference maximisation as the aim for public goods 
and services. To see how TQM aimed to do this we need to begin from its origins. 
Although it gained influence in the public sector in the 1990s, TQM originally 
emerged within the arms manufacturing industry in the USA during the Second World 
War, and then spread to the whole manufacturing industry globally (Morgan and 
Murgatroyd 1994: 35). In its early periods, TQM was only applied to certain processes 
such as production and packaging. Later on, it has become a widespread theory of 
management, applicable to a wide range of processes and sectors.  
The main idea of TQM is that quality can only be achieved through the elimination of 
extra costs and error, and through commitment to improvement and the satisfaction of 
consumer preferences in every process involved within an organization (Sallis 2002: 
24-9; Bovair and Loffler 2003:143-6). Elimination of extra costs and commitment to 
improvement and so on were always part of management and business. What can be 
considered new in TQM is the idea that quality cannot be achieved only by changing 
the structure of an organization. Within the TQM literature it widely accepted that 
TQM requires a change in the organizational culture.  
TQM is considered as a “culture of never ending improvement, [which] lead first to 
customer satisfaction and then to customer delight” (Morgan and Murgatroyd 1994: 
6). So, TQM targets the practices of an organization rather than the structures (Sallis 
2002: 30-33). It tries to implement a new type of approach or motivation for the 
practices. That is, it tries to get the practitioners to be motivated by improvement with 
respect to consumer satisfaction. But how is this culture going to be implemented 
within the public sector? According to the proponents of TQM, implementation of 
such culture requires a constant measurement of results with regard to consumer 
satisfaction (Powell 1995: 16). First, one needs to gather data on what customers want 
or prefer. Then, one needs to accumulate information on performance and manage it 
accordingly. Quality, from this point of view, depends on a link that needs to be 
established between performance and consumer preferences.  
Most important is the process of gathering data on practitioners’ performance and 




[Quality improvements] must be based on hard data and not on impressions 
or an expressed opinion justified in terms of kudos of wide or long previous 
experience. In the new paradigm of TQM, all strategy and improvement 
decisions should be research-based: they must be supported by data which 
are collected scientifically on all aspects of the operation, even those 
internal processes which everyone in the old way of doing things believes 
they know so intimately.  
 
Quality public service, from this point of view, require one to know, before anything 
else, consumer preferences, and how to satisfy them, in an “explicit” and “scientific” 
form (Hackman and Wageman 1995: 312; Osborne and Geabler 1992: 143; Lapsley 
1999: 256-7). It is important, however, to be clear about the particular understanding 
of what data is and how it needs to be collected that is implied by the phrase 
“scientific data”. TQM, uses complex quantitative methods, like control charts, Pareto 
analysis, cost-of-quality analysis statistics, flow-charts, and diagrams to understand 
and measure quality (Hackman and Wageman 1995: 313). Without getting into the 
details of these methods, I can say that they are all quantitative methods of enquiry. 
Within the TQM framework, that is to say, quality can only be measured through data 
collected in statistical and mathematical forms. Therefore, TQM claims that consumer 
preferences and whether services do actually fulfil those preferences needs to be 
measured and acted upon only through the use of quantitative methods. Thus, if 
practitioners’ knowledge on quality and performance is not quantitative, it is going to 
be considered as secondary to quantitative data. Therefore, within the TQM, it is the 
practitioner, who needs to modify his understanding and practice by appealing to the 
preferences of consumers, because consumer preference is sovereign.  
In the old public sector, the role of practitioners and their judgement was central 
(Foster and Wilding 2000: 146; Lorenz 2012). However, with the NPM, and 
particularly with TQM, it will no longer be practitioners who make the final 
judgement about the quality of services (Kirkpatrick et al 2005: 20). Rather, the final 
judgement needs to be made according to consumer preferences. If consumers are not 
satisfied with the service, then the quality within an organization will be evaluated as 
low. It follows from this that evaluating quality within the public sector would require 
knowledge of the preferences of consumers and costs of the services provided. As I 
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have illustrated, whereas practitioners traditionally have different criteria for 
evaluating the public services and goods, within the TQM they are also expected to 
possess knowledge of the costs of the services they would provide. Thus, under the 
TQM, it is explicit, measurable and shared knowledge of consumer preferences that 
leads to quality, not the goods internal to practices, as has traditionally been believed 
by practitioners.  
What is crucial to note here is that such knowledge is believed to be possessed by 
managers rather than practitioners. Techniques through which one gets to know the 
consumer preferences and the necessary performance to satisfy them are of special 
kind. Such specialized techniques are taught in MBA’s or management courses and 
not in disciplines like medicine, education, broadcasting and so on. A doctor, teacher 
or broadcaster would not have the necessary expertise to investigate cost-effectiveness 
and consumer preferences. Proponents of NPM believe that it is managers, graduated 
from business schools, who have such an expertise (Ackroyd et al 2007). Hence, 
managers are the main professionals who need to define quality alone with the 
consumers. Therefore, after the techniques of TQM were introduced to the public 
sector, management and its special techniques of gathering information about 
performance and customer preferences became much more important than they were 
before.  
There is another important aspect of TQM which needs to be mentioned here. TQM 
aims to extend the usual understanding of consumer from an outsider to an insider. 
That is, certain relationships between different departments teams, and individuals 
within an organization, also need to be considered in terms of supplier-consumer 
relationships (Morgan and Murgatroyd 1994: 20). For instance, if a team of people 
within an organization is responsible for supplying resources for another team, the 
former team would need to consider the latter as their consumer. Prior to NPM, the 
public sector had not encountered a consumer-supplier relationship within its 
organizational forms (Pollitt 1993: 180). TQM, therefore, changed the culture in which 
quality was defined. That is, quality of services after TQM has been defined by new 
experts, namely managers, who are believed to have the expertise on consumer 
preferences and how to maximise them. It is clear that TQM presupposes human 
beings and especially those who use public goods and services as preference 
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maximisers. Following this presupposition, it aims to redefine quality of services and 
goods in terms of preference maximisation.  
1.7:3 Auditing 
During NPM and after the CC not only has TQM been introduced to the public sector, 
but also auditing has been increasing to a significant degree. Auditing consists of 
techniques employed to check or inspect the activities of a company in order to make 
sure that the shareholder’s capital is used in accordance with the shareholder’s 
intentions. Accounting technologies such as balance sheets and price determination are 
the main tools through which an organization can be audited. This is to say that 
auditing emerged originally as financial auditing in the private sector. However, 
although audit systems initially developed for this purpose, they began to be used for 
checking many other activities of an organization too - such us quality and 
performance (Power 1997: 15).  
What is important to note is that the use of this technique significantly increased 
during the period of NPM. Power (1997) names this increase as the “audit explosion”. 
Establishment of organisations whose sole purpose is to audit, such as the Audit 
Commission (1983) and the National Audit Office (1983), can be considered to be the 
initial stage of this explosion. What is interesting and worth elaborating on is not only 
the increase in the auditing itself, but also the effects of such increase on practices. 
Just like TQM, audit explosion can also be considered as an attempt to change the 
ways in which quality and performance is understood and evaluated. In particular, as I 
show below, audit explosion indicates understanding and redefining quality and 
performance in terms of preference maximisation. How, then, did auditing change the 
ways in which performance is understood and managed within the public sector? And 
how is this change related to the conflict between practices and institutions? In order 
to illustrate this, I need to elaborate more on the nature of the audit processes 
themselves.  
As Power (2000: 114-5) puts it, “audit processes are not neutral acts of verification but 
actively shape the design and interpretation of auditable performance.” This is an 
important aspect of auditing that is relevant to our argument. As a result of the audit 
explosion, performance, just like quality, is redefined in very explicit and even 
mathematical terms through auditing techniques (Broadbent and Laughlin 2002: 100; 
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Lapsley 1999). Auditing bodies have been demanding clear and measurable indicators 
of performance from their establishment onwards (see National Audit Office 2007). 
An important dimension of what auditors demand from public organizations, 
therefore, consists of clear, numeric and explicit answers to the question of what is it 
to be performing well within the public sector (Osborne and Geabler 1992: 144; 
Lapsley 1999). After such demand, schools, hospitals and universities began to be 
evaluated on the basis of quantitative and statistical terms (de Waal 2006; Hood et al 
1999; Hyndman and McGeough 2008). This implies that the performance of 
practitioners, just like the quality of what they produce, begun to be understood in 
isolation from goods internal to practices and standards of excellence peculiar to their 
activities.  
Just like the proponents of TQM, proponents of auditing also claimed that 
practitioners lack the necessary neutrality and knowledge to understand and satisfy 
consumers (O’Reilly and Reed 2011: 1087; Lapsley 2009). Practitioners, it is believed, 
cannot understand the preferences of the consumers and for this reason they cannot 
aim at preference maximisation (Broadbent and Laughlin 2002). This is not a surprise 
considering the presupposition of practices. As I have demonstrated above, practices 
rely on a different presupposition than preference maximisation. Auditing authorities, 
however, considered practitioners and their ways of producing services and goods as 
“implicit” and “detached” from consumer preferences (Broadbent and Laughlin 2002). 
Once again, the capacity to turn such “implicit” and “detached” way of practices into 
“explicit” and “inclusive” approach, was declared to be possessed by the managers. As 
the institutions of the public sector agreed (or had to agree) to increased auditing, 
managers have been one of the main agents responsible for this increase in the public 
sector. Audit explosion, that is to say, opened up a space for managers to redefine 
performance, which has traditionally been the responsibility of practitioners.  
Audit explosion, and the ways in which preference maximisation has aimed to be 
implemented to the public sector, can also be observed in the 1992 Local Government 
Act. This act can be considered as a historically important step towards the extension 
of auditing as well as TQM and performance indicators within the public sector 




make new provision, by giving effect to proposals in Cm. 1599 (The 
Citizen’s Charter) relating to publicity and competition, for securing 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the manner in which local 
authorities carry on certain activities (Local Government Act 1992: 1).  
 
As is clear from the above quote, the legislation aimed to materialize The Citizen’s 
Charter. The enactment aims to set up quantitative and clear targets for practitioners 
and practices, against which performance and quality can be measured and compared. 
With this enactment, the role of developing performance indicators for local 
authorities and their employees was assigned to the Audit Commission (AC).  
Indeed, not only the authority to develop performance indicators was given to AC, but 
the enactment also introduced the requirement for  
 
every authority in England and Wales […] to measure its performance 
against these indicators and publish details in a local newspaper. The 
[Audit] Commission will, then, compare the different levels of performance 
achieved by different authorities (Local Government Act 1992:2).  
 
Once the comparisons are made by AC, the ineffective and inefficient organizations 
will be detected. Organizations which are able to meet the expectations of the 
indicators are going to be considered as complying with the “norms”, whereas the ones 
who fail to do so would count as “abnormal”. What is crucial to note is that these 
norms were established again on the basis of the presupposition that human beings are 
preference maximisers. That is, the norm of the performance indicators is to think and 
act in terms of cost effectiveness and preference maximisation. When we look into the 
details of the indicators developed by the AC, we realize that from provision of 
education and health services to refuse collection and housing, performance was 
expected to be indicated on the basis of numeric data (AC, 1992). Indicators, that is to 
say, appeal to numbers and percentages that are believed, by the proponent of NPM, to 
be more objective and universal than those of the “subjective” qualitative perceptions 
of the practitioners.  
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Furthermore, it is not a coincidence that TQM gained popularity within the public 
sector right after the Local Government Act (1992). As explained above, within the 
framework of TQM, quantitative information on performance and quality was 
conceived to be more reliable than the traditional understandings, after the Local 
Government Act (1992). This Act envisaged a type of management of quality and 
performance just like TQM. Hence, it was these types of enactments that allowed 
TQM to redefine and redesign quality and performance within the public sector.      
Related to this, in the same year, the Education (Schools) Act (1992) took effect. It is 
worthwhile to note that this coincides once again with the period in which TQM and 
education began to be considered as strictly relevant to each other (see Sallis 2002; 
Deem and Brehony 2005). One of the main aims of the Education (Schools) Act 
(1992) is “to improve standards of achievement and quality of education through 
regular independent inspection, public reporting and informed advice” (DfEE 1997: 
150, para. 17.8). In order to implement the Education (Schools) Act, OFSTED (Office 
for Standards in Education) was established in 1992. 
OFSTED’s principal purpose was (and still is) to inspect the performance of schools 
and publish reports as recommendations to the central government and to the public. 
After the Education (Schools) Act and establishment of OFSTED, examination results 
and performance indicators had to be published in quantitative form. OFSTED style 
inspection and audit, in other words, required explicit written procedures based on 
statistical information. Teachers and headmasters, in turn, are expected to record and 
project examination results, set up quantitative targets to improve these results, and be 
available for inspection by OFSTED (Hood et al 1999:142). This is believed to be the 
only way towards achieving the aim of preference maximisation.  
Thus, once the institutions of public sector begun to presuppose citizens as preference 
maximising consumers, they also began to redefine quality and performance alone 
those lines. Managers, in turn, claimed to possess the knowledge and skills to connect 
‘professional clans’ with consumers (Broadbent and Laughlin 2002: 98-9). As 
explained above, there are, however, practices in the public sector with a different 
presupposition about human beings that entails different understandings of quality and 
performance. When we compare the two presuppositions and what they entail with 
respect to the relationship between practices and service users, it becomes clear that 
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coexistence of the two presuppositions is problematic and contradictory. Whereas 
presupposing human beings as aiming at wellbeing entails that practices need to 
flourish through achievement of internal goods, presupposing human beings as aiming 
at preference maximisation does not entail anything related to goods internal to 
practices. Presupposing wellbeing as the aim of human beings, that is to say, entails 
that practitioners need to strive for standards of excellence and goods internal to 
practices to perform well and produce quality service. Presupposing preference 
maximisation, however, entails that practices need to develop the skills and knowledge 
that can effectively match their services with the preferences of consumers whatever 
those preferences are.   
1.8. Power shifts and conflict 
As stated in the introduction, the crisis of the public sector emerges out of a conflict 
between practices and institutions and the mere coexistence of rival presuppositions 
and ethoi such presuppositions entail regarding the relationship between practices and 
the users of their services is not sufficient for there to be conflict. Rival 
presuppositions of practices and institutions are strictly related to power relationships. 
That is, institutions enforce the ethos they drive from their presuppositions over to the 
practices and it is this enforcement that generates conflict.   
Within the mainstream literature, there are many studies that point out a certain type of 
conflict between managers and professionals since the NPM (Pollitt 1993: 9; 
Exworthy and Halford 1999; Broadbent and Laughlin 2002: 99; Born 2003; Farrel and 
Morris 2003: 136; Dent and Barry 2004: 8; Ackroyd et al 2007; Lapsley 2009; Lorenz 
2012). Although these studies do indicate a conflict between professionals and 
managers, they do not understand this conflict as accruing between practices and 
institutions and between their rival presuppositions regarding human beings. 
Furthermore, studies that point out the problems of NPM with respect to the conflict it 
creates between professionals and managers often refer to changing policies and 
organizational structures. Although policies and structures are actually changing and 
generating conflict within the public sector, conflict needs also be analysed with 
reference to practices and institutions and their presuppositions. Only within such 
framework can we understand what is special about the conflict generated by the NPM 
regime and how this conflict yields to a crisis.  
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If we only appeal to the mainstream accounts of the conflict within the public sector, 
we are likely to conclude that ambiguity and conflict is part of all modern 
organizations and NPM generated just a different version of these conflicts. I argue 
that NPM not only generates a different version of conflict within the public sector but 
also a crisis that will result either in diminishing of practices or their survival and 
flourishing. I need to make it clear that my argument do not suggest that the public 
sector was devoid of conflict and that conflict has only emerged during the NPM. On 
the contrary, it should be noted that conflict is an inevitable aspect of modern 
organizations. My argument is that there is a special kind of conflict within the public 
sector. That is, a conflict that reached to a turning point which will result either in the 
disappearance or the survival and flourishing of practices as MacIntyre understands 
practices.  However, in order to develop this argument, I need to elaborate on the ways 
in which the ethos of preference maximisation is imposed on the practices. To 
illustrate this and how it generates the conflict between practices and institutions, I 















Chapter II: Enforcement of Preference Maximisation: 
neoliberal governmentality and disciplinary power 
 
This chapter focuses on Foucault's philosophy of power and reconsiders NPM from 
this point of view. In particular, I focus on Foucault’s general view of power and his 
notions of governmentality and disciplinary power. In doing this, I will illustrate the 
ways in which public institutions attempt to control practices to ensure that they aim at 
preference maximisation in their production of services. This illustration will 
particularly clarify the ways in which the presupposition of public sector institutions 
and the subsequent ethos that follow this presupposition is enforced to the practices 
and generated the crisis in the public sector.  
2.1. Foucault’s understanding of power 
 
I begin with an exposition of Foucault’s general understanding of power. I then 
explain his concepts of governmentality and disciplinary power. As I will illustrate 
below, the governmentality that surrounds the NPM enforces preference maximising 
as the main element of rationality. This enforcement, I argue, is done through what 
Foucault calls disciplinary power. I will illustrate how disciplinary power has tended 
to increase and expand its field of application towards that of practices, performances 
of practitioners and quality of services since NPM. Whereas during the old-style 
public sector disciplinary power was applied mostly to the users of the services such as 
students and patients, it is now applied also to practices that are responsible for the 
production of those services. As we will see, it was through this expansion that 
practices were compelled to understand and evaluate performance and quality with 
reference to preference maximisation.  
As is well known, Foucault is a complex thinker who has been influential in many 
disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, anthropology, history and politics. 
However, although Foucault’s wide range of influence is well known, the ways in 
which he is seen as influential varies to a large extent with various, and sometimes 
conflicting, commentaries. Some take Foucault as the main heir of Nietzsche whose 
main purpose is to show that there is no such thing as morality or normativity, but 
instead only a will to power that is masked by the appearance of norms and moral 
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values. Some consider him as a radical democrat aiming to rewrite history in new way. 
There is of course some truth to almost all differing interpretations of Foucault. 
However, my main task in this study is not to develop a Foucault commentary, but 
instead to use some of the existing commentaries with his original work to explain the 
changes that took place within the public sector and develop my argument regarding 
the crisis in the public sector.  
Thus, without going into the debate of how one needs to interpret Foucault’s work, I 
consider him as a social theorist. That is, I assume Foucault to be a social theorist, who 
managed to develop one of the best methodological insights into how power operates 
within the institutions of modern liberal societies. Instead of using Foucault’s own 
histories of particular institutions such as his history of the hospital and the prison, I 
adopt Foucault’s suggestion about how we should explore or unveil power 
relationships, and apply this to changes within the public sector. What I will say of 
Foucault below is therefore limited to a particular understanding of his work, and 
especially his late work (what is largely known as his genealogical period).   
The best way of explaining Foucault’s theory is to begin with what he thinks is 
missing from other types of approaches to power. According to Foucault, mainstream 
understandings of power can be classified under two broad traditions. One he defines 
as the juridical (or contractarian) understanding of power, and the other as economic 
understanding (Foucault 1980a: 87-8). Both traditions, for Foucault, fail to grasp how 
power operates within modern societies to an important extent. The problem with 
these understandings of power is that they only grasp one dimension of power, 
whereas for Foucault power in modern societies is multi-dimensional.  
Let me begin with the juridical understanding of power. Within the juridical 
framework, power is understood only as a possession or a right. According to the 
juridical approach to power, Foucault notes,  
 
power is taken to be a right, which one is able to possess like a commodity, 
and which one can in consequence transfer or alienate, either wholly or 
partially, through a legal act or through some act that establishes a right, 




Another main element of the juridical understanding of power is that power is thought 
to be only exercised in a repressive and top down mode. In the juridical framework, 
there are always individuals who possess the power, and there are individuals who are 
subjected to it. Moreover, this subjection occurs only in a top down and repressive 
form.14 In its top down repressive way of asserting power, however, juridical power 
becomes an ineffective type of power that is not often preferred to be used within the 
modern liberal societies. Foucault notes that the 
 
[Juridical] power is poor in resources, sparing of its methods, monotonous 
in the tactics it utilizes, incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed 
always to repeat itself. Further, it is a power that only has the force of the 
negative on its side, a power to say no; in no condition to produce, capable 
only of posting limits… This is the paradox of its effectiveness: it is 
incapable of doing anything, expect to render what it dominates incapable 
of doing anything either, expect for what this power allows it to do… it is a 
power whose model is essentially juridical, centered on nothing more than 
the statement of the law and the operation of taboos (1976: 85). 
 
Juridical power, that is to say, sets concrete limits to freedom of the individual. It sets 
these limits through the use of methods such as coercion, exploitation and oppression 
(Foucault 1976: 92). This implies that juridical power requires a sovereign, that is, a 
sovereign either in the form of a King or of a state, capable of imposing laws to its 
subjects through coercion.  
                                                 
14 It is important to stress here that Foucault does not incline to claim power to be devoid of violence 
(Foucault 1986: 234-5). Foucault thinks that juridical understanding of power is inherited from the 
times of the juridical monarchy and in so far as our societies resemble those monarchies, juridical 
framework is helpful in understanding power. Indeed, to a certain degree, our societies do still resemble 
monarchy and juridical approach to power does apprehend this dimension of our society. To be sure, 
Foucault is not claiming that there are political theorists or sociologists who believe in monarchs. He 
thinks that there are political and social theorists who conceive power as a possession that is exercised 
through top-down policies and legislations. And on Foucault’s account it is this type of understanding is 
inherited from the time of monarchy. But if we limit our approach to power to a juridical understanding, 
this would be an insufficient method that inhibits us from understanding a certain dimensions of power 
within modern liberal societies. 
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Juridical power also requires obedient subject(s) in order to operate. And infringing 
the law or being disobedient, in the juridical framework of power, means doing wrong 
to the sovereign, who has the right to decide the life and death of its subjects (Foucault 
2002: 49). Accordingly, punishing the disobedient within this form of power takes the 
form of revenge by the sovereign. Here, the sovereign does not have to be a king. It 
can be the state or any group of people who formally hold power. Therefore, the 
essential nature of juridical power is a law-giving sovereign where power is a 
possession and exercised in a top-down regressive way through limiting individual 
freedom.  
However, power in the modern liberal societies does not only operate in a juridical 
way, for Foucault. Power has another dimension that is quite different from the 
juridical power, but before I explore this dimension of power, let me explain the 
second mainstream understanding of power that Foucault finds to be problematic. As 
mentioned above, Foucault names this dimension of power as the economic approach 
Here Foucault has Marxism in mind, but his account is not restricted to this tradition 
only (Foucault 1980a: 88). Compared to juridical approach, this form of 
understanding, and in particular Marxism, has an innovative way of analysing power. 
The issue of class and economic structures would not be brought into the spectrum of 
power without this approach. As it is well known, on classical Marxist accounts, it is a 
particular class who possesses the power: namely the bourgeoisie class. The state, 
political parties, law and public institutions within capitalism are mere reflections of 
this class structure of the society.  
Foucault accepts that this understanding of power is obviously different and new 
compared to the juridical understanding. However, Marxists too, he thinks, conceive 
of power in juridical terms (Foucault 1980a: 89). Although it shifts the emphasis from 
right and law to economy and class structure, this approach also conceive of power as 
a possession. Furthermore, just like the juridical understanding, Marxist understanding 
also conceives power in terms of repression and violence. As is again very well 
known, the bourgeois class, according to Marxist tradition, exploits, represses and uses 
the working class for its own advantage within capitalist societies.  
Let me note that Foucault does not deny the fact that the juridical or economic 
framework directs us to particular truths about power. However, he still thinks that one 
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needs to go beyond these understandings of power in order to fully apprehend how 
power actually works in modern society. First of all, Foucault thinks that juridical 
conception of power (which is also inherited by the economic understanding of power) 
formed during the monarchical period, where power resembled more of a possession 
of the King than anything else. In modern society, however, there is no king and 
power operates in rather different ways than it used to do. This is why Foucault claims 
that “in political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king” 
(Foucault 1976: 88-9). He thinks that we still conceptualize power in a way that would 
be more appropriate for how it existed in a traditional monarchy, even though such 
social orders no longer exist. 
Foucault believes that one should not understand power only in terms of repression, 
coercion, violence and oppression of one or more individual or groups over others 
(Foucault 1977: 194, 1976: 84–6; 1982). One might understand pre–modern forms of 
power in these terms, but not the modern forms of power. Modern power relations, for 
Foucault, need not be understood only as a top-down process (Foucault, 1980a: 84). 
Instead, power must be thought of as an exercise: an exercise that flows horizontally. 
Power, in other words, operates through producing norms, values and knowledge and 
enforcing these to the individuals who are subjected to power. Once these produced 
norms, values and knowledge are accepted by those who are subjected to power, then, 
power becomes effective and efficient in its effects. This implies that within this 
horizontal activity individuals are not necessarily oppressed and passivized (Foucault 
1982). Indeed, individuals are often active in the process of power relationships. They 
become active by accepting (or taking part in the production of) norms, values and 
knowledge that is enforced.  
Foucault of course accepts that certain individuals often become the victim of power, 
but he also wants to emphasize that those very victims of power can also take active 
part in the formation of power without necessarily being aware of this. As he puts it: 
 
[Power] is never localized here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never 
appropriated as a commodity or a piece of wealth. Power is employed and 
exercised through a netlike organization. And not only individuals circulate 
between its threads; they are always also the elements of its articulation. In 
71 
 
other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of 
application (Foucault 1980a: 98).   
 
What Foucault is trying to point out here is that individuals are not necessarily always 
victims of power. Individuals, who are the victims of power can at the same time also 
become (and often do become) vehicles of power in their decisions, judgements and 
actions. This is to say that for Foucault, when an individual makes a particular 
decision or acts in particular ways, he can at the same time actively take part in the 
operations of power. For instance, when an individual (say a manager) makes a 
decision on the basis of what he think to be scientific and objective he might at the 
same time be part of a larger network of power relationships. As I will explain below, 
in the case of NPM for example, a manager might decide to apply a certain method of 
management to the practices on the basis of what he thinks to be the ‘objective’ and 
‘scientific’ way of bringing about effectiveness and efficiency to the organization 
(Foucault 1980b). However, from a Foucauldian point of view, this does not mean (as 
is often thought) the manager is acting in a power-free way. In applying a management 
method to the practices, the manager is at the same time taking part in the operation of 
power. Thus, claiming or thinking to be acting ‘objectively’ and ‘scientifically’ does 
not necessarily entail an act free from power relationships. It is this aspect of power 
that, for Foucault, cannot be apprehended from a juridical or economic perspective.  
What he emphasizes here is that juridical and economic power is an obvious and direct 
form of power, as it uses easily observable means such as law, economy and force. 
However, other forms of power, which are more complex and discreet than juridical or 
economic power do exist in modern liberal societies – and as I claim below NPM is 
one of these forms of power. As Veyne argues, Foucault understands power as “the 
ability to control the behaviour of others without exerting physical pressure, to get 
people to walk without physically placing their feet and legs in the necessary 
positions” (Veyne 2010: 94).  That is, there is a certain dimension of power whereby 
rather than repressing the individuals through force, power gets them to do certain 
things in an apparently voluntary way.  
What is most interesting in these relatively new forms of power is that they are 
productive. That is, power, from Foucault’s point of view, can also produce or create 
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desires, norms, values, understandings, motivations and knowledge, through the use of 
various techniques and methods (Foucault 1977:194; 1988a). As will be explained 
below, methods of management used by the NPM such as auditing, TQM and 
performance indicators can all be considered as examples of this kind of power. They 
are all techniques of power that introduce new understandings, norms and values to the 
public sector, and in so doing get either practitioners or managers to be part of the 
power relationships in a voluntary way without use of coercion and violence 
(Foucault, 1980b). All these management methods introduce new understandings, 
values and norms regarding public services, their users, performance of practitioners 
and quality of products and services. Such new values, norms and understandings are 
not neutral acts of ‘scientific’ and ‘objective’ management but instead acts that renders 
power relationships possible within the public sector (Foucault, 1980b).  
Also important to note that by being productive in this way, power makes its 
application much more economical and efficient – and more importantly, much less 
observable and understandable – than pre–modern forms of power. Liberal society, 
from this point of view, does not denote lack of power (or less power compared to pre-
liberal period). Although juridical and economic power still exists in liberal society, 
Foucault argues that it is marked by this type of power.  
He gives various names to such type of power such as ‘liberal governmentality’, 
‘disciplinary power’ and ‘bio power’. Foucault thinks that modern society is marked 
by these forms of power but it is seldom understood, due to our thinking only in 
juridical or economic terms (Foucault 1976: 86). How, then, do these other forms of 
power operate in modern society? And more importantly, how can this help us 
understanding the transformation of the public sector and the crisis I claim to exist in 
the public sector? Two ways in which Foucault thinks power operates in modern 
society are central to answering these questions. As stated above, one of them is 
governmentality and the other one is disciplinary power. As I will demonstrate below, 
neoliberalism is the governmentality and NPM is a form of disciplinary power through 
which power relationships are formed within the society.  
2.2. Governmentality 
Analysing neoliberalism and NPM from a Foucauldian perspective will allow me to 
establish my argument regarding the crisis of the public sector in a more accurate and 
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substantive way than I have done so far. To demonstrate why this will be the case, 
however, I need begin from some reminding from the first chapter: I have 
demonstrated in the previous chapter that the crisis in the public sector is strictly 
related to the two rival set of presuppositions. One of these presuppositions, as I have 
shown, is held by the practices and the other is by the institutions of the public sector. 
I have also illustrated in the previous chapter that the presupposition of the institutions 
is related to the neoliberal politics. The concept of governmentality first of all helps to 
extent our understanding of the relationship between the presupposition of institutions 
and neoliberal politics. In particular, it helps to understand the productive side of 
power (mentioned above) in the case of neoliberal politics and how this productive 
side is connected to NPM and to the conflict between practices and institutions.  
Foucault developed his concept of governmentality in a series of lectures between 
1978 and 1979 and thus he has not published a complete work that deals with 
governmentality (Gordon, 1991). Partly because of this, and partly because of 
Foucault’s style, this concept has been interpreted in various different ways (e.g. Dean, 
1999; Gordon, 1991; Rose and Miller, 2008). Gordon (1991: 3) for instance, claims 
that it is a rationality of government that means “a way or system of thinking about the 
nature of the practice of government”. Dean (1999) thinks that it is multidimensional 
sphere of the ‘conduct of conduct’. That is, it is related to various ways of governing 
our conduct such as government of the self, of the population, of sexuality and so on. 
These different interpretations of the concept of governmentality emphasize different 
aspects of it. Here in this study, I will use the interpretation by Rose and Miller (2008) 
as well as Foucault own elaborations of the concept. Hence let me begin from 
Foucault’s.  
Foucault, in a rather sophisticated way, refers to various forms of governmentalities 
exercised during different periods of history, such as in Ancient Greece, Middle Ages 
and late modernity before he explains the concept in detail (he provides various 
explanation of the term in between his lectures (2007), but not in an analytic and 
systematic way. Here in this study I will begin with what he claims to be the dominant 
governmentality since 18th century and the governmentality that he thinks to presently 
dominant as these two governmentalities are the most relevant one to the purposes of 
this study. He begins exploring these types of governmentalities by pointing out a 
certain change in the objective of the government during the 18th century. Whereas 
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territory and sovereignty were the main concerns of government prior to the 18th 
century, since then the main concern has been the population and its so-called natural 
processes such as its birth rates, productivity, and wealth (Foucault 2007: 65-6). 
Foucault invites us to consider this new governmentality in comparison to 
Machiavelli’s political thought.  
Firstly, he suggests that Machiavelli’s The Prince which dates back to 16th century 
well represents the old governmentality that existed before the 18th century. It is well 
known that Machiavelli’s The Prince consists of set of pieces of advice directed to a 
prince or sovereign state, and how to maintain and strengthen this sovereign power. 
Foucault rightly points out that, for Machiavelli, the primary aim of the government is 
to secure the principality of the prince within a conquered or inhabited territory 
(Foucault 2007: 90-3). Even though Machiavelli had a new conception of politics, he 
still thought within the limits of what Foucault names as subject-sovereign-territory 
triangle. That is, within the Machiavellian framework, the main role of the sovereign is 
thought to be obtaining maximum sovereignty over its subjects and territory for the 
maximum amount of time.  
The type of governmentality Machiavelli represents relies on a juridical form of power 
I have explained above. However, for Foucault, a new type of government that cannot 
easily be captured through a Machiavellian political theory or practice emerges in the 
18th century. He names this form of power as liberal governmentality. At this point of 
the study, I will refer to the interpretation of Miller and Rose in order to elaborate on 
liberalism and neoliberalism. Note that, as mentioned above, this interpretation of 
governmentality in general and liberal governmentality in particular is just one of 
various interpretations and I have chosen this interpretation simply because it is 
helpful for the purposes of this study. Miller and Rose use Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality in order to elaborate on liberalism and neoliberalism from a 
Foucauldian point of view and my purpose here is to do the same. Miller and Rose 
(2008: 60) claim that what is distinctive about liberal government is that it “identifies a 
domain outside 'politics', and seeks to manage it without destroying its existence and 
its autonomy”. Within this form of government ‘preferences’, ‘private life’, ‘economic 
life’ and ‘civil society’ are all compartmentalized spheres of social life, which are to 
be conceived as non-political and be subjected to government at a distance, rather than 
a direct form of government.    
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How, then, does this indirect form of government become effective? As stated above, 
it becomes effective through enforcing15 or idealizing certain forms of a self-
understanding. Liberal governmentality presupposes that individuals within a 
population pursue a common goal: they pursue their own preferences before and 
beyond everything else (Miller and Rose, 2008: 20-6). As explained in the previous 
chapter, this presupposition is also made by the neoliberal politics and it corresponds 
to the presupposition of institutions of NPM too. But liberal governmentality does not 
only presuppose. It also aims to enforce that presupposition. It enforces this 
presupposition through promoting an understanding of self as homo economicus 
(Burchell 1991: 199). That is, self as a preference maximising individual, acting in a 
market either as a seller or a buyer. The idea of laissez-faire, initiated by Physiocrats 
and then developed by Adam Smith is an example of this liberal governmentality for 
Foucault. As is well known, from the point of the laissez-faire theorists, the primary 
aim of government is portrayed as the security of the link between preference 
maximising subjects and the wealth of populations (Gordon 1991: 127). The more 
subjects compete (in a fair way) for preference maximisation, the more wealth for the 
population is created. Such a link between preference maximisation and the wealth of 
the population can only be established, as laissez-faire theorists suggest, if the 
government does not dictate to individuals and population what to do and how to 
progress. The government only needs to enforce preference maximisation as a primary 
motive and secure fair competition between preference maximising subjects (Lemke, 
2001). Thus, the governmentality of liberalism as a political power is to promote or 
idealize a self-understanding that aims at preference-maximisation and acts in a 
market as a buyer or a seller.  
Now, to come back to neoliberalism, Foucault argues that neoliberal governmentality 
is also a form of liberal governmentality, as it too enforces homo economicus as an 
ideal form of subjectivity, but with an important difference.  He deals with 
neoliberalism in his 1978-1979 lectures at the Collège de France. There, neoliberalism 
is considered as a political power in which homo economicus is extended to the whole 
of the social sphere.  That is, whereas homo economicus of liberal governmentality 
mostly manifests itself in trade, accounting and business, in neoliberalism it is no 
                                                 
15 I have been using and will use the term enforcing throughout this chapter the following chapters but 




longer restricted to these areas. Referring to Hayek and Backer, who are considered to 
be thorough neoliberals, Foucault suggests that the neoliberal homo economicus, 
unlike the classical one, expands to wider spheres of social life. Marriage, crime, 
immigration, education and many other aspects of social life are considered as areas in 
which homo economicus can and should expand (Foucault 2008: 270-1). On the 
neoliberal account, one gets married, educated and indeed commits a crime on the 
basis of cost-benefit analysis, just like buyers and sellers (or investors) do in markets 
in the same way that one buys, sells or invests. 
This corresponds to an argument I have already made in the previous chapter, but with 
an additional element. I have already demonstrated that neoliberals like Hayek and 
Becker presuppose human beings as preference maximisers. The New Right 
formulation of early NPM policies, I have argued, inherited this presupposition from 
neoliberal economists. What needs to be added now is that this is not only a 
conceptual or theoretical heritage. As I will illustrate below, this heritage also opens 
up a number of ways in which new power relationships are exercised. Such 
relationships enforce practitioners to think of themselves and those who engage with 
the practices as homo economicus and hence to act and produce as preference 
maximisers in markets.  It is this aspect of Foucault’s analysis that has influenced 
some commentators of neoliberalism such as Wendy Brown and Thomas Lemke and it 
is this aspect of his account that is most relevant to our study too (see Brown 2003; 
Brown 2007; Lemke 2001; Miller and Rose 2008).  
Let me elaborate on what these commentators propose and how such propositions are 
related to the argument of this study. Wendy Brown argues, from a Foucauldian point 
of view that neoliberal governmentality understands and enforces homo economicus as 
an ideal type of subjectivity in all aspects of social life (Brown 2003: 11). According 
to Brown and Lemke, neoliberalism requires all forms of social existence to be 
submitted to an economic rationality (Brown 2003:4-5; Lemke 2001). Human beings 
are no longer categorised as ‘workers’, ‘managers’, ‘fathers’, ‘mothers’. They are all 
considered as owners of capital with an ability to make investments. Individuals’ 
actions, judgements and thoughts resemble those of entrepreneurs, even if he is not 
doing trade, business or accounting. Indeed, the ways in which individuals are 




Now, what is crucial to note once again is that for Foucault, power within the modern 
society does not only operate through law and state. As explained above, only juridical 
power operates through these means but not power as such. If neoliberal 
governmentality operates through a different form of power, it follows from this that 
neoliberal governmentality must use other means than only the state and the law to 
enforce homo economicus as an ideal form of self. I argue that along with the state and 
the law, the management regime of NPM is the main means through which homo 
economicus (and hence preference maximising self) is enforced as an ideal form of 
self. 
2.3. Neoliberal governmentality and NPM: liberation, radical change or 
intensification of bureaucracy? 
Although I have already remarked on the relations between NPM and neoliberalism in 
the previous chapter, I need to note also that the relations between them are not 
something unattended within the mainstream literature too. Many others have been 
pointing out certain relations between neoliberalism and NPM. In particular, at the 
critical side of the spectrum of mainstream literature, it has been argued that NPM is a 
reflection of neoliberalism – as the ideology of New Right (Walsh 1995; Diefenbach 
2009; Lorenz 2012). However, the link I find between the two is not that NPM is a 
simple reflection of the New Right ideology. Once we consider NPM and 
neoliberalism with reference to their presuppositions and governmentality, the relation 
between them is not merely one of ideology, but also one of power that goes beyond 
ideology.  
Neoliberal governmentality, I argue, has been implemented in the public sector 
through intensifying what Foucault calls ‘disciplinary power’. And as will become 
clear, disciplinary power does not depend on one ideology, but can function within 
different ideologies. In developing this argument, I will also point out some important 
problems with the mainstream accounts of NPM and how my account overcomes these 
problems. I begin the argument by pointing out what I find to be most problematic 
with the mainstream literature. Within the NPM literature, it is commonly agreed that 
NPM emerged during the 1980s in the Anglo-Saxon world, and became globally 
popular by the early 1990s. It is also widely accepted that the economic and political 
context of the 1970s and 1980s had significantly effect on the emergence of NPM. As 
is well known, from the 1970s onwards government revenues have been declining 
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both in the USA and the UK, whereas government spending and demand for public 
services and the number of employees working in the public sector have been 
increasing. Related to this, in the 1970s, there appeared to be a fiscal crisis in the UK. 
Such economic context brought about an intense dispute on cost-effectiveness, 
efficiency and accountability of public organizations. 
It is not a surprise that one of the most popular books advocating NPM, Reinventing 
Government: how the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public sector (Osborne 
and Gaebler 1992), was a direct response to the problem of cost-effectiveness, 
efficiency and accountability within the public sector. Not surprisingly again, other 
influential advocates of NPM considered effectiveness and efficiency in the public 
sector as the main problem to tackle (e.g. Pirie 1992; Le Grand 2007). Thus, within the 
mainstream literature, NPM is considered as an attempt to solve the alleged problems 
of effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability.  
How than is NPM considered to solve these alleged problems? Firstly, NPM proposed 
to shift the focus of the public sector from regulations, rules, and inputs to consumers, 
performance and output (Hood 1991; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Gruening 2001: 519; 
Denhardt and Denhardt 2004: 550; Kettl 2005: 17-8; Grand 2007; Diefenbach 2009: 
893). This was based on two claims: one descriptive and one normative. The 
descriptive claim is that public sector organizations are centralized bureaucracies with 
an inefficient hierarchical organizational structure (Lane 2000: 49-50). The normative 
claim suggests that this reality of public sector needs to be changed. Departing from 
this point of view, proponents of NPM have been arguing that NPM is an attempt to 
make the public sector more effective, efficient and accountable by liberating it from 
bureaucracy (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Kettl 2005; Grand 2007). They consider the 
aforementioned new management regime consisting of TQM, performance indicators 
and auditing as the main tool for realizing such liberation.  
Critical accounts do not consider NPM as a liberating force, but they too recognize it 
as a new management regime that results in a radical change in the nature of the 
bureaucratic form of public institutions (e.g. Hood 1991; Farrel and Morris 2003; Dent 
and Barry 2004; Ackroyd et al 2007). NPM, therefore, is considered to be an attempt 
to create a post-bureaucratic public sector both by its proponents and its critics. 
However, this shared belief does not rely on solid theoretical grounds because the 
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concept of bureaucracy has no clear meaning within the mainstream literature. The 
term is very often used without any comprehensive definition. On the one hand, 
proponents of NPM regularly use the term with a negative connotation (see Pirie 1992; 
Le Grand 2007). Certain critics of NPM, on the other hand, consider it as an ideology 
that tries to overcome bureaucracy in a rather unsuccessful and wrong-headed way 
(Diefenbach 2009; Walsh 1995). However, what they mean by bureaucracy is not 
clear. Indeed, the main aspects of bureaucracy (in Weber’s original definition) do not 
seem to be very different from the actual NPM methods and policies. Both the critical 
and proponent sides of NPM literature fails to understand this due to their lack of a 
theory of power and a theory of goods, practices and institutions. I argue that the right 
way of understanding NPM is to consider it as an intensification of bureaucracy rather 
than a liberation or departure from it. Once we analyse the original definition of 
bureaucracy developed by Weber from a Foucauldian point of view, it becomes clear 
that NPM has not changed the main elements of bureaucracy within the public sector. 
In particular, management methods of NPM such as auditing, performance indicators 
and TQM, are no less bureaucratic procedures than the so-called old public sector. 
What has been changed instead is the presupposition underlying the bureaucracy. 
NPM no longer shared the same presupposition with that of the practices. In the 
absence of a shared presupposition institutions began to intensify disciplinary power 
so that their presupposition is enforced upon practices.  
It is well-known, for Weber, bureaucracies are based on impersonal standards, rules 
and regulations introduced by centralized institutional governance (Weber 1946: 196). 
This is not at all denied by NPM (and its proponents). As is clear from the first 
chapter, auditing, performance indicators and TQM all introduce centralized and 
impersonal rules and regulations to the public services. Another important aspect of 
bureaucracy Weber rightly notes is the employee recruitment process. That is, contrary 
to the feudal type of organizations, in modern bureaucracies employees are recruited 
on the basis of their education, training, examination results and specialization (Weber 
1978:958). This is an indispensable feature of bureaucracy for Weber. One can hardly 
deny that both private and public organizations, from the beginning of bureaucracy 
until now, recruit individuals with a certain type of education, training and speciality. 
NPM does not aim to change this aspect of public organizations and neither the critical 
not the proponent accounts of it argue for such change.  
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Another central element of bureaucracy, for Weber, is related to the type of loyalty 
employees develop within bureaucratic organizations. In bureaucracies, loyalty is 
expressed in different forms to organizations with a feudal structure. According to 
Weber, loyalty to the functional purposes of the organizations rather than to a person 
or a figure of authority is central to bureaucracy (Weber 1978: 959). It is quite clear 
that this is also pursued in today’s organizations. Employees and managers of all kinds 
are expected to strive for organizational goals and objectives rather than the private 
purposes of an authority figure. No proponents or critiques of NPM deny this aspect of 
the public sector organizations under the NPM. Thus, neither this aspect of 
bureaucracy is changed by the NPM. This again entails that NPM is neither a 
departure nor liberation from bureaucracy as proponents and critics think.   
There is another important aspect of bureaucracy that I also need to point out. 
Bureaucracy “is the means of transforming social action into rationally organized 
action” says Weber (1978: 987). Bureaucracy, that is to say, is a rationalization 
process. Central to this rationalization16 process is ‘calculation’. By calculation, Weber 
denotes an ability to calculate the best means to achieve given ends. He notes that in 
modern societies “one can, in principle, master all things by calculation” and modern 
bureaucratic organizations are marked by this type of mastery (Weber 1946: 139). 
Rather than the mere power of a person, it is the power of calculating reason that is in 
operation within bureaucracies. Calculation of expenses, profit, efficiency and 
performance is of fundamental importance to bureaucratic organizations.  
This indicates another important element of bureaucratic organizations, which happens 
to exist within almost all types of organizations of our capitalist societies and which 
has never been denied or rejected by the NPM: instrumental reason. Instrumental 
reason can be defined as a process in which human rationality develops and utilizes 
ways of determining the most effective and efficient means to achieve a pre-given end. 
Instrumental rationality, from Weber’s point of view, calculates, divides and regulates 
the procedures of production or service provision for the sake of efficiency. Modern 
society and particularly capitalist societies develop as a result of the development and 
dominance of instrumental reason through the bureaucratic organization (Weber 1978: 
                                                 
16 Here and elsewhere I use the concept of ‘rationalization’ in terms of its use in classical sociology and 
particularly in Weber’s sociology. Which means domination of rationally calculated behaviour over the 
traditionally, culturally motivated action.  
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975-6). Therefore, bureaucratic organizations can be understood as organizations 
where instrumental rationality develops and becomes dominant. NPM cannot 
consistently target this aspect of bureaucratic organizations either. This is because 
NPM is highly in favour of instrumental reason and the rationalization process (see 
Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Le Grand 2007: 20-5). This is because, as explained 
above, the main target of NPM is in fact efficiency and effectiveness. NPM essentially 
promises effectiveness and efficiency. Neither the proponent accounts nor the critical 
ones disagree on this. What they disagree is whether NPM is a successful attempt to 
bring about effectiveness and efficiency to the public sector. It is, therefore, obvious 
that NPM aims to enhance the operation of instrumental reason within the public 
sector rather than replacing it with another type of rationality. Mainstream accounts of 
NPM, therefore, cannot accurately understand what is new about NPM. They claim 
that it is an attempt to diminish bureaucracy, but as it clear from the above, there is not 
such an attempt. 
Within the mainstream literature, NPM is also considered as an application of 
“business-like” management methods to the public sector. On the one hand, this 
application is believed by the proponents of NPM to be the main tool to free public 
sector from bureaucracy (Le Grand, 2007; Pirie 1992; Osborne and Geabler 1992). 
Critics, on the other hand, also considered NPM as an application of "business-like" 
management methods that challenges the bureaucratic nature of public organizations 
(Du Gay 2005). However, this too does not rest on solid grounds. It is highly 
disputable whether private business organizations are exempt from bureaucracy. Many 
contemporary business organizations are bureaucratic too.  
One important work which illustrates this is Ritzer’s The McDonaldization of Society. 
Ritzer convincingly shows that organizations in various industries such as fast food 
restaurants, retail, leisure and many other private businesses use the bureaucratic 
processes that I have just mentioned above. McDonald’s restaurants use calculation, 
quantification and efficiency just like the old bureaucracies of capitalism and the 
public sector (Ritzer 1993; 1997). Ritzer names the spread of these techniques of 
calculation, quantification and efficiency to the other industries, and to other spheres 
of society, as the process of “McDonaldization”. He claims that the idea of 
McDonaldization relies on Weber’s notion of rationalization and thus on bureaucracy. 
McDonaldized business organizations, for Ritzer, are based on routinized, regulated 
82 
 
and rule-based procedures, which in turn reveal their bureaucratic content. Although 
bureaucratic organizations have changed throughout time, their nature – and especially 
the rationalization processes – have remained the same, and indeed spread to various 
other areas of social life. Therefore, if business organizations are not necessarily 
devoid of bureaucracy, the application of “business-like” methods to the public sector 
would not necessarily imply relief (or a radical departure) from bureaucracy.  
It follows from what has been stated in this section that mainstream literature fails to 
understand the nature of NPM. As I argue below, from a Foucauldian point of view, 
instead of being an attack or liberation from bureaucracy, NPM is an intensification of 
bureaucracy that enforces homo economicus as an ideal type of self within the public 
sector. In so doing, NPM becomes part of neoliberal governmentality. As will also be 
clear from below, failing to recognize this nature of NPM prevents the mainstream 
literature of public management from understanding the nature of the conflict in the 
public sector. This is not to say they mainstream literature fails absolutely. What have 
been described within the literature are often right descriptions of the formal 
management methods and structures brought about by NPM. But they fail to 
understand that such methods also enforce certain expectations and understandings of 
the self, which are rival to the expectation and understandings of practices. Not only 
that they fail to recognize these rival expectations and understanding, but also the 
ways in which this rivalry turns into a conflict and then into a crisis. I argue that this 
can be done with reference to Foucault’s concepts of governmentality (in the sense 
that it is interpreted above) and disciplinary.   
2.4. Bureaucracy as a form of disciplinary power 
At first sight, Weber and Foucault are of course very different types of scholars. 
However, although Weber’s general sociology differs from Foucault to an important 
extent, his analysis of bureaucracy precedes and resembles Foucault’s notion of 
disciplinary power. It can be argued that, as some others also do (see O’Neil 1986), 
Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power can be interpreted as a certain kind of 
modification and extension of Weber’s illustration of bureaucracy. Let me thus move 
on by elaborating on Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power.  
To begin with, disciplinary power is a form of power that uses the methods of 
surveillance, normalization and examination. It requires modern institutions like 
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prisons, workshops, hospitals and schools in order to function. It is neither juridical 
nor economic power. It is not a form of power that is only applied through the usual 
means such as the state, law, police, political ideology (or party) and wealth. It is not a 
form of power that uses violence, coercion and oppression. As mentioned above it is a 
form of power that is productive. That is, it produced norms and values through which 
power is exercised more effectively and efficiently.  
It is crucial to note that effectiveness and efficiency are the main goals that underlie 
disciplinary power, rather than exploitation and oppression (Foucault 1977: 171). That 
is, disciplinary power is a form of control that is considered to lead to more 
effectiveness and efficiency within particular institutions. In fact, for Foucault, it is a 
successful form of power with respect to effectiveness and efficiency. This success of 
disciplinary power is again related to the methods it uses. That is, “the use of simple 
instruments; hierarchical observation, normalization, and their combination in a 
procedure that is specific to it, the examination” (Foucault 1977: 170). Foucault names 
these instruments as ‘technologies of power’.  
Although I will explain this below, let me note now that when we think of NPM from 
this perspective, such technologies directly correspond to management methods like 
TQM, performance indicators and auditing. Furthermore, as stated above, proponents 
of NPM proposed certain management methods as scientific and objective tools to 
render public organizations into effective, efficient and accountable organizations. 
From a Foucauldian point of view, however, NPM is not only about efficiency and 
effectiveness, but also about power relationships.  
My argument is that no matter how good or bad the intentions of the New Right, The 
Citizens’ Charter and the aforementioned enactments were, and no matter whether 
they lead to effectiveness and efficiency, the result is a change in the ways in which 
disciplinary power is exercised within the public sector. That is, from a Foucauldian 
point of view, there is a dimension of NPM that goes beyond that of say ideology-
power and the so-called scientific objectivity of organizational management. This is 
mainly because of technologies of power that are widely used, such as surveillance, 
normalization and examination are not neutral scientific tools but also tools of power. 
These methods can be applied within different “sciences” of organizations as well as 
within different ideologies, but in any case, they enforce certain norms for rationality 
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and self-understanding that allows power to operate without the need for repression 
and oppression.  
Through information on attendance, hours of work, output, quality, performance, 
profit, timing and so on, a certain form of self-understanding and rationality can be 
exerted over the practices (Foucault 1977: 175; Foucault 1980c:117).  
 
[Disciplinary power] aims to establish presences and absences, to know 
where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications, to 
interrupt others, to be able to at each movement to supervise the conduct of 
each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its qualities or merits. 
[Disciplinary power is] a procedure, therefore, aimed at knowing, 
mastering and using (Foucault 1977:143).    
 
Disciplinary power is capable of doing these things largely through the use of 
surveillance. Foucault notes that in modern institutions there are individuals who are 
responsible for the surveillance of others. In the case of public sector organisations, 
this is the responsibility of managers, who either belong to the institutions in which 
practices are based or institutions which are directly responsible for surveillance such 
as AC and OFED. With the use of information that is gained out of surveillance, 
eliminating the ineffective and detecting the useful behaviour or individuals becomes 
much easier.  
Note that this does not entail that power in disciplinary institutions is possessed by 
those who are responsible for surveillance.  
 
The power in hierarchical surveillance of the discipline is not possessed as 
a thing, or transferred as a property; it functions like a piece of machinery. 
And, although it is true that pyramidal organizations gives it a ‘head’, it is 
the apparatuses as a whole that produces ‘power’ and distributes 
individuals in this permanent and continuous field (Foucault, 1977: 




In fact, it is this unique formation of power that makes disciplinary power ‘discreet’, 
because it allows a kind of supervision that is everywhere and always alert and that 
“functions permanently and largely in silence” (1977: 177). On Foucault’s account, 
surveillance happens to be one of the fundamental techniques and methods of modern 
power relationships that goes beyond that of juridical and economic power. The reason 
for surveillance being at the centre of power is its ability to contribute to the making of 
“useful” individuals (Foucault 1977: 211). To understand what Foucault means by this 
claim, we need to explore another technology of power, namely, normalization.  
The main purpose of normalization is the correction of deviant or unwanted behaviour. 
That is, it aims to standardize human behaviour in such a way that behaviour becomes 
efficient or productive. Foucault unfolds this aspect of disciplinary power through 
demonstrating the ways in which punishment is used within different power 
frameworks. He notes that premodern implementation of power used punishment as a 
form of revenge taken by the King or by whoever possesses the power (Foucault 1994: 
43). In institutions, where disciplinary power is used, on the other hand, power is 
implemented in order to correct, with a view to what is efficient and inefficient 
(Foucault 1977: 189). In such institutions, there appears to be a social body with its 
norms of efficiency and normality; and a whole system of ranking and fixing 
individuals in terms of these norms. Punishment, within such system of ranking and 
fixing takes the form of confinement and training in order to transform inefficient 
individuals into efficient ones. “Disciplinary punishment has the function of reducing 
gaps” says Foucault (Foucault 1977: 180). That is, reducing the gaps between the poor 
and good performers. Through disciplined training or habituation, individuals within 
the disciplinary institutions of liberal society are controlled on the basis of what are 
good and bad in terms of performance.  
There is another technique of disciplinary power that allows power to operate without 
the use of violence and oppression. This technique is examination. Both of the 
techniques I have mentioned above are combined in examination. “The examination 
that places the individuals in a field of surveillance also situates them in a network of 
writing; it engages them in whole mass of documents that capture and fix them” 
(Foucault 1977: 189). That is, in an institution where disciplinary power is widely 
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used, there is documentation related to each individual. And such documentation 
would involve information on whether that individual is present, absent, successful, 
effective, docile and so on. In other words, there appears to be an accumulation of 
documentation, which makes it possible to classify, to form categories, to determine 
averages and fix norms. “Examination is the technique by which, power, instead of 
emitting the signs of its potency, instead of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds 
them in a mechanism of objectification” (Foucault 1977: 187). Examination and 
surveillance turns individuals and their performance into knowable entities.  
What is knowable in the framework of disciplinary power is quantified information. 
One can know by examination and surveillance how far a worker, student, doctor, a 
teacher or a programme-maker departs from being normal. Once this is known, then 
the necessary training or corrective action can be taken. That is, normalization can take 
place. Examination is the main tool through which gaps between bad and good 
performance is aimed to be reduced. It is through examination that individuals are 
measured “in quantitative terms and hierarchize[d] in terms of value the abilities, the 
level, the ‘nature’ of individuals” (Foucault 1977: 183). Examination, with 
surveillance, therefore, helps to effectively put the norms of effectiveness and 
efficiency into motion.17  
Commentators like O’Neil (1986: 45) and Szakolczai (1998) are therefore right to 
think that Foucault’s account of disciplinary power complements Weber’s concept of 
bureaucracy with a physiology of power. This is mainly because just like Weber’s 
exposition of bureaucracy, Foucault’s account of the disciplinary power too unfolds 
the ways in which instrumental rationality operates within our modern institutions. But 
on Foucault’s account, unlike Weber’s, the explanation is provided with reference to 
various micro mechanisms of power such as surveillance, normalization and 
examination. From a Foucauldian point of view, one can understand bureaucratic 
                                                 
17 This is not to say, however, that these techniques are put into the service of identical ends. There are 
various pre-given ends of different organizations. If the organization in question is a prison, the end is 
correction of deviant behaviour of the prisoners. If it is a school, then the end is educating individuals so 
that they can become useful for the society, and if the organization in question is a factory, the aim is 
productivity. But as a matter of fact, in all these institutions, techniques of disciplinary power are put in 
the service of achieving such pre-given ends in an effective and efficient way. This entails that 
disciplinary power does not have the purpose of changing the ends of an organization. It rather uses 
certain techniques to achieve ends of various kinds. 
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organizations as social spheres in which disciplinary power is institutionalized and 
applied18.  
Before I move on, it is important to note (on the basis of the interpretation of 
governmentality I have developed above) that the ends to which disciplinary power is 
going to serve, depends on the type of governmentality. That is, the pre-given ends, to 
which disciplinary power helps to achieve in an effective and efficient way, are often 
designed by governmentality. Having said that the governmentality we have in today’s 
society is neoliberal governmentality, it follows that disciplinary power aims to 
enforce individuals to think of themselves and act in terms of homo economicus. That 
is, disciplinary power under neoliberal governmentality would enforce those, upon 
which the power is applied, to aim at preference maximisation of buyers or sellers in a 
market. I have already argued without referring to homo economicus that this is the 
kind of self-understanding that is initiated by CC and internal markets. As explained in 
the previous chapter, internal markets introduce a new type of competition to the 
public sector. It introduces a competition based on the criterion of preference 
maximisation. As again explained in the previous chapter, internal markets are 
designed in a way that within such markets organizations and practitioners are 
expected to compete for more consumer and maximisation of their preferences (Le 
Grand and Bartlett, 1993; Ferlie, 1992). That is, the more consumers are satisfied the 
more successful the organization and the practice is. Now, I can add to this that this is 
also enforced as part of neoliberal governmentality through internal markets, CC and a 
number of management methods that has followed these polices.  
As explained in the previous chapter, internal markets require one to think of himself 
(does not matter whether one is a practitioner or user of the services) as a self, acting 
within a market as either a buyer or a seller. This is indicated by the purchasers and 
providers distinction required by internal market. Schools, universities, GP clinics and 
hospitals need to compete with each other as providers of services for getting funds (or 
being purchased) by the state or relevant authorities. They need to compete for more 
customer satisfaction (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993; Ferlie, 1992). To do this they need 
                                                 
18 There is, of course, an important difference between Foucault and Weber here. Although it is 
disputable, a certain reading of Weber suggests that the domination of instrumental rationality is a 
negative development in human history. Thus, certain commentators believe that Weber evaluated 
instrumental rationality in normative terms, with reference to his notion of ‘iron cage’ posited in 
Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism. Foucault, on the other hand, has no normative position 
regarding the domination of instrumental rationality, although he somehow accepts such domination. 
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to use methods such as marketing strategies and management methods that place 
preference maximisation at the hearth of public sector organizations such auditing and 
TQM. That is, internal markets enforce and require citizens and practitioners to 
understand themselves and others as homo economicus through using methods such as 
auditing, TQM and performance indicators.  
As I will explain below, internal markets and the understanding of human beings 
particular to it (human beings as homo economicus) has established the criterion for 
one of the main methods of disciplinary power used by NPM; namely, normalization. 
That is, through introduction of internal markets considering oneself as a buyer or a 
seller acting in a market has become the normal self, whereas considering oneself as a 
human being the principle of which is wellbeing the achievement of which requires 
cultivation of the virtues has become marginalized.  
2.5. Disciplinary power and NPM 
Now, in order to developed the argument sketched above I am going to focus on 
specific management methods of auditing, TQM and performance indicators. I argue 
that practitioners, who were at once the main vehicles of disciplinary power (Larson, 
2005), are now subjected to this form of power since NPM. It is through this 
subjection that internal markets are established and preference maximisation has been 
enforced to the practitioners as one of the ultimate aims. I have already explained in 
the first chapter that since the NPM auditing methods of management, TQM and 
performance indicators have been proliferating. Power (1997) names this proliferation 
as the “audit explosion”, which means that auditing has become much more of a 
common and widespread method of management than it was before NPM. This can be 
recognized from an apparent development within the public sector since the NPM. 
There has been a huge increase in the number of recruited employees and finances 
devoted to activities that relate to auditing. New employees were recruited to report, 
check and analyse whether practices are doing well with respect to efficiency, 
effectiveness and consumer satisfaction (Hood et al 1999: 23-24). Management 
consultants were hired; organizational structures were developed or redesigned for this 
purpose. This auditing cycle illustrates how effective the disciplinary power was 
becoming over the practices during the NPM.  
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However, in order to develop this argument one has to look into the ways in which 
auditing can be associated with disciplinary power and neoliberal governmentality. As 
explained in the previous chapter, auditing basically means a system of checking. It 
checks whether an organization and its practices are performing the role they “should” 
be performing. From an audit (or auditor) point of view, what kind of role employees 
and organizations claim to play is supposed not to be important. Instead, what is 
considered to be important is to conduct a checking on whether the means match with 
the predetermined ends of the organization in a lawful, efficient and effective way. It 
is, therefore, clear that “audit explosion” amount to highly increased level of 
surveillance and examination on the performance and quality of services of the 
practitioners in the public sector. Without these technologies of power, it is impossible 
to conduct a reasonable audit.  
Furthermore, from a Foucauldian point of view, auditing not only includes intense use 
of surveillance and examination. Auditing involves techniques of normalization that 
transforms the meaning of quality and performance on the basis of a certain 
presupposition about human beings (that is, human being as preference maximisers or 
as homo economicus). As explained in the previous chapter, auditing or surveillance 
and examination aim to quantify performance and quality on the basis of quantified 
information on costs and consumer satisfaction. Such quantification requires 
practitioners to understand both themselves and the users of services in terms of 
individuals who are acting as preference maximising individuals as buyers of services 
in a market. Thus, internal markets do not only require purchasers and providers 
distinction within the public sector, but also a particular form of disciplinary power 
that enforces homo economicus as an ideal understanding of self.  
If we reconsider the aforementioned policies, enactments and the authority given to 
the AC and OFSTED to inspect public organizations from this point of view, it again 
becomes clear that disciplinary power and bureaucracy has been intensifying in the 
public sector since NPM with the effect of normalizing self-understanding in terms of 
homo economicus. Let me elaborate on this with reference to one of the main roles 
assigned to the AC. Since the emergence of NPM, AC had been responsible for either 
developing performance indicator or enforcing organizations to do so. When we 
analyse what kind of performance indicators AC attempted to develop, we confront 
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with the method of normalization and examination on the basis of preference 
maximisation.   
AC’s purpose in developing performance indicators is to 
 
facilitate the making of appropriate comparisons (by reference to the 
criteria of cost, economy, efficiency and effectiveness) between the 
standard of performance achieved by different authorities and the standard 
of performance achieved in different years (Local Government Act 1992, p. 
1). 
 
As is clear from the above quote, performance indicators were developed to facilitate 
“appropriate comparisons” between organizations. However, to make comparisons on 
the basis of effectiveness and efficiency requires a certain form of data collection. That 
is, quantitative data collection.  
Without quantitative data it is almost impossible to make comparisons (in terms of 
effectiveness and efficiency) between different organizations. This is not because no 
comparisons can be made between organizations on the basis of other forms of data 
(such as qualitative data), but because without quantitative data, it would cost more 
time and finance to make comparisons – which would contradict with the main aim of 
NPM to render organizations effective and efficient. It is, in other words, much more 
efficient and effective to make comparisons on the bases of quantitative information, 
and this is in fact what NPM preferred to do in making its comparisons. It compared 
schools on the bases of exam results; universities on the basis of the number of student 
and student satisfaction, TV-programmes on the bases of ratings, and research on the 
bases of the number of publications in journals.  
It is important to note that from a Foucauldian point of view this not a simple process 
of quantification but also a way of asserting the power to the practices. As I have 
illustrated above, in order to gather quantitative data on performance, doctors, teachers 
and academics need to be closely inspected and examined. They need not only to 
report their performance in numeric terms but they also need to report how they will 
do better in future - i.e. their projections on future exam results, number of students, 
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the number of surgeries, publication and so on. Thus, they are inspected and expected 
to inspect themselves, and then to develop information out of such inspection to make 
it available for the examination by the managers and certain bodies such as AC and 
OFSTED. How good or bad the schools, universities and, therefore, the teachers and 
academics are performing begun to be evaluated against the league tables where 
statistical and quantitative information on performance were accumulated and 
published.  
As mentioned above, there are also normalization processes that are applied to the 
practices through this quantification process. To understand further aspects of these 
normalization processes, one needs to seek what is understood by effectiveness and 
efficiency. As stated above performance indicators are developed on the basis of 
effectiveness and efficiency for "appropriate comparisons". But what is meant by 
effectiveness and efficiency? Effectiveness and efficiency are understood here in a 
twofold way. One is in terms of costs and the other is in terms of the maximisation of 
consumer preferences.  
What is important regarding the purposes of this study is this latter side of 
effectiveness and efficiency. Although I have explained what consumer sovereignty 
means and how is has been used within the public sector, let me briefly explain it 
again as it will help us to see how normalization of performance and quality took place 
through NPM. Consumer sovereignty means that the final judgement on the 
performance of practitioners and quality of public goods and services should be made 
by the consumers of those goods and services. As shown in the previous chapter, this 
has been widely applied since the NPM. What is important to add now is that it is 
particularly used in the quantification process of performance and quality as 
effectiveness and efficiency largely understood in terms of satisfaction of consumer 
preferences. That is, quality and performance normalized through the idea that the 
users of the services are preference maximising consumers in a market and this needs 
to be taken as the main target of practices. What happened to be normal or the norm 
and valuable is the satisfaction of preference maximising consumer in the market.  
Whereas audit, and hence examination and surveillance were mostly about the 
finances of an institution before the NPM, it now expanded from finance to 
performance. This amount to a significant change: auditing is no longer just about how 
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much and how for instance doctors spend public money in certain hospitals, but also 
about how they diagnose and cure their patients (Leavey et al 1989). As for education 
and research, the same point can be made. Auditing is not only about how schools and 
universities use their finances, but also about how teachers and their schools educate 
their students and how academics conduct research (Shore and Wright 2000; Hood et 
al 1999: 141). From a Foucauldian point of view this is a clear indication of how homo 
economicus, as the ideal self, expanded throughout the sphere of practice by the 
intensification of disciplinary power.    
Now, like auditing, TQM turned out to be another main tool for the quantification of 
quality on the same basis. Hence, TQM is another management method through which 
disciplinary power is intensified within the public sector under the neoliberal 
governmentality. As explained in details again in the previous chapter, TQM consists 
of processes whereby performance and consumer preferences are observed, 
documented and objectified in terms of hard data. This has been done once again on 
the basis of preference maximisation. That is, hard data were collected on the amounts 
of costs spent, on uniform results such as the number of patients served, the number of 
viewers of a programme and eventually the number of consumers satisfied with such 
services.  
To demonstrate this through an example let me refer to the illustrative case (of the 
fourth chapter). Practitioners of TV and radio programmes are subjected to heavy 
normalization, surveillance and examination from management since the NPM (Born 
2003). Although I will explain the BBC case in much more details, in chapter four, let 
me note now that auditing attempted to change the ways in which performance and 
quality had been understood and evaluated within the BBC (Born 2004: 99-100; 214-
5). Ratings – the number of people who watch a programme – for instance, come to 
play a much more decisive role in the evaluation of quality and performance after the 
NPM. This illustrates how auditing is not a mere objective technical tool for 
improving the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of public sector 
organizations, but also a vehicle for the disciplinary power to change the nature of 
performance and quality on the basis of preference maximisation.19  
                                                 
19 As I have explained in the previous chapter, within practices like medicine, sciences and arts there are 
internal goods the achievement of which requires standards of excellence peculiar to the activities of the 
individuals participating to those practices. Such standards, as I have demonstrated, developed through 
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To illustrate the ways in which this has been done within the BBC further, it would be 
sufficient for now to note that while the BBC was going through efficiency cuts during 
the 1990s, the spending on the managerial activities such as inspection, management 
consultancy, reporting, and accounting were dramatically increasing (see Born 2004: 
215). Furthermore, a whole range of procedures were introduced to the BBC with the 
intention of accumulating information, increasing inspection and setting up new norms 
concerning the performance of professionals and the quality of the services. In 
particular, the ways in which quality has been evaluated and judged were subjected to 
serious changes. Whereas the quality of programmes was evaluated largely by the 
practitioners of programme-makers before the NPM, this has attempted to be changed. 
Quality had begun to be judged by managers, against the standards of cost-
effectiveness and the number of potential and actual viewers (Born 2003; Burns 1977). 
This is to say that quality and performance began to be judged on the basis of 
preference maximisation.20  
Before I move on, let me note that this is not to say that public sector and disciplinary 
power had no relations before the NPM. In fact, in Foucault’s original analysis, 
disciplinary power captures patients, prisoners, students and workers through a 
network of power relations in the main institutions of modern society, including public 
institutions such as hospitals, schools and prisons from the beginning of the 18th 
century. Indeed, for Foucault, disciplinary power had been largely exercised through 
experts or professionals that are employed within the public organizations (Foucault 
1977; 2003; see also Larson 2005; Rose 1999). A teacher, a doctor or a guardian and 
their relevant disciplines are the main vehicles through which disciplinary power has 
been traditionally exercised within prisons, hospitals and schools on Foucault’s 
account.  
What needs to be added to Foucault's account is that after and during the NPM, 
disciplinary power expanded to the performance of academics, teachers, broadcasters 
and doctors and to the quality of public services and goods (see also Power 1997; 
Shore and Wright 2000: 59-61; Born 2003; Leavey et al 1989). An interesting joint 
publication by the National Audit Office (NAO), HM Treasury, Cabinet Office, Audit 
                                                                                                                                                        
the accumulation of knowledge and experience. However, auditing, as a form of disciplinary power, 
aimed to transform this aspect of practice with respect to preference maximisation.    
20 Not only the ways in which quality is evaluated and judged was changed, the number of reporting and 
inspection also increased in order to bring this new type of evaluation and judgment into actuality. 
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Commission and the Office for National Statistics (ONS) (2001) unfolds this aspect of 
NPM in a very apparent way. The principal aim of this document is to outline: 
 
The general principles behind producing high quality performance 
information – that is information used to measure an organisation’s 
progress towards its objectives. It looks at what sort of information is worth 
collecting as performance information, and the principles behind pulling 
together a set of performance measures (NAO, HM Treasury, ONS, 
2001:3).  
 
This document provides a detailed set of advice on the best ways of gathering 
information on performance. Without getting into the details of the document, I should 
note that it manifests a desire to accumulate quantified information on the performance 
of practitioners, which once again indicates the intensification of disciplinary power 
and hence bureaucracy within the public sector. More to the point, consumer 
satisfaction once again is taken as one of the main criterions for data collection. It is 
important to note that although I am referring to a particular document here it is 
representative of a proliferation publications and recommendations about how to 
measure and evaluate quality and performance in the public sector, which indicates an 
intense process of normalization and examination of performance and quality. That is, 
through various bodies such as AC, National Audit Office and so on, preference 
maximisation is recommended to be enforced as a norm and surveillance and 
examination are recommended as the main method to accomplish this enforcement.  
One year later to this document, for example, AC published another report on 
performance management named as Performance Breakthroughs with the intention of 
improving performance management in the public sector (AC 2002). This report was 
produced for the attention of high-level managers in the public sector. It is again a 
very detailed document outlining the best techniques and methods to gather 
information, evaluate and manage the performance of practitioners such as doctors, 
academics and teachers. It suggests the use of techniques and methods that are similar 
to that of auditing and TQM. And it eventually advises reformulation or 
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reconceptualization of what has been traditionally understood by quality and 
performance on the basis of preference maximisation of consumers.  
Now, what has been illustrated above implies that these policy recommendations, just 
like the enactments I have mentioned in the first chapter, assume that practitioners’ 
knowledge on quality and performance are not very useful for managers. This is 
because knowledge of practitioners on quality and performance is thought to be 'tacit' 
and what is tacit cannot be subjected to disciplinary power. Such recommendation-
documents, therefore, advise managers to change practitioners’ understanding of 
performance and quality in a way that they become explicit. What is understood from 
being explicit, however, is again based on preference maximisation (and costs). That is 
to say, once again we can see how through the methods of disciplinary power, 
practitioners and the users of the services come to be understood as, and enforced to 
think and act like, homo economicus.  
One of the most recent areas, in which we can observe this, is the idea or policy of 
Social Impact Bonds21. Also known as Pay for Success Bond, Social Impact Bond 
(SIB) is one of the most recent manifestations of NPM in the management of public 
services - though it has not yet been considered under such theme within the 
mainstream literature. Although only applied to limited areas and not very widespread 
for now, it has an increasing influence on public services such as health, education and 
criminal justice (Mchugh et al, 2013). One of the main aims of SIBs is to get investors, 
public organizations, NGOs and government to work together for the solution of social 
problems.  
There are a number of novel aspects to SIB that needs to be mentioned. First, a bond 
needs to be created, but compared to the traditional bonds, such bond needs to be 
based on a social problem. Also, certain NGOs (together with public organizations) 
need to be assigned for the solution of the problem(s) that the bond is based on. 
Private investors, who are interested in the solution of such problems, would then buy 
those bonds. If the organizations in question succeed in solving the relevant social 
problem, then, the investors win out of their investment. If the organization(s) fail, 
then, investors will lose their investment.  
                                                 
21 What I am going to argue here about the SIBs are inferred from Social Finance UK website 
(http://www.socialfinance.org.uk/). This is because there are only couple of academic publications on 
this policy and even those are mainly on whether the policy can be effective or not.  
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We do not need to go into the details of SIBs here, but there is a crucial element that 
needs to be noted: SIBs need to be specific, quantifiable and achievable. These would 
allow outcomes to be measurable. This is essential because without measurement SIBs 
would not be possible. In other words, activities within a specific SIB, needs to be 
auditable. An independent body needs to audit the organization to see whether it has 
achieved the aims and objectives of the project that aims to solve a social problem. For 
this reason, it is not surprising that performance indicators and management of quality 
is at the core of the idea of SIB. We can clearly observe this in a recent announcement 
from the Worcestershire Country Council where SIBs are used: “There will be a 
robust evaluation process which will focus on the effectiveness and cost benefits of the 
programme, with the Council and Clinical Commissioning Groups only paying for 
results.” (Quoted in, Worcestershire Country Council 2015). As is clear, once again, 
there is the implication that disciplinary power is implemented to the services whereby 
SIBs are present. That is, in order to evaluate the success of the SIB services, 
performance and quality need to be quantified and inspected through examination and 
normalized through the norms of effectiveness and efficiency. Practitioners, who are 
responsible for the delivery of the services, are expected to work on the basis of cost-
benefit analysis and conceive quality and performance in measurable and observable 
terms under SIBs.  
The traditional understanding of quality and performance within these practices are, 
once again, not counted as valid as they are considered unmeasurable. As stated above, 
without measurability disciplinary power cannot work effectively. And what are, in 
fact, measurable in quantitative ways are the costs and the ways in which preferences 
are maximised through the services and goods produced within the practices. Thus, 
SIBs once again enforces practitioners to act and think like homo economicus through 
technologies of power such as surveillance, normalization, and examination.    
2.6. NPM, disciplinary power and the crisis of the public sector 
Now, as a result of the attempt to change the meaning of quality and good 
performance, a new type of occupation becomes quite an important aspect of power 
within the public sector, namely, management. This is because auditing, TQM, 
performance indicators and, hence, the techniques of examination, surveillance and 
normalization of performance and quality has been exercised through management. 
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Regardless of whether management and managers are representing the objective ways 
of turning public sector organizations into effective and efficient organizations, as 
claimed by the proponents of NPM, it is apparent that they exert disciplinary power 
over practices through which preference maximisation is enforced as one of the main 
motivations for action. Therefore, NPM does not only amount to a certain ethos 
regarding the relationship between practices and users of their services (that are 
followed by a certain presupposition) but also to a change in the ways in which power 
is exercised by the institutions and managers. More to the point, NPM does neither 
imply a radical departure nor liberation from bureaucracy. Since bureaucracy and 
disciplinary power resemble each other, NPM is an intensification of disciplinary 
power through which neoliberal governmentality becomes effective within the public 
sector. This, I argue, subordinates goods internal to practices to the goods external to 
them and lead to a conflict between practices and institutions. However, as mentioned 
in the introduction too, to develop this argument one needs to go beyond Foucault and 
appeal to MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism.  
Foucault argues and illustrates in a successful way that “the characteristic feature of 
power is that some men can more or less entirely determine other men’s conduct – but 
never exhaustedly or coercively” (Foucault 1988: 83). As I have demonstrated 
throughout this chapter, NPM attempts to do this in the public sector. However, some 
important questions remain to be answered with regard to Foucault’s theory of power 
that affects my account of NPM and the crisis of the public sector too: even if 
practices within the public sector are surrounded with disciplinary power and 
neoliberal governmentality, are they condemned to such power? More importantly, if 
there is resistance, what exactly motivates this resistance? What kind of alternative 
forms of governmentality and power would regulate institutions and practices without 
conflict and crisis? These questions are of special importance for the purposes of this 
study and a Foucauldian approach alone does not provide sufficient answers to them. 
It is important to ask and answer these questions because, there is resistance to 
neoliberal governmentality and disciplinary power within the public sector and such 
resistance plays a key role in the conflict within the public sector and hence, in the 
crisis of the public sector. But why Foucauldian account alone cannot do this?   
This is for at least two reasons. First, Foucault does not have an account of practices as 
separate from institutions and second, Foucault lacks a normative critical account of 
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power. To be sure, it is not within the scope of this study to develop a comprehensive 
criticism of Foucault, but it is worth mentioning that the similar insufficiencies are 
pointed out by other important scholars too (especially criticisms related to the second 
problem I have just mentioned). Before I elaborate on this let me note also that these 
insufficiencies, as I will explain below, are at the same time points of conflict between 
Foucault’s and MacIntyre’s philosophy. To point out some of them, Habermas thinks 
that “the problem of justifying criticism excluded in favour of value–free historical 
explanations” in Foucault’s project (Habermas 1994: 87). In other words, within 
Foucault’s analyses of power, there is no normative criticism of power through which 
reasons for opposition to or adoption of say disciplinary power is explained. Another 
similar critical point is made by Taylor (1984). Taylor also suggests that Foucault’s 
project is quite ambiguous, as it lacks any coherent critique of the power. Foucault’s 
work cannot explain why certain groups resist or why they should or should not resist 
power. Likewise, he cannot develop any alternative view of power. He does assume 
that we cannot escape from power as there is no social organization without it. He also 
assumes that where is the power, there is also resistance, but does not develop a 
theoretical framework in which resistance can be explained, justified or rejected.  
I share these criticisms of Foucault with these scholars, but add to these criticisms that 
from a MacIntyrean point of view another aspect of Foucault’s philosophy becomes 
problematic. In Foucault’s theory of power practices are considered as techniques of 
management. This understanding of practices, as is clear, differs fundamentally from 
that of MacIntyre’s understanding of practices. From a MacIntyrean point of view, 
techniques of power belong to the institutions rather than to the practices. Foucault, 
however, does not recognize an area outside of the techniques of power. Hence, he 
would not consider architecture, medicine and so on as cooperative activities in which 
individuals can find goods greater than their untutored desires. Simply put, for 
Foucault, practices are not schools whereby individuals can achieve goods internal to 
them. They are indeed techniques of power that has no normative nature. From a 
MacIntyrean point of view, such a view dismisses an important aspect of social life 
that is essentially normative. To be sure, MacIntyre agrees with Foucault that practices 
do not exist outside power relationships. Techniques of power can affect practices (as 
this study aims to show), but they are not the practices. This difference is of course 
related to the fact that Foucault has no understanding of goods, but MacIntyre has.  
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As explained in the previous chapter, MacIntyre thinks, together with the Aristotelian 
tradition, that there are varieties of goods that human beings and practices can pursue 
and these goods need to be put into a hierarchical order if individuals and practices are 
to flourish. As explained, it is on the basis of this understanding of goods that 
MacIntyre distinguishes practices from institutions. Since Foucault does not have such 
an understanding, institutions in Foucault’s account are thought as structures and 
practices are thought as techniques of power. That is, on the one hand, organizational 
structures and decision making process are considered as institutional settings and, on 
the other, practices are thought as the techniques of power such as surveillance and 
examination. Within such an understanding of practices and institutions there is no 
normativity attached to their relationship too. For instance, medicine is seen only as a 
set of techniques through which power is exercised and hospital is portrayed as 
organizational structures within which the techniques of power are exercised. This 
view of institutions and their relation to practices obviously conflicts with the 
MacIntyrean understanding of practices-institutions relationship.  
As I will explain in the following chapter, for MacIntyre, practices can either flourish 
or fail to flourish. Whether they will flourish or not depends upon the kind of 
presuppositions practitioners make, goods they strive for and the kind of relations 
practices have with that of institutions. Foucault, however, does not have an account of 
flourishing. He is simply not interested in the flourishing of practice and for this 
reason his theory diverges fundamentally from MacIntyre’s theory. As I illustrate in 
the following chapter, if one wants not only to explain NPM, but also to critically 
evaluate its effects on the practices such as medicine, education and programme 
making, one has to choose the MacIntyrean path. Otherwise, we would only be able to 
describe how power operates through NPM but cannot critically evaluate such power. 
Nevertheless, this does not entail they one need to dismiss Foucault. Many critiques of 
Foucault seem to underestimate the power of his methodology. Agreeing with 
Foucault’s account of disciplinary power, as critiques often do, entails that his 
methodology is at least partially useful for understanding power relationships within 
the modern society. Critiques seem not to make any use of this aspect of Foucault's 
philosophy of power. However, as I have demonstrated throughout this chapter 
Foucault’s methodology can be quite useful when used for particular purposes such as 
to understand a particular period of the public sector.  
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Foucault commentators might rightly protest at this point that the issues I have raised 
above are irrelevant to Foucault's project, as he never claim to be a normative moral 
philosopher. This might be true, but he did propose his whole project as a critical 
approach to our present condition (Foucault 1984: 47) and stated that resistance to 
power is possible and common (Foucault 1986: 242). Thus, although he seems to 
assume that normative critique and resistance is possible, he does not seem to provide 
us any account of them. And related to the purposes of this study, without such an 
account one cannot fully understand the conflict between practices and institutions and 
hence, the crisis in the public sector.  
Let me refer to a case in order to elucidate this problematic aspect of the Foucauldian 
account with respect to the purposes of this study in further detail. When I analyse the 
BBC from a Foucauldian point of view, in the fourth chapter, it will become apparent 
that the case of the BBC is a good example of an organization where disciplinary 
power is intensified and neoliberal governmentality is implemented since the NPM. 
From the late 1970s onwards, there is an increased level of surveillance, normalization 
and examination of the TV and radio programme making within the BBC (Burns 
1977; Seaton 1997: 223; Born 2004). As I will illustrate in the fourth chapter, such 
intensification in the use of disciplinary power was not a result of neutral acts of 
managers. Intensification of disciplinary power over programme makers enforced 
them to consider themselves, viewers, and their colleagues in terms of homo 
economicus. That is, they are expected to reason and produce programmes on the basis 
preference maximization. However, within the BBC we can also observe a tradition of 
programme makers who take the intensification of disciplinary power as a threat to 
their understandings and motivations regarding performance, quality and viewers.  
This leads to a condition in which managers and practitioners conflict. I do not need to 
go into the details of this now, but I would like to underscore that Foucauldian 
approach, in this case, fails to answer the question of why there appears to be 
resistance to disciplinary power and neoliberal governmentality within the BBC. 
Foucauldian approaches to power only state that power creates resistance, and 
articulates how power operates (in a successful way), but they lack a comprehensive 
account of what motivates such resistance towards power. To relate this to the 
purposes of this study, failing to explain this is also a failure to sufficiently explain the 
crisis in the public sector. As pointed out many times throughout this study, the crisis 
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in the public sector results from the condition in which conflict between institutions 
and practices reached to a point that the practice will either cease to exist in the way 
that MacIntyre understands practices or they will survive and flourish. The resistance 
of practices towards that of disciplinary power and neoliberal governmentality has a 
key role in this conflict. However, one cannot develop any satisfactory explanation of 
this resistance within the limits of the Foucauldian approach.  
I argue that one needs a normative critical account to do this and MacIntyre’s 
Aristotelian theory is a good alternative. There is, in other words, another alternative 
approach that does not necessarily ignore Foucault’s methodology concerning power 
and at the same time does not retreat from normative and critical evaluation of 
institutional power and resistance. As explained in the previous chapter, MacIntyrean 
account distinguishes practices from institutions, unlike the Foucauldian accounts. As 
is shown in the previous chapter, this would first of all, allow an understanding of the 
role different and rival presuppositions play within the public sector. Since Foucault 
does not distinguish practices from institutions in a very different way than MacIntyre, 
his account is enclosed to an understanding of the expectations or intentions of 
institutional power and the possible rival expectation and intentions of practices within 
the public sector. It is within a MacIntyrean framework that I claim that practices and 
institutions of the public sector have rival presuppositions concerning human beings 
and public goods and services.  
As is demonstrated throughout this chapter, Foucault’s account of power is helpful in 
understanding how presupposition of the institutions have been realized through 
power, but his account fails to explain the reaction of practices and practitioners 
towards such power due to lack of a distinction between practices and institutions with 
reference to goods, and lack of a normative account of the relationship between 
practices and institutions. And without such an explanation one cannot develop a 
sufficient account of the conflict between practices and institutions and hence the 
crisis in the public sector. I argue in the next chapter that MacIntyrean notion of 
‘flourishing practices’ helps us to understand the motivation behind the reaction of 
practices towards that of disciplinary power and neoliberal governmentality. Since 
such an account would be the final stage in which I develop the argument of the crisis 
of the public sector, I turn to move on to elaborate on this in the following chapter.  
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Chapter III: Flourishing Practices, NPM and Resistance: the 
crisis of the public sector 
 
In order to overcome the insufficiencies of the Foucauldian account in general (and the 
Foucauldian account I have developed in the previous chapter in particular), I now 
turn to MacIntyre's philosophy. In this chapter, I focus on MacIntyre's account of the 
conditions in which practices can flourish in a more detailed way than I did in the first 
chapter. As will be clear from the below, this chapter will not only help overcome the 
failures of the Foucauldian approach to NPM but also to develop the account of the 
conflict between practices and institutions and hence the crisis of the public sector.  
The notion of flourishing practices entails a normative approach to practices, and to 
the relationship between practices and institutions. Such a normative approach, I go on 
to argue, helps explain the conflict between practices and institutions in a way that 
neither Foucauldian nor the mainstream accounts of NPM can do. Once this 
explanation is given, I will move on to discuss the political context in which old-style 
public management was conducted. This discussion will be developed with reference 
to New Liberalism and it will demonstrate that New Liberalism had a presupposition 
about human beings that is to some extent similar to the presupposition of practices. I 
argue that because of this similarity, practices and institutions had a different 
relationship than they have now. In particular the ethos regarding the relationship 
between practices and users of their services conveyed by institutions and practices 
had been, to some extent, similar. Related to this, I will also argue that practices, in the 
old public management, had more autonomy in terms of defining quality, performance 
and the ways in services were going to be produced. However, as I illustrate in the 
relevant section of this chapter, this does not entail that the context of New Liberalism 
was fully supportive of the flourishing of practices. There were some important 
problems with regard to New Liberal context that not only had negative effects on 
practices, but also some effects on the emergence of neoliberal governmentality and 
NPM.   
I will conclude this chapter with an account of the kind of politics that is considered to 
be necessary for the flourishing of practices by MacIntyre and some of his 
commentators. Such an account will reveal that practices within the public sector 
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cannot be successful in their resistance towards institutions, and hence will not be able 
to flourish with their full capacity due to lack of a kind of a politics necessary for 
flourishing of practices. In the concluding section of this chapter, I will argue that 
NPM too, cannot be successful in its attempt to control the practices on the basis of its 
own presuppositions insofar as practices (understood in a MacIntyrean way) exist 
within the public sector. This will reveal the reasons why public sector is in a state of 
crisis. Simply put, it is in a state of crisis because the conflict between the practices 
and institutions, within the neoliberal governmentality and the NPM regime, is at a 
turning point where either practices (again understood in a MacIntyrean way) or the 
NPM regime of public sector cease to exist.   
3.1. Flourishing practices, virtues and practical rationality 
To say a practice is ‘flourishing’ means that the majority of its practitioners are able to 
achieve the goods internal to the practice. However, the flourishing of practices 
requires certain conditions to be met, both within the practices themselves and the 
institutions that sustain them. These are the conditions regarding the exercise of virtue 
and practical rationality and the ways in which practices should be related to the 
institutions. Among these conditions, the one related to the virtues is of prime 
importance, because, as mentioned previously, without virtues, practitioners cannot 
achieve goods internal to practices. However, whether virtues will be exercised or not 
depends upon the ways in which practitioners are educated on reasoning about goods 
and the good within practices and institutions. As I will illustrate below, certain type 
of an education and rationality is necessary for virtue to be exercised by practitioners 
and to some extent by managers. I will argue below that NPM cannot provide (and 
indeed, prevent) these conditions. In order to act virtuously, a certain kind of self-
understanding is also necessary. As I will explain, to become virtuous, we need to 
understand the self as unfolding in narrative form, whereby integrity and constancy are 
essential virtues. Such a self-understanding, I argue, is contrary to the self-
understanding enforced by the neoliberal governmentality. That is, homo economicus 
is not a kind of self-understanding that is conductive to virtues.  
Another condition of the flourishing of practices is a certain type of relationship 
between practices and institutions. Institutions need to be instrumental to the practices, 
if practices are to flourish. That is, they need to be governed in a way that they do not 
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subordinate internal goods to external ones but instead, enable practitioners to achieve 
goods internal to their practices. Subordination of goods internal to practices to the 
external ones depends on two main factors. One is the lack of virtue among both the 
managers and practitioners, and the other is the kind of politics that is pursued by 
those bodies who influence the institutional setting of the practices. However, rather 
than an enabling effect, NPM considers institutional survival as more important than 
the flourishing of practices. And for this reason it fails to provide another important 
condition of the flourishing of practices within the public sector.  
Neoliberal governmentality and NPM, I will conclude, cannot and do not provide the 
conditions necessary for flourishing practices. Resistance to NPM is generated by and 
because of this situation. But as will become clear below, this cannot be recognized 
through the notions of disciplinary power and governmentality alone. We need to 
understand governmentality and disciplinary power together with the notion of 
‘flourishing practices’ to recognize the motivation behind resistance and hence the 
nature of the conflict between practices and institutions.  
Let me begin with virtues and practical rationality. As mentioned in the first chapter, 
the possession and exercise of virtue is central to the achievement of goods internal to 
practices. Practitioners, MacIntyre argues, cannot realize internal goods without the 
virtues (MacIntyre, 2007: 191). Thus, to understand the ways in which practices 
flourish, one has to know the nature of virtue and conditions in which it can be 
exercised. To be sure, virtue is a subject of its own, a full account of which goes 
beyond the scope of this study. However, what MacIntyre and other Aristotelians 
consider to be a very important element of virtue is crucial to underline: practical 
rationality is a key attribute which is essential to the proper exercise of the virtues.  
Virtue requires the ability to execute practical syllogisms either right before a decision 
for action is made or at some point much earlier than the decision for action is made22. 
In any of these cases one can, and should be able to, make his own or others’ actions 
intelligible in terms of practical syllogism.  That is, virtuous actions must either be 
based on, or be understandable in terms of premises that lead to a conclusion in terms 
of an action. The first premise of such reasoning is, for the Aristotelians, eudaimonia. 
                                                 
22 As I will explain below, I am making this distinction between syllogism executed right before an 
action takes place and long before the action, because in many cases virtuous acts result from habit 
which does not require practical syllogism. Nevertheless, for such habit to develop one has to cultivate 
his or her practical rationality in a way that I will explain in order to act virtuously.  
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As explained in the first chapter this premise can be (and indeed often is) a 
presupposition that we are not aware of. Even if different individuals understand 
different things from eudaimonia, it the first premise of practical syllogism (MacIntyre 
2006b: 32). As mentioned in the first chapter, all our actions and decisions presuppose 
an ultimate good, namely, wellbeing. All other goods we aim at, that is to say, can be 
conceptualized as a means to wellbeing.  
What takes an explicit form in the practical syllogism, however, are particular goods, 
which is followed by another premise that states the context in which the action is 
going to take place and if necessary, the means through which the good can be 
achieved. The conclusion that results from these premises needs to be the action itself 
(see also MacIntyre 1988: 129). Consider the reasoning below that result in an action: 
 
1. Moral goods contribute to one’s wellbeing. (Can be implicit) 
2. Helping friends when they are in need of care is a moral good.  
3. John is a friend and he is in need of care.  
-------------- 
The person helps John.  
This is an example of the kind of practical rationality required for virtuous actions. 
However, the reasoning does not have to take place every time a friend is in need of 
care. A person might help his friends whenever they are in need of care, without 
executing this kind of syllogism. Indeed, friends often help each other without 
executing such syllogism. But for a person to act in this way, he must have been 
educated to reason so and sufficiently executed practical syllogism at some point of 
his life so that he can now act without going through such syllogism. To do this, 
however, what Aristotelians in general, and MacIntyre in particular, name as 
habituation is also necessary (MacIntyre 2006c: 15). That is, by having the relevant 
education and experience in executing practical syllogism, acting virtuously becomes 
a habit of character so that the virtuous person does not always need to execute 
practical syllogism. What is important to note, however, is that a virtuous action that 
leads to the achievement of goods internal to practices can be formulated in terms of 
such syllogism, whereby wellbeing is the first implicit (or explicit) premise.  
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At this point, it is crucial to note that although practical syllogism of this kind and 
being habituated is a necessary condition for virtue, it is not sufficient with regard to 
the flourishing of practices. This is because one may also act in a bad way on the basis 
of such a practical syllogism. Consider an apparently vicious act – such as killing an 
innocent person – that results from this kind of reasoning:  
 
1. Being rich contributes to wellbeing.  
2. Killing John will make me rich in this particular case 
----------- 
My act of killing John.  
 
This would not be a virtuous act at all, not because killing will not bring about the 
good at stake, but because killing someone for the sake of being rich is a vicious act.  
Consider another example related to practices: 
1. Free time is a good 
2. Preparing a bad lecture for tomorrow would give John more free time 
---------- 
John prepares a bad lecture  
This is again not a virtuous action that would lead to the achievement of goods internal 
to practices. In fact, it is an action that prevents achievement of goods internal to the 
practice. These examples imply that there must be some other criteria, which we 
appeal to when judging whether an act is virtuous or nor, other than the practical 
syllogism itself.  
As MacIntyre's cardinal work After Virtue attempted to show, although what counts as 
a virtue can change depending upon the social and political context, there are virtues, 
then there are ‘simulacra’ of the virtues (MacIntyre 1988: 349-69; 1998b). If, in a 
society, maximisation of preference satisfaction is considered as an ultimate good, 
then, being rational and virtuous would appear to be acting in such a way that 
preferences of the individual are maximized. However, for MacIntyre, and 
Aristotelians in general, this kind of virtue would be ‘simulacra’ of the virtues rather 
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than the actual virtues (MacIntyre 1985: 241; MacIntyre 1998b: 120-1). This is 
because practical syllogism, which results in virtuous actions, needs to have more 
objective motivations than the satisfaction of preferences (MacIntyre 2006a: 29; 1999: 
91). This entails that not all understandings of the human good are equally valid.  
According to MacIntyre, achievement of the highest good requires learning to move 
beyond our initial ‘animal state’ to a ‘specifically human one’ through evaluation and 
transformation of our preferences (1999: 88-91). The ‘initial animal state’ MacIntyre 
refers to amounts to aiming at maximisation of preferences whatever those preferences 
happens to be. The ‘specifically human state’, on the other hand, amounts to a state in 
which preferences are evaluated on the basis standards and goods that go beyond the 
subjective preferences of an individual. Goods internal to practice and standards of 
excellence peculiar to the activities in practices are these types of standards and goods, 
because they are established historically before our subjective preference and their 
achievement require one to adjust her preferences to them through cultivation of habits 
and intellectual abilities. Thus, one of the main conditions in which practices can 
flourish is where standards of excellence and goods internal to practices are formed 
apart from and prior to our subjective preferences.  
Practices provide individuals with these kinds of standards and goods and their 
flourishing also depends whether individuals will place these goods as a major premise 
for their practical syllogism. As mentioned in the first chapter, these standards and 
goods are peculiar to each practice and develop over time through innovation, 
deliberation and sometimes through conflict between practitioners (see also Beadle 
2013). Therefore, the major premise of the practical syllogism needs to be based on 
goods internal to practices and standards of excellence, if virtues are to be expressed 
and practices are to flourish. Thus, according to MacIntyre:  
 
what makes practical rationality [and virtue] possible within each practice, 
no matter how large or small its place, is the way in which practice is 
directed towards the achievement of certain goods, specific to and internal 
to each particular practice, which provide both activity and enquiry within 




It is the internal goods taken as the telos of the practice by the practitioners that lead to 
the flourishing of practices. This is to say that, in a practice, where practitioners learn 
to place such telos, as a major premise of practical rationality, flourishing becomes 
possible. What needs to be added to this account is that internal goods as telos of the 
practice presuppose another telos. That is, the human good to which all other activities 
are related as means. Consider this through a particular example from the practice of 
medicine. Within this practice, a practical syllogism that would lead to virtuous action 
would be something similar to this:  
 
1. Goods internal to practice contributes to my wellbeing (this premise is often in an 
implicit form) 
2. Curing illness in an excellent way is a good internal to the practice of medicine  
3. Working an extra hour instead of drinking a beer with friends is necessary to cure 
the illness of this patient.  
----------- 
The doctor works for an extra hour and cures the illness.  
 
Working an extra hour to cure the illness in this particular case is a virtuous action, as 
it achieves a good internal to the practice of medicine by prioritizing such a good over 
the immediate desires or preferences. To arrive at this type of conclusion, however, 
practitioners need to be educated and experienced enough to consider curing and 
diagnosing illness as the telos of their practice. They need also to presuppose that such 
achievement will help them to achieve their human telos. That is, they need also to 
learn to establish relations between the goods internal to practices and the human good 
as such.    
This brings us to another important aspect of how practices can flourish. As briefly 
explained in the first chapter, being constituted by objective standards of excellence, 
practices need to transform the practitioners’ habits and intellectual abilities, rather 




in the course of doing whatever has to be done to achieve those goods, they 
[the practitioners] also transform themselves through what is at once a 
change in desires and an acquisition of those intellectual and moral virtues 
and those intellectual, physical and imaginative skills necessary to achieve 
the goods of that particular practice (MacIntyre 1998c: 226).  
 
It is through such transformation that goods internal to practices and standards of 
excellence become the major premise of practical syllogism and hence virtuous action 
become possible. That is, through experience, knowledge and deliberation, 
practitioners learn (over time) that goods internal to practices should be the basis of 
practical rationality. In this way, practitioners can learn to order goods in a way that 
practices can flourish. That is, ordering external goods of the practice as a means to 
the achievement of goods internal to the practice.  
There is another dimension of this transforming aspect of practices that needs to be 
pointed out. That is, the ways in which practices transform the users of their services. I 
have argued in the first chapter that practices in the public sector presuppose that 
human beings aim at wellbeing, and by prioritizing goods internal to practices over 
other goods, practitioners help not only themselves, but also those who use their 
services to achieve this aim. In the case of medicine, for instance, achieving the goods 
internal to medicine helps patients to achieve their physical wellbeing. This, I have 
argued in the first chapter, is based on the authority of the practitioners over the 
patients (MacIntyre, 1977). The same applies to practices within educational 
institutions. When practitioners achieve goods internal to their practices in schools, 
they also help students achieve their wellbeing with respect to their moral and 
intellectual development (MacIntyre, 1999).  I can now add to these that, practitioners 
in acting virtuously and hence in rendering their practice to flourish, also serve the 
good of those who use what they produce. And the good they serve is again 
presupposed to be wellbeing the achievement of which requires the cultivation of 
habits and intellectual abilities of those who use what the practices produce such as a 
TV programme, a lecture, a diagnosis and so on. This is to say that flourishing of a 
practice such as arts, necessarily implies that those who engage with the products of 
art are not simply maximising the satisfaction of their preferences but cultivating and 
transforming their habit and intellectual abilities. Likewise, in maths lecture students 
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are not simply satisfying their preference. If the practice of maths is to flourish with its 
full capacity, students of maths are also transformed. Thus, the transforming aspect of 
practices, as a condition of flourishing, is not restricted to the practitioners, but extends 
to that of users of what is produced within the practices.   
What is stated above entails that, from a MacIntyrean point of view, there is no 
flourishing practice that is ‘self-contained’. Flourishing practices serve the good of the 
community or the good of those who are engaged with practices. So, the distinction 
made by Miller (1994) between ‘self-contained’ and ‘purposive’ practices (referred in 
the first chapter) does not hold right. Practices like medicine and education flourish 
through the achievement of goods internal to it, and in so doing, they help patients and 
student achieve their own wellbeing.  
The final condition that is necessary for the flourishing of practices is related to the 
relationship between practices and institutions. As stated in the first chapter, practices 
and institutions must coexist, but they are fundamentally different because of the 
nature of the goods they pursue. Whereas institutions pursue external goods, 
practitioners pursue internal ones. Goods external to practices and their acquisition 
need to be instrumental to the achievement of goods internal to practices. That is, on a 
MacIntyrean account institutions are related to the practices in an instrumental way. 
Institutions and goods they acquire such as money and power serves the goods internal 
to practices (Knight 2007: 158). But as briefly mentioned again in the first chapter, 
this is not only a descriptive account of the relationship between practices and 
institutions. It is also a normative account. It is not always the case that institutions 
serve practices by providing them the necessary conditions for flourishing. It is likely, 
and indeed often the case, that in modern society practices become subordinated to the 
aims of the institutions (Knight 2007: 158; MacIntyre 2011). Thus, whereas 
institutions need to play an enabling role with respect to the flourishing of practices 
they are likely to turn out to have a disabling effect– especially in modern society. 
Below, I argue that under the NPM regime, institutions of public sector began to play 
this kind of a role that leads to a conflict between practices and institutions.  
3.2. NPM and flourishing practices 
In this section, I will argue that NPM prevents practices from flourishing because it 
cannot provide the necessary conditions for the flourishing of practices and in fact 
often enforces conditions that are contrary to the flourishing of practices. The conflict 
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between practices and institutions that turns into a crisis relies on this aspect of NPM. 
That is, NPM, in preventing practices from flourishing, also creates a conflict between 
practices and institutions that turns into a crisis. It needs to be noted here that 
unveiling this aspect of the NPM will enable me to extend the argument of Overeem 
and Tholen (2011), I have mentioned in the introduction. Overeem and Tholen (2001) 
argue that NPM neglects goods internal to practices and overemphasize external goods 
(2011:738). They rightly explain this with reference to managerialism and emotivism. 
Although I will draw upon emotivism below in more details, let me note now that 
Overeem and Tholen rightly claim that NPM represents a variant of emotivism. 
According to them, this is apparent from NPM’s exclusion of ends from objective 
moral judgement. As I have also shown above and in the previous chapters, by 
focusing only on effectiveness, NPM indirectly refuses the possibility of objective 
standards for morality. What is believed to be objective is the quantifiable information 
based on preference maximisation, costs and effectiveness of organizations (Hood et 
al, 1999; Hyndman and McGeough, 2008; Lapsley, 1999). As I argue, Overeem and 
Tholen also argue that this is why NPM neglects internal goods and overestimates the 
role of external goods within the public sector. Internal goods cannot be quantified in 
the sense that external goods and effectiveness can, and if one takes quantified 
information as the only objective basis for evaluation of action and success, then, such 
goods will only have a secondary place within the public sector. This is what happens 
within the NPM regime. However, Overeem and Tholen, do not pay much attention to 
the possible conflicts this negligent can lead to and how this conflict prevents practices 
from flourishing.  
I argue that NPM neglects internal goods mainly because of its presupposition about 
human beings and the policies and management methods that evolves out of these 
policies. NPM not only neglects internal goods in this way, but also enforces its 
presupposition on the practices and practitioners. In doing so, it creates conflict 
between practices and institution and prevents practices from flourishing. Consider the 
main aspects of the disciplinary power of NPM: auditing, TQM and performance 
indicators. As I have shown in the previous chapters, for something to be audited it 
needs first to be made auditable. To make something auditable requires a 
quantification process whereby disciplinary methods of surveillance, normalization 
and examination are applied to practices. As explained in the previous chapter, the 
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quality of services and the performances of practitioners are quantified through these 
disciplinary methods since NPM.  
I have illustrated that identifying and eliminating ineffectiveness and inefficiency have 
been the main purpose of auditing. However, with reference to what Foucault named 
as ‘normalization’, I claimed that effectiveness and efficiency are never neutral and 
objective concepts, but often defined with reference to the dominant norms within the 
political power and institutions. So, we can always ask: efficiency and effectiveness 
for what? And the answer would be related to the kind of norms or, as I have named it, 
the kind of ethos envisaged by an institution. Bearing in mind what has been pointed 
our regarding this ethos in the first chapter, I can claim that under the NPM regime, 
effectiveness and efficiency is for maximisation of the satisfaction of consumer 
preferences. I need to add to this argument now that this quantification and 
normalization process is detrimental to the flourishing of practices at least in three 
important ways – note also that one cannot argue for this through a Foucauldian 
account alone.   
First, it yields to a certain view of success that is incompatible with the flourishing of 
practices. Second, and more importantly, quantification and normalization on the basis 
of consumer sovereignty ignores the transforming nature of practices with regard to 
both the practitioners and the users of their services, and hence ignores virtues and the 
kind of rationality necessary for the flourishing of practices. Finally, quantification 
and normalization on the basis of consumer sovereignty subordinates practice to the 
acquisitiveness of the institutions. These three problems especially occur in the case in 
medicine, broadcasting, and practices that are situated within education and research 
related institutions such as schools and universities. 
I have also argued in the previous chapter that NPM is part of a larger political context 
that can be understood in terms of neoliberal governmentality. This governmentality, 
forces a specific type of self-understanding: self as homo economicus. This kind of 
self-understanding, I argue in this chapter, also prevents practices from flourishing and 
in so doing creates conflict between practices and institutions.   
Let me begin from the first problem with reference to examples from practices situated 
in educational institutions such as schools. Whether practices such as maths, literature 
and sciences, in schools, are flourishing, does not often depend on numeric or 
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quantified success as NPM imposes on those practices.23 The number of students who 
passed uniform exams, the scores a teacher gets from student evaluation and costs of 
education, for instance, does not directly indicate the flourishing of such practices24. 
Sahlberg, with different intensions and without reference to MacIntyre explains this 
with reference to empirical cases from the Fin educational practices. He considers Fin 
public schools as good examples whereby excellence of the students and teachers is 
developed within practices such as literature, maths, physics and philosophy. Note also 
that this is confirmed with various other bodies such as PISA (Programme for 
International Student Assessment). He illustrates that uniform examination, auditing 
and costs are not only secondary to excellence in education, but also a regime that 
intensifies the use of these methods and distances practitioners and students from 
excellence (see Shalberg, 2007; 2012). Shalberg claims that rather than uniform 
exams, alternative methods of evaluation developed by the practitioners individually 
bring about more excellence to education and this is the key part of Fin education 
system he claims (Sahlberg, 2012). Although Sahlberg does not use MacIntyrean 
terms in his analysis, they can easily be translated into those terms and argued that 
uniform exams as well as auditing, which are intensely used by NPM regime, prevents 
practices within educational institutions from flourishing. Thus, uniform examination 
and auditing processes do not necessarily evaluate whether practices are flourishing or 
not, but NPM regime constantly evokes these kinds of evaluations as the main 
indicators of performance of teachers and students. But as stated earlier, performance 
of practitioners need to be judged on the basis of goods internal to their practices, if 
practices are to flourish. Judging performance on the basis of some criteria that is not 
related to such goods will prevent practices from flourishing.  
Furthermore, teaching maths and evaluating students on the bases of goods internal to 
practices often requires different methods to be used depending on the class 
environment. A maths teacher working in a deprived area, with high number of 
students, needs to use different methods of teaching and evaluation than a teacher 
                                                 
23 And when practitioners (who possess a view of flourishing practices) are enforced to think success in 
those terms, there will be conflict between hem and those who enforce such understanding of success, 
but I will deal with this problem in the following sections of this chapter. 
24 Note that the main criterion upon which a teacher’s success is judged within the NPM is the uniform 
exam scores of the students, costs spend by the schools, and the grades she gets from the student 
evaluation (all of which are quantified data). More recently it is accepted that qualitative information is 
also important for evaluating success of teachers, but this does not seem to go beyond a simple 
acceptance (AC 2008).  
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working in an economically advanced area with a low number of students (OECD, 
2011). Evaluating the success of these two teachers requires qualitative knowledge of 
the context of the practice, rather than uniform exam results (Sahlberg, 2012). It might 
well be the case the former teacher is more helpful in terms of flourishing of a practice 
like arts or maths even if the teacher is less successful in terms of quantitative results 
(that is, uniform examination results and student evaluation).  
Indeed, not only the class environment is important for the flourishing of practices in 
educational institutions, but also expressing virtue in one's activities is central, like it is 
in any other practice. Fairness and justice are the main virtues in the case of teaching 
and evaluating students. In general, teachers and academics need to be fair and just in 
the evaluation processes of their students, if they are to help their practices to flourish. 
However, to assess whether a teacher expressed fairness and justice in teaching and 
evaluating his or her students is not a matter of quantitative data (see Smith 1999) as 
suggested by auditing and TQM management methods. It is rather a matter of 
qualitative information about the context of teaching. In fact, to exercise virtues of 
justice and fairness in the context of teaching, teachers need first to have enough 
experience and knowledge of that context and second be cultivated enough to be able 
to prioritize certain internal goods over the external ones. However, NPM neither has 
nor has developed any tools to evaluate this aspect of education. As explained above, 
and in the previous chapters, NPM is occupied with evaluating effectiveness and 
efficiency in terms of quantitative data that does not take context into account. 
Effectiveness and efficiency, however, is not equivalent to virtue and flourishing 
practices and in fact contrary to them in many cases. Therefore, NPM neglects virtue 
and the ways in which it can be developed.  
In addition to neglecting virtuous action, NPM regime encourages a type of education 
that leaves out the ways in which practices such as arts, history, literature and 
philosophy might contribute to the wellbeing of students. What is distinctive about 
these types of practices is that learning their standards of excellence and goods internal 
to them, yields students to critically reflect on their actions, character and goods in a 
way that they may become better persons in their social affairs. Such learning process, 
however, is not something teachable within a uniform examination system that aims to 
achieve good scores in league tables. The kind of education system NPM regime 
encourages is very similar to what Freire calls ‘banking system of education’.  
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Although Freire does not consider education in terms of practice and flourishing, his 
concept of ‘banking education’ grasps the reality of education we come to have under 
the NPM regime. Banking education, for Freire, is an act of depositing knowledge into 
the student’s mind (Freire 1993: 71). In this form of education, there is a teacher, who 
knows the reality and a student who does not yet know the reality and needs to be 
deposited the knowledge of that reality in order to know that reality. Rankings and 
testing of success in such kind of education are generally done by quantitative 
methods which are in no way appropriate to measure the development of a student’s 
character and critical thinking. What they measure is whether the deposition of 
knowledge to students mind is successful or not. However, from a MacIntyrean 
perspective, quantitative methods of measuring educational success are not 
measurement of success in flourishing of practices. Good educators, in flourishing 
practices of arts, literature and philosophy are not the ones who successfully deposit 
the knowledge to the students’ minds. Good educators, before anything else, are the 
ones who have been able to help their students to form a character whose actions are 
manifesting virtues of justice, integrity, constancy, honesty and truthfulness.  
One might claim at this point that it is knowledge and not the action that is necessary 
in practices constituted in schools and universities such as mathematical and historical 
inquiry. That is, one might suggest that goods internal to the practice of mathematical 
inquiry are knowledge not action. It is true that what is internally good to enquiry of 
mathematics is knowledge and not necessarily action. However, banking model of 
education does not actually enable children and young to achieve those goods in a 
genuine way too. The main reason for this is that in banking model of education, 
knowledge becomes a commodity to find a good job, to have a good CV or to gaining 
money and status. In other words, banking model of education reduces knowledge, 
which is a good internal to many practices undertaken by the institutions of school and 
university, to tool to achieve external goods.  
What has just been stated above also entails that flourishing of a practice like maths in 
education cannot easily be evaluated by managers as if it is a purely technical matter. 
Evaluating flourishing is more of a matter of using prudence, which requires 
knowledge of the particularities of the relevant practice gained through practical 
experience and shared deliberation with other members of the practice, than 
quantitative data collection and presentation. However, as explained in the previous 
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chapter, NPM policies regarding education, such as the Education School Act (1992) 
and the establishment of OFSTED, and the following of explosion in the use of 
auditing and TQM tend to evaluate education mainly on the basis of quantitative data 
(e.i. exam results, costs and student evaluation). Although it is sometimes accepted by 
the institutions that quantitative knowledge is not always enough to evaluate success in 
education, it is also typical for institutions to believe that quantitative data such as 
exam scores and costs are more important overall (see AC 2008). As a result, NPM 
type management methods cannot evaluate the services provided by practices through 
the use of prudence, which requires qualitative and contextual knowledge.  
Related to this, another aspect of the disciplinary power of NPM, which I argue to be 
detrimental to the flourishing of practices, is its ignorance of the transforming 
dimension of practices. In the case of education, for instance, achieving goods internal 
to the practices necessitates making certain changes on the students (and sometimes on 
the families of students too). In order to learn to solve a maths problem, students often 
need to change their preferences. For example, a student might prefer or desire to 
spend time on internet or watching a movie, but a good teacher teaches her students to 
transform their preferences in a way that they can also prefer studying maths. To do 
this, the teacher also needs to transform her own preferences.  
For instance, if might be more preferable to focus on the good students in a class and 
spend less effort and time on a specific subject, but to become a good practitioner one 
has to transform that preference to teach to all students the standards of excellence in 
maths. However, how accurate it is to evaluate this transformation process with 
reference to uniform exam results is a matter of dispute. Evaluation of the kind of 
achievement made in terms of transforming students in fact requires contextual 
knowledge regarding the practice and the institution in which practice is situated. 
However, uniform exam results do not provide such knowledge and information, and 
this is what the disciplinary methods of NPM focuses on.  
Similar examples can be given from broadcasting and medicine. As will be explained 
in more details in the next chapter, in the case of TV programme making practices, the 
viewers are expected to transform themselves through watching a news programme or 
a documentary, if those practices are to flourish. In a flourishing programme making 
practice, that is to say, educating and informing the viewers is of central importance 
and this is not always reflected in numbers such as the ratings. Although the next 
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chapter will elaborate on this issue in further detail, I need to note now that NPM aims 
to prevent this aspect of programme making by aiming to define excellence with 
reference to the satisfaction of consumer preferences (see, Born 2003; Schlesinger 
2010; ); that is, mostly with reference to ratings. This turns out to be the case because 
ratings are the main quantitative data that would indicate success in meeting this 
expectation. Whether ratings correspond to the transforming dimension of the practice, 
and to the standards peculiar to the activities of the practitioners, have been largely 
ignored within the disciplinary methods of NPM.   
Within the NHS, for instance, doctors are expected to be oriented towards consumer 
satisfaction much more than before the NPM (Shackley and Ryan 1994:520; Fotaki 
2014). As with other practices too, with medicine NPM have been trying to normalize 
practices through preference maximisation. Many of the NPM reforms related to the 
NHS have been largely rationalized with reference to consumer satisfaction or 
improving the choice of the consumers (Lorenz, 2012). This was most apparent from 
the White Paper, ‘Working for Patients’, which initiated NHS Community Care Act 
(1990). The NHS Community Care Act (1990) was the main enactment responsible 
for introducing the internal market to the health sector and referred to as one of the 
main NPM type policies. The white paper (1989: 3) envisaged the purpose of the 
reforms regarding the NHS as “to give patients, wherever they live in the UK, better 
health and greater choice of the services available”. In this white paper, one can easily 
observe a tendency to set consumer satisfaction as the main target of the NHS.  
The concept of ‘greater choice’ that is frequently used in (and since) the white paper 
(Working for Patients), amounts to the application of the notion of ‘consumer 
sovereignty’ to the health sector. However, in medicine, as in other practices, gaps 
between practitioners’ and users’ viewers of what needs to be preferred can be 
extensive (Shackley and Ryan 1994:520; Fotaki 2013). That is, what is preferred by 
patients can be different from what doctors and nurses want their patients to prefer. 
And in order for the practice of medicine to flourish, it is important that doctors and 
nurses change the preferences of their patients on the basis of what they think patients 
need to prefer, instead of simply satisfying whatever preferences patients happen to 
have. This is firstly because doctors always have better knowledge than the patients in 
terms of the treatment of an illness or injury. Indeed, this is why patients visit doctors 
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when they do not feel well. MacIntyre highlights this relationship between doctors and 
patients in some of his papers on health (MacIntyre, 1978; 1977).  
He compares the relationship between a restaurant and its customers with that of the 
relationship between doctors and patients. He thinks that whereas in the former case 
the relationship is contractual or a market relation, in the second one it is quite 
different (1977: 204-5). In a restaurant no one tells us what to eat (unless we ask so), 
whereas, in a hospital we are told what to do and what not to do including what to eat 
and what not to eat. This is because when we are in a restaurant as a customer, we are 
considered as autonomous subjects, but when we are in a hospital or in a GP clinic we 
are not considered as autonomous. This is simply because we are patients there not 
customers in the usual sense. In fact, MacIntyre rightly points out that being a patient 
(or a potential patient) entails incapacity of the individual (MacIntyre, 1977: 205). In a 
restaurant, however, certain incapacities often prevents us from being a customer. For 
instance, if we become ill in a restaurant, we would need to leave the place because we 
happen to have incapacity to eat there. Thus, where with regard to medicine incapacity 
makes one a patient, in the contractual or market relations, incapacity dissolves the 
relationship between the organization and the customer.  
To give a simple example here, a patient might think that he or she needs a certain 
type of medicine to cure his illness, and he might indeed be right in this. However, the 
doctor might also know that the medicine would not be beneficial for the patient in the 
long term and thus avoid prescribing this medicine and try to cure the patient through 
different means. In these kinds of cases, it is likely that the patient would not be 
satisfied with the treatment even if the doctor is doing the right thing in terms of the 
standards of his practice. Hence, more consumer satisfaction would not directly mean 
that patients are benefitting more from the service. As MacIntyre claims, this entails 
that in the practice of medicine (like it is in education) authority is not the preference 
of the users, but the practitioners based on the knowledge and experience they have 
(MacIntyre, 1977). In fact, as previously explained, if practices such as medicine and 
sciences are to flourish, preferences need to change again on the bases of knowledge 
and experience of the individuals.  
Within the normalization process of NPM, however, there is no consideration about 
the ways in which preferences of service users are to be changed. NPM regime, 
therefore, first fails to understand and evaluate the qualitative side, and second, 
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ignores the transforming dimension of practices as well as the authority of 
practitioners. In doing so, it also fails to help practices flourish. However, these are not 
the only reasons why NPM is detrimental to the flourishing of practices. As mentioned 
above, NPM also ignores another important aspect of flourishing practices: the virtues 
and the kind of practical rationality that is necessary for the exercise of such virtues. 
Although MacIntyre has not particularly analysed public sector in the way that I do 
and has not used Foucauldian notions in his criticism of modern institutions, I will 
draw upon his contention about the dominant mode of practical reasoning in modern 
society to further elaborate on how NPM prevents practices from flourishing. 
According to MacIntyre, in modern liberal societies, 
 
we are presented … with agents as if detached altogether from any 
conception of or perception of the good or goods. They are to be 
understood as practically rational or as failing in practical rationality only 
in respect of the way in which they argue so as to get their preferences 
implemented, whatever the grounds for those preferences may be… Here 
each person is entitled to express his or her preferences and the institutions 
which govern and determine public discourse and decision-making are 
committed to taking no account of how these preferences are arrived at. 
Public discourse and decision-making exclude any background to 
preference formation (MacIntyre 1998b:129). 
 
As is clear from the previous chapters, this exclusion takes place within the public 
sector too, because institutions expect and enforce public services and goods to be 
directed towards maximisation of preferences. Preference maximisation, in other 
words, is enforced to be the major premise of practical syllogism within the public 
sector. What follows from this is that the kind of rationality I have argued to be 
necessary for virtues is marginalized within the public sector and a kind of rationality 
that is contrary to virtues is promoted through disciplinary power and neoliberal 
governmentality. This kind of rationality, I have argued in the previous chapter, 
amounts to a particular form of self-understanding too, namely, homo economicus. As 
has been argued, this self-understanding helps neoliberal political power to govern at a 
distance without the use of methods like coercion and violence. It is clear that this kind 
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of a self is another element of NPM that is incompatible with the flourishing of 
practices. However, although incompatibility is clear, further elaboration is needed at 
this point, to illustrate the ways in which this prevents practices from flourishing and 
has led to the crisis of the public sector. To do this, I will once again draw upon 
MacIntyre’s philosophy. In particular, I will elaborate on his understanding of 
'emotivism'.  
On MacIntyre's account, emotivism is a theory that denies the possibility of moral 
claims. Moral claims, on this view, are expressions of personal attitudes and feelings 
that can be neither true nor false. As moral claims are expressions of subjective 
attitudes and thus cannot be subjected to objective evaluation. It follows from this that 
emotivism is a theory in which no objective grounds exist for ordering different kinds 
of goods within any collective activity. The claim that goods internal to practices are 
more valuable than external goods with regard to the flourishing of practices, thus, 
becomes meaningless within emotivism. This is because such a claim would be 
considered only as an expression of a subjective feeling that cannot have any objective 
value. Disputes about the ordering of goods within practices (or within an individual 
life), therefore, cannot be solved rationally on the emotivist account. 
Furthermore, if we are to be serious emotivist, we would not believe in the objectivity 
of virtues within our social practices. That is, a practical syllogism of the following 
kind would not be possible for an emotivist: Justice is a virtue and in the such-and-
such type of circumstances every practitioner should act in such-and-such kind of way 
to be just and the practitioners acts. For an Emotivist, the major premise of a practical 
syllogism is always the expression of a subjective feeling or attitude and for this 
reason there can be no such normative claim for ‘every practitioner’. Practitioners act 
as they feel; there are no objective goods to be pursued through the exercise of virtues. 
Understood in this way an emotivist understanding of self is very similar to that of a 
homo economicus. In fact, it can be argued that homo economicus is at the same time 
an emotivist.  
At this point I need also to note that for MacIntyre, emotivism is no longer just a 
theory but also a culture in liberal societies. That is, for MacIntyre, it is widely 
believed in advanced liberal societies that claims related to goods are claims of 
feelings and attitudes that cannot be contested on a rational basis (MacIntyre 2007: 
22). There can be no rational agreement on a good that is shared by the members of a 
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community. However, as I have explained above, virtues and hence flourishing of 
practices requires such a shared understanding of goods. It follows from this that if, in 
an organization, emotivist culture is enforced, virtue perishes simply because there 
remains no ground for practical rationality to be used in a way that leads one to 
virtuous actions. Thus, having explained how neoliberal governmentality enforces 
homo economicus as an ideal form of self, we can now see that it also promotes an 
emotivist culture within the public sector.    
What has been said in this section, however, does not necessarily entail that all 
practices will necessarily fail in terms of flourishing within modern society. In certain 
institutions, virtues can still be possessed and exercised, but only if virtues are able to 
play a certain further role, in addition to that of achieving goods internal to these 
practices – additional to their role of achieving goods internal to practices. MacIntyre 
thinks that at least part of corruption is simply the privileging of external goods over 
internal ones (MacIntyre 2007: 194). What he means by corruption in the relevant part 
of After Virtue is not perfectly clear, but I take it that at least this function of the 
virtues implies that corruption can mean prevention of practices from flourishing. That 
is, virtues not only help practices to flourish but also protect them from institutions 
that are detrimental to the flourishing of practices.  
This brings us to the issue of conflict and resistance as once virtues are understood in 
this way, it follows that they can also be a source of resistance to institutional power 
such as that of disciplinary power and neoliberal governmentality.  
3.3. Virtues, practices and resistance 
Now, given what has been stated so far, one might come to the conclusion that the 
public sector is transformed into something totally new through the NPM and practices 
(as MacIntyre understands them) no longer exist. It is significant to note that this 
would be a mistaken view. NPM has not been fully successful in its attempt to change 
the public sector, and the crisis I would like to unfold in this study is partly a result of 
this failure. Many studies clearly illustrate that certain employees of the public 
organizations such as the programme makers in the BBC, teachers in schools, 
academics in universities conflict with the institutions that adopt the management 
regime of NPM (Exworthy and Halford 1999; Broadbent and Laughlin 2002: 99; 
Farrel and Morris 2003: 136; Dent and Barry 2004: 8; O’Reilly and Reed 2011: 1086; 
Born 2003; Clarke 2005; Arckyord et al 2007). That is, a considerable number of 
122 
 
employees within public institutions refuse to comply with the regime of NPM. 
However, studies that point this conflict out do not sufficiently explain what motivates 
the conflict.  They cannot explain the motivation behind the conflict partly because 
they have no theory of practices and goods, and hence no theory of flourishing 
practices. Some of these theories implicitly resemble a Foucauldian account, but like 
Foucault they too, do not answer the question of why certain employees resist NPM 
and conflict with the institutions.  
Bearing in mind the relationship between disciplinary power, neoliberal 
governmentality and NPM regime, and the ways in which they prevent practices from 
flourishing, I can go beyond these studies and claim that certain employees resist to 
NPM and conflict with institutions because they are not simply employees but 
practitioners, who are educated and experienced enough to possess virtues. They 
resist, and conflict with institutions, because, as I have shown above, disciplinary 
power of NPM cannot generate the conditions in which practices can flourish. In fact, 
they generate conditions that are contrary to flourishing.  
A number of MacIntyrean studies show that once institutional setting of practices do 
not generate the conditions for flourishing or once they generate conditions that are 
contrary to flourishing, practitioners resist to such institutional settings (Robson 2015; 
Conroy 2009; von Krogh et al 2012; Wilcox 2012; Beadle 2013). Although these 
studies are not directly related to the public sector, they are MacIntyrean studies of 
organizations that provide us with some explanation of resistance by practitioners to 
the institutional settings. With different intentions and interests these studies illustrate 
that when institutions pressurize practices to prioritize goods external to practices, 
practitioners tend to resist such institutional concerns. Among these studies Ron 
Beadle’s study of circuses is of special importance (2013; Beadle and Moore 2010; 
Beadle and Könyöt 2006). As mentioned in the first chapter, some of Beadle’s studies 
apply MacIntyre’s social theory to circuses. Beadle demonstrates that circuses house 
practices and practitioners, who strive for standards of excellence, and achieve goods 
internal to practices (Beadle and Köynöt 2006: 129; Beadle 2013). As with practices 
like medicine and arts, in practices situated in circuses too, such standards develop 
over time through the accumulation of experience and knowledge.  
Beadle’s studies of circuses are much more extensive, but at this stage of the study, 
what is important to note is a specific aspect of his study. He demonstrates that on 
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certain occasions conflict between the pursuit of goods internal to practices and pursuit 
of external goods can emerge within the circuses (Beadle 2013: 685). Circus directors, 
for instance, appeal to audience satisfaction in evaluating the success of the shows, as 
audience satisfaction means generation of more income and financial sustainability. 
This amounts to something similar to applying the notion of consumer sovereignty to 
the circuses. However, circus practitioners find that this disturbs their practices and 
tend to resist anything that detracts from the achievement of goods internal to their 
practices (Beadle 2013: 684-5). In other words, when circus practitioners are asked to 
surrender their autonomy regarding the standards of excellence peculiar to their 
activities, they often refuse to comply with such a demand. This implies that when 
practices confront with power structures through which goods external to practices 
might be prioritized over standards of excellence and goods internal to practices, 
practitioners are likely to resist to those forms of power structures.  
In fact, in many cases such resistance is successful, due to the ways in which 
institution governs the practices in circuses. Beadle points out that certain circus 
directors exercise virtues of phronesis, justice, and constancy in order to keep the 
relationship between the practices and institutions in a way that institutions are 
instrumental to the development and survival of practices (Beadle and Köynöt 2006). 
In the case of circuses, practitioners have the autonomy necessary to pursue goods 
internal to their practices in their particular activities. They differentiate standards of 
excellence, which are known to them due to their experience, knowledge, and skills, 
from consumer satisfaction, and pursue those standards regardless of institutional 
concerns.  
Although managers of circuses give more consideration to consumer preferences (and 
although they define quality with reference to consumer satisfaction then practitioners, 
managers are also concerned with those standards of excellence that may not 
necessarily coincide with consumer satisfaction (Beadle 2013). Beadle argues and 
illustrates that managers need the virtue of constancy in order to achieve a balance 
between the two, in order to prevent permanent conflict between practices and 
institutions. This virtue first requires managers to be engaged with the practice 
(possibly being at least a former practitioner) and second, to understand practitioners’ 
work as meaningful (Knight and Beadle 2012). Beadle illustrates that in circuses, 
managers have a conception of what is excellent in their work regardless of how much 
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money they make out of it. It is true that directors think that a good show needs to 
satisfy consumers, as without this no external goods can be achieved, but directors are 
also interested in standards other than consumers’. They also aim at receiving 
appreciation from other directors and practitioners in other circuses (Beadle 2013). 
Therefore, directors aim to sustain the tradition of circus not only through achieving 
external goods but also through exhibiting excellent shows, which requires 
achievement of goods internal to practices by the practitioners and the exercise of the 
virtues of constancy and phronesis by the managers.  
If we are to compare this aspect of Beadle’s study with the conflict that emerges in the 
public sector – between practices and institutions – such conflict appears to be less of 
an issue in the circus than it is in the public sector. To put this differently, practitioners 
and managers in the circuses appear to work in more harmony than they do in public 
sector organizations such as state schools, NHS hospitals, and universities. This 
difference, I argue, is due to the intensification of disciplinary power and 
implementation of neoliberal governmentality to the public sector that seems not to be 
present in the management of circuses despite of the economic difficulties they 
experience. To be sure, Beadle’s work does not consider relations between managers 
and practitioners within circuses with respect to the notions of disciplinary power and 
governmentality. But even though this is not the main concern of Beadle’s study, it 
does show that practitioners with the virtues that are necessary to achieve flourishing 
of their practices will resist the detrimental power of institutions.  
Beadle’s study of circuses also indicates that institutions should enable practitioners to 
exercise their practical rationality so that they can express virtues in their activities. In 
other words, Beadle’s study also implies that institutions as such are not detrimental to 
the flourishing of practices, even though some particular types of institutions are. The 
resistance of practitioners to power structures are taken into account by the institutions 
due to the exercise of particular virtues both by practitioners and by the managers of 
circuses. This creates a condition in which the institution of the circus is not 
detrimental to the flourishing of the practices in circuses. But in the case of NPM, as I 
have argued throughout this chapter, institutions become detrimental to the flourishing 
of practices.  
It is this dimension of NPM that generates resistance to institutional power within the 
public sector. I argue that there were (and still is) a tradition of teachers, academics, 
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doctors, nurses and broadcasters who have a particular understanding of how goods 
and the relationship between practices and institutions need to be ordered. For them, 
concerns related to goods external to practices need to be subservient to the 
achievement of goods internal to practices. And, more importantly, for this tradition of 
practitioners, standards of excellence need to be defined and evaluated through 
experience, knowledge, and virtues that are contextual and historical to particular 
practices. None of these, however, are taken into account by the institutions that 
adopted the management methods of NPM. As a result, the kind of practical rationality 
that is necessary for the exercise of the virtues had become marginalized within the 
institutions of the public sector and this became the source of resistance to NPM and 
conflict between practices and institutions of the public sector. 
To be sure, this does not mean that old public management and the political power that 
supported it was not problematic. For reasons I will explore below, old public 
management were also problematic, but the differences between practices and 
institutions within that context did not yield to a conflict that can be named as a crisis. 
That is, practitioners had more autonomy with respect to striving for goods internal to 
practices and standards of excellence. This had allowed more room for the kind of 
practical rationality that is required for the exercise of virtue and hence for the 
flourishing of practices. It is the context of NPM that leads to a conflict between 
practices and institutions that can be considered as a crisis in the public sector.   
3.4. New Liberalism and liberal governmentality 
To elucidate the conflict between practices and institutions further, I focus an old 
political and philosophical movement: New Liberalism and compare it with that of 
neoliberal governmentality and disciplinary power of NPM. This comparison will 
further illustrate the context in which the crisis of the public sector emerged as well 
developing some indications of the sources of the development of neoliberal 
governmentality and the disciplinary power of NPM.  
New Liberalism is a political and philosophical movement that has emerged in the UK 
by the end of 19th century. It is the movement that initiated the modern welfare state 
where free and quality education, healthcare and social security became the chief 
responsibility of the state. It is agreed that New Liberalism had been an influential 
movement on the formation of the modern public sector too (see Freeden 1978; 
Vincent 2001). In other words, although New Liberalism is not the only agent 
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responsible for the formation of the modern public sector itself, it was one of the first 
political movements to give it content (see Freeden 1978). Indeed, New Liberalism is 
also believed to have a latent effect on later periods of the public sector – that is, the 
1945 Labour’s formation of the welfare state and the following post-war consensus 
(see, Vincent 2001). This feature of New Liberalism helps to explain why there was 
not a conflict between practices and institution in the old-style public sector and why 
there is now a conflict that can be considered to be turning into a crisis.  
To be sure, analysing New Liberalism in a detailed and comprehensive way is not 
possible within the scope of this study. However, one aspect of New Liberalism is 
important to highlight in comparison with the liberal tradition (and neoliberalism). 
Like other liberals, New Liberals also presuppose liberty as the main and most 
important aspect of human beings. However, as I will illustrate below, there is an 
important difference between liberals/neoliberals and the New Liberals with respect to 
what they understand by ‘liberty’.  
According to the New Liberals of the 19th and early 20th century, such as T. H. 
Green, L. T. Hobhouse and John A. Hobson, liberty needs to be understood in 
relationship to the common good of a society and to an objective morality (Vincent 
and Plant 1984: 3). This indicates an important difference between the classical 
liberalism of Locke and the recent type of liberalism of Hayek and New Liberals. I 
argue through neoliberal governmentality and the disciplinary power of NPM, this 
difference had been eliminated from the public sector institutions.25 Elimination of the 
difference, as I will explain below had been an important influence on the generation 
of the crisis of the public sector.   
What, then, do New Liberals mean by ‘common good’ and ‘objective morality’? New 
Liberals presupposed that human beings are essentially moral and they need to 
develop certain abilities in order to become moral. Such development, they thought, 
can only be achieved within a certain type of political society. This assertion is first of 
all based on a specific notion of the relationship between the individual and society: 
for the New Liberals, the individual and the society are inextricably linked. Thus, 
unlike the classical liberal like Locke, the New Liberals do not believe that isolated 
individuals can exist or that society is simply a collection of such individuals. As 
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Hobhouse (1911: 36) states, “society is a whole which lives and flourishes by the 
harmonious growth of its parts, each of which in developing on its own lines in 
accordance with its own nature tends on the whole to further the development of the 
others.”  
It is for this reason that they often reject the Lockean (or contractarian) type of 
liberalism – as well as they would reject neoliberal type liberalism. According to New 
Liberals, contractarian liberalism analyses society and the individual in isolation from 
each other. That is, contractarian liberals presuppose that individual exist before and 
beyond that of society. Such a presupposition, however, entails a distorted 
understanding of liberty according to the New Liberals. That is, it leads one to 
understand the liberty as entities of individual in the ‘state of nature’. ‘State of nature’, 
however, is as a mistaken view not only because it has no correspondence in reality, 
but also because it is wrongheaded way of thinking about politics (Hobhouse 1911: 
16-9). New liberals, that is to say, did not believe in the power of the ‘state of nature’ 
as a tool for political organization and analysis. They strongly disagree with any 
analysis of individual and its features in isolation from his or her social setting. The 
individual is always in a society and is always part of it. For this reason, liberty of 
individuals can only exist within a society and in fact through the common good of 
that society.  
New Liberals think of the individual as being capable of associating his own good 
with the good of others, and development and exercise of this capacity is fundamental 
for the development of society and individual. Green, for instance, claims that 
 
the capacity … on the part of the individual of conceiving a good as the 
same for himself and others, and of being determined to action by that 
conception, is the foundation of rights; and rights are the condition of that 
capacity being realised (1999: 20).  
 
This entails that liberty, as a right, finds its meaning and application only in and 
through society. It is true that liberty, for New Liberals, is the liberty of the individual, 
but it emerges as a result of certain social and political formations based on a notion of 
a common good and moral capacities of the individual. But how do they conceive the 
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common good? What does the common good mean for New Liberals? It is important 
to deal with this question because their understanding of the common good is another 
import divergence point from the latter type of liberalism that has initiated NPM. For 
the New Liberals, the common good implied by the definition of liberty is related to a 
certain moral ideal. Thus, to understand New Liberals’ conception of the common 
good, we need to begin from discussing this moral ideal.   
The New Liberal moral ideal is concerned with the development of character, and is 
also referred to as ‘self-realization’. To be sure, it is not an easy task to outline what 
New Liberals understand from morality within few lines – and I do not claim (or need) 
to do this here – but it is significant to at least note a few important elements of their 
general view of morality. This will help me to illustrate the ways in which earlier 
public management differs from NPM and how NPM generates conflict between 
practices and institutions of the public sector.  
First of all, for the New Liberals, moral development requires unity and integrity of 
character. As Mander puts it, self-realization “is a life good as a whole, one springing 
from a unity of vision, a life which manifests a single aim and overall coherence... It is 
a life of integrity” (Mander 2011: 185). This can only be attained through education of 
desires and passions. 
For Green human beings are self-conscious of a state of perfection that is attainable 
with a rational will (Green 1883: 183-4). New Liberals and especially Green 
introduces ‘consciousness’, ‘good will’ and ‘human progress’ to their discussion of 
morality These concepts are not central to the Aristotelian tradition: however, they do 
refer to the virtues and a life of reason as one of the main tools for achieving self-
realization. One needs the virtues of justice, honesty and generosity in order to achieve 
self-realization.  
For New Liberals, to develop a personality of virtues one needs society. Green states 
“society is the condition of the development of personality” (1883: 201). For Green, 
and other New Liberals, development of personality, through the cultivation of desires, 
is morality itself, and one can only achieve this type of morality within society and 
with the help of others. This indicates that liberty understood as self-realization can 
only be realized through moral development and collective cooperation. Green makes 




The claim or right of the individual to have certain powers secured to him 
by society, and the counter-claim of society to exercise power over the 
individual, alike rest on the fact that these powers are necessary to the 
fulfilment of his vocation as a moral being, to an effectual self-devotion to 
the work of developing the perfect character in himself and others (Green 
1999: 15).  
 
This understanding of liberty implies a particular idea of the state, law and citizenship 
too. New Liberalism’s notion of citizenship presupposes a particular morality and a 
common good (Vincent 2001: 213). State and law, it follows, need to function so that 
the good of the individual and society are not distinguished and hence realized 
concurrently. It is for this reason that citizens, for New Liberals, also have duties 
towards their society. Citizenship, in other words, not only entails the possession of 
certain rights (or liberties) that is guaranteed by law but also duties towards other 
fellow citizens. Duties, on the other hand, are tied up with the common good and 
hence with morality.  
It follows that for the New Liberals the limits and potentials of liberty not only relate 
to the rights of others, but also to the common good. As Freeden states, “for the new 
liberals, a notion of community was … one of the fundamental constraints within 
which choice would be exercised” (Freeden 2001: 32). This is to say that even if 
certain choices are not infringing upon others’ liberty, they can still be considered as 
being morally wrong – which is a point of difference between New Liberalism and the 
classical liberals. This, however, is not to say that the common good can override the 
liberty of individuals. New Liberals reject the dualism between the so-called egoism 
and altruism on the basis of their view of the relationship between society and 
individuals (as explained above). They do not think that the genuine individual good 
can be distinguished from the good of society. Likewise, liberty as a genuine good of 
the individual cannot be distinguished or understood apart from the good of the 
society. The implication of this is that the common good of the society – understood as 
the collective development of the moral character of each individual – is the criterion 
upon which liberty needs to be evaluated. This is believed to be only possible within a 
society where public institutions and practices, such as education, health and sciences, 
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facilitate the exercise of such a capacity. That is, a good society needs to assist 
individuals in their self-realization. It is only through such a society that liberty can be 
enjoyed by the individuals of that society.  
It is for this reason that New Liberals considered free and quality education and 
healthcare, and hence the modern welfare state, as an important aspect of liberty. They 
were highly concerned about providing these services to the citizens through a system 
of progressive taxation and state investment. New Liberals were of the view that not 
having access to health care and education would prevent one from self-realization and 
thus from enjoying liberty. This is how they understood welfare and this is why they 
took the theoretical and political initiative to reorganize the state and law on the basis 
of this understanding.  
I argue that within such a context, practices, and their presupposition have found a 
space to be expressed without falling into an intense conflict with the principle of 
liberty as understood and applied by the New Liberals. This is because, as shown 
above, New Liberals, like practices, presuppose that there are goods beyond that of 
preference maximisation that require transformation of one’s initial desires and 
preferences. This implies that the political context of the pre-NPM period allowed a 
shared presupposition among the institutions and practices of the public sector. That is, 
they all shared the presupposition that human beings aim at wellbeing. This is 
considered to be a good common to all members of a society, the achievement of 
which is considered to require moral development. Furthermore, practices and goods 
internal to them are thought to partly contribute to the development of this good. It is 
for this reason that the institutional framework of the old public management allowed 
more autonomy to practices. To put this differently, old public management did not 
direct the disciplinary power of institutions towards practices in an intensified way, 
because they shared the same presupposition. In the political framework of New 
Liberalism, teachers, academics, doctors, nurses and programme-makers and their 
practices were thought professional and fields that needed to be regulated by the 
standards and codes that are developed within the history of each of those professions. 
This is because these standards and codes are assumed to aim at the same goods, 
namely, wellbeing of the individual and society. However, with neoliberalism (or the 
New Right), liberty began to have different meanings with respect to citizens, 
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practitioners, and practices. This, in turn, has given way to the conflict between 
practices and institutions.  
3.5. Liberty as preference maximisation and the crisis of the public sector 
Although the main differences of New Liberal and the classical view of liberty are 
clear, some further elaboration is needed to relate this difference to the conflict 
between practices and institutions of the public sector. I move on by drawing upon 
Isiah Berlin’s account of liberty. In his famous account, he considers the kind of view 
New Liberals have on liberty to be defective. Hayek regarded such view of liberty as 
“pseudo-individualism”, which, as I will explain below, amounts also to saying that it 
is pseudo-liberalism. As is well known, Berlin defined negative liberty as freedom 
from interference and claimed its priority over a specific type of freedom: that is, 
positive freedom understood as self-realization. This amounts to claiming that New 
Liberals are not a good representative of the liberal tradition as their conception of 
liberty is more of a positive kind than negative.  
But what does Berlin’s liberal tradition mean by negative liberty? Does it simply mean 
freedom from interference? Although it is often understood as freedom from 
interference, it does not simply mean that. Freedom from interference, on Berlin’s and 
other contemporary liberal accounts, presupposes liberty to be the possibility of 
choosing between various types of goods. That is, negative liberty does not only mean 
lack of interference, but also the possibility to choose and pursue various forms of 
goods. Referring to Mill, Berlin claims that the most valuable of freedom is “pursuing 
our own good in our own way” (Berlin 1969: 127). It is crucial to note here that this 
amounts to saying that preference maximisation is understood once again as the basis 
of liberty and hence also the basis of the state and the law. That is, for Berlin and the 
tradition that he claims represent liberalism better than New Liberals, the highest good 
of all is to be able to prefer whatever we want and to pursue the maximisation of such 
preferences without infringing upon others’ pursuit of the very same thing. Hayek, as 
one of the main figures of neoliberalism, also believed in this.  
Hayek thought that the main presupposition of the tradition of liberalism (that he also 
situates himself in) is that the individual “ought to be allowed to strive for whatever 
they think desirable” (1948: 15). Although I have explained in the first chapter that 
neoliberals presuppose that human beings are preference maximisers, it should be 
noted now that this presupposition underlies their understanding of liberty. For the 
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neoliberals too, liberty is being free to maximise preferences without infringing upon 
others’ ability to do the same thing. Liberals (including the neoliberals), therefore, 
believe that freedom from interference is a good that needs to be pursued by the state 
and law, because only this type of freedom allows us to pursue “our own good in our 
own way”. Without this possibility, negative freedom would not have such a special 
status within the liberal tradition that Berlin rightly portrays.   
Neoliberal governmentality, with the use the disciplinary power of NPM, returned to 
this concept of liberty and applied it to the public sector. As a result, the shared 
presupposition of the institutions and practices ceased to exist. No longer have they 
presupposed that public services and goods need to be directed towards the highest 
(and common) good of individuals. Rather, institutions presupposed preference 
maximisation and enforced practices and practitioners to use their rationality on the 
basis of this presupposition. This led to a condition in which practices and institution 
conflict within the public sector. But how does this conflict turn into a crisis? It turns 
into a crisis because neither can institutions fully achieve their aim in enforcing 
preference maximisation as the ultimate aim nor practices can successfully resist to the 
institutions so that they can flourish. Drawing upon MacIntyre’s (1994) two 
contrasting fishing crew examples can help illustrate this argument further.  
In one of the hypothetical crews, MacIntyre envisages the normative relations between 
practices and institutions as an ideal type (which to some extent also resembles the 
relation between practices and institution that existed in the New Liberal framework), 
whereas in the other crew the reverse is true. In the first fishing crew, goods internal to 
fishing, such as fishing in a sustainable way, and performing one’s role within the 
crew in an excellent way, are the shared telos of the members of the crew. In such 
fishing crews, MacIntyre argues, external goods are always secondary to the standards 
of excellence in catching fish and the commitment to the common good of the crew. 
Their reasoning and decisions are often justified and motivated in relation to the 
internal and common goods of the practice of fishing. Like in other practices, in this 
one too, goods internal to the practice of fishing and the standards of excellence are 
developed and defined through the history of the practice of fishing.  
Just like in other practices, in this one too, there are practitioners who have been part 
of the practice of fishing over a period of time that is sufficient to develop the 
necessary virtues and skills to achieve the goods internal to fishing. In such a crew, the 
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effectiveness and efficiency of the institutional settings of fishing are justified and 
pursued for the sake of goods internal to the practice of fishing. Thus, in this fishing 
crew, in reasoning about how to act the practitioners make use of practical syllogisms, 
the major premises of which are always informed by both the virtuous character of the 
practitioner and the standards of excellence they have internalised and this allow the 
exercise of virtues through which the internal goods of fishing can be achieved.  
The other fishing crew, on the other hand, is 
 
organized and understood as a purely technical and economic means to a 
productive end, whose aim is only or overridingly to satisfy as profitably as 
possible some market's demand for fish. Just as those managing its 
organization aim at a high level of profits, so also the individual crew 
members aim at a high level of reward. Not only the skills, but also the 
qualities of character valued by those who manage the organization, will be 
those well designed to achieve a high level of profitability (MacIntyre 
1994: 284-5).  
 
MacIntyre claims that in this kind of a fishing crew, practical rationality is exercised in 
terms of ‘individual reasoning qua individual’. This way of practical reasoning has this 
kind of a structure: “I want such and such; doing so and so will enable me to achieve 
such and such; and doing so and so will not frustrate any equal or stronger preference” 
(MacIntyre, 1998b:130). The practical reasoning here occurs as a result of individual 
preferences, and it functions as a form of calculation about how to attain those wants.  
Whereas in the former crew one has to transform one’s preferences in line with the 
tacit dimensions of the practice (that is, standards of excellence and goods internal to 
practices), in the latter kind of crew, internal goods of fishing and the standards of 
excellence are valued only insofar as they satisfy individual preferences. In the latter 
crew, the main motivation for engaging in the practice of fishing and developing the 
institutional settings of the practice, thus turns out to be the satisfaction of subjective 
preferences of either an individual member of the crew or of some other stakeholders 
such as the consumers.  
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To put this differently, the practice of fishing in the latter crew does not become a 
transforming sphere. In the latter fishing crew, internal goods and standards of 
excellence will only accidentally motivate practical rationality. The efficiency and 
effectiveness of such organization in turn will become a means to the satisfaction of 
individual’s preferences, be it the preferences of the individual crew members or of 
shareholders. This kind of an organization and the ends to which effectiveness and 
efficiency serve, on MacIntyre’s account, is antithetical to the flourishing of practices, 
because (as explained above) virtuous actions results from reasoning as a member of a 
practice the telos of which is goods internal to practices, rather than satisfaction of 
wants and desires.  
In the latter crew, therefore, there is an emotivist culture in which individuals 
understand themselves in terms of homo economicus. In such an organization, power 
(does not matter what kind of power it is) will be effectively implemented for the 
purposes of institutional effectiveness and efficiency. Furthermore, in such types of 
organization institutional power will easily subordinate goods internal to practices to 
external ones and hence the practices the institution supports (such as fishing in the 
example just given) will be prevented from flourishing. There would be no resistance 
to such power in such organizations due to the emotivist culture and the kind of self-
understanding adopted both by the practitioners and the managers.  
Now, I argue that since the intensification of disciplinary power and introduction of 
neoliberal governmentality through NPM, public sector organizations have been in a 
state whereby they are caught in between the two fishing crews I have elaborated 
above. That is, organizations such as state schools, universities, and the BBC neither 
become the like the former nor like the latter fishing crew. And this is why they are in 
a state of crisis. Within public sector institutions, I argue, there are practices and 
practitioners who pursue the standards of excellence peculiar and tacit to their 
activities and in so doing they prioritize goods internal to their practice to external 
goods and the effectiveness of institutions. In so doing they also resist to emotivist 
culture and refuse to understand themselves and others in terms of homo economicus. 
However, within the very same institutions there are also managers (and sometimes 
practitioners) who take preference maximization and effectiveness of institutions as 
their main target and in so doing ignore the transforming dimension of practices and 
virtues and adopt the model of homo economicus in their self-understanding.  
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The framework of New Liberalism shows us a political context whereby flourishing 
practices are regarded as contributing to the common good of society. However, we 
are now faced with faced with a political context in which expectations of institutions 
are quite different from the expectation of practices. The neoliberal political context, 
that is to say, has turned the institutions of the public sector into institutions that 
resemble the latter fishing crew. However, unlike the latter fishing crew, there is still a 
tradition of practitioners who use their rationality in ways that results in virtuous 
actions – which generates resistance becoming like the latter fishing crew within the 
public sector. Public sector organizations, in other words, neither resemble entirely the 
former nor the latter fishing crew. They are in between the two.  
 
3.6. Aristotelian politics and the crisis of the public sector 
 
Does what has been argued above mean that old public management and New 
Liberalism did not have any drawbacks with respect to the flourishing of practices? 
More importantly, does this mean that old-style public management had no role in the 
present conflict between practices and institutions and hence in the crisis of the public 
sector? As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, this is not the case. New 
Liberalism strongly believed in the power of a centralized nation-state to provide the 
necessary conditions for individuals to achieve self-realization (or moral 
development). Public services and goods such as health, education and broadcasting 
had been thought of as the primary tools for this. But how far the rationality and 
virtues necessary for the flourishing of practices can be developed within such a 
structure, and hence how far practices can flourish within such structure, is disputable.  
I argue that from a MacIntyrean perspective certain difficulties emerged within the 
political context of New Liberalism. Indeed, I also argue that it was such difficulties 
that rendered the institutions of the public sector vulnerable to neoliberal 
governmentality and disciplinary power.26 I will elaborate on this by drawing upon 
MacIntyre's view of politics, which he thinks to be conducive to the flourishing of 
practices, and his critique of liberalism from that point of view. The kind of politics 
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MacIntyre envisages for the flourishing of practices would be quite different from and 
critical of both New Liberalism and neoliberal governmentality.  
One central consideration of MacIntyre in After Virtue is to explore “how the history 
of philosophical ethics should be written and what its relationship was to the history of 
the moralities embodied in the life of the societies inhabited by the philosophers” 
(MacIntyre 1998: 69). However, he also argues that “ethics or theories on morality are 
historically and socially situated and they always represent some social and political 
formations” (MacIntyre 1966:1). This implies that whenever we do ethics (or think 
about morality), we are at the same time doing (or thinking about) politics and visa 
verse. Considering ethics as something separate from politics, that is to say, is a 
mistake, on MacIntyre’s account. From this point of view, MacIntyre’s most important 
works can be taken to be political too, though they mainly address morality, 
rationality, and history.  
The relationship between politics and ethics, however, should not be understood in 
terms of simple causality. That is, for MacIntyre, it is not the case that political and 
historical structures determine the practical reasoning of individuals or visa verse. 
They both require each other in order to function. It is for this reason that he proposes 
certain political structures to be more conducive to virtue, just like the possession and 
exercise of such virtues can be conducive to certain political structures.27 But, politics 
is still not morality and it is important to note why it is not. First of all, MacIntyre 
thinks that politics is a practice, though it differs in an important way from other 
practices (1988: 32-4). Politics is a practice the aim of which is “the achievement of a 
form of life which is the highest good” (MacIntyre 1998b:123)28. Such kind of 
politics, for MacIntyre, “provides a telos above and beyond those internal to practices” 
so that other practices can be regulated with a view to the highest good of the 
individual qua community (ibid). As I will explain below, for MacIntyre, within such 
political context, wellbeing becomes a telos, the meaning of which is shared by the 
adult members of the community. Although what kind of meaning will be shared 
requires participatory ways of deliberation within a community, what the highest good 
                                                 
27 It is worth noting that that he does not develop his politics and ethics only from a purely theoretical 
point of view. Instead, he also refers to real societies, practices, institutions and communities within the 
history. He suggests, for instance, that there were sufficient social and political structures to render the 
kind of practical rationality necessary for the possession and exercise of genuine virtue possible in the 
ancient polis (MacIntyre, 1988:33-4). Likewise, he also thinks that in some farming and fishing 
communities we confront with such form of practical reasoning. 
28 MacIntyre draws this idea from Aristotle NE Book 1 
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is not can be identified without such participatory deliberation onces politics becomes 
the kind of practice I have mentioned above. It is important to note that in such kind of 
politics wellbeing cannot consist of preference maximization. Whatever meaning is 
shared by the members of a community about wellbeing requires deliberation about 
the good and transforming one’s self on the basis of such deliberation. Preference 
maximisation, however, simply ignores this type of deliberation and transformation, as 
explained in the previous section. Thus, politics as the practice of forming and 
achieving the highest good of human beings cannot be about preference satisfaction.  
Now, although MacIntyre seems to share this with that of New Liberals he differs 
from New Liberals is his views on the ways in which such a good is formed and the 
ways in which it needs to be achieved. Whereas New Liberals think that the human 
good can be formed and achieved through centralized liberal nation-states, MacIntyre 
thinks that it can only be achieved through a decentralized politics of local 
communities (1999: 129-35; 2011: 19-25). In this kind of political context practices 
can flourish without the kind of conflict they experience with the institutions under the 
regime of NPM. It is, however, important to note that the politics of local community 
as such may or may not be a type of politics that is conducive to the flourishing of 
practices. Such decentralized forms of local politics need also to have what MacIntyre 
names ‘institutions of shared rational deliberation’.  
Independent practical reasoners within such a community need to have equal access to 
such institutions by their arguments, proposals and objections about the nature of the 
good and how to achieve it (MacIntyre 1999:129; 1998c: 248; 2008: 263). These are 
institutions whereby individuals freely participate, reason and learn (from shared 
deliberation) what goods need to be pursued instrumentally and what goods need to be 
pursued for their own sake. They can ask and answer questions such as what is good 
and best for them as human beings and what is good and best for them in their own 
conditions. It is through such deliberation together with others that individuals learn or 
discover what is good for them and others they are living with. It follows from this 
that the highest good, for MacIntyre, cannot be formed solely by some politicians’ or 
philosophers’ definition of it (MacIntyre 2006c). Before the philosopher or the 
politician, such a good need to be formed by the members of the society and (to 
repeat) this is only possible through ‘shared rational deliberation’ (MacIntyre 1998a). 
In After Virtue MacIntyre stated that “the good life for man is the life spent in seeking 
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for the good life for man”. To seek such a life, one has to be able to participate in such 
institutions of deliberation, and hence be part of a politics as a practice.   
This is where both New Liberalism and neoliberalism fail from a MacIntyrean point of 
view. This because within the New Liberal framework (and the old-style public 
management), there was lack of institutional formations in which individuals could 
participate in shared deliberation on moral and political matters that goes beyond that 
of goods internal to practices. On MacIntyre’s account, in modern nation-states 
(including the New Liberal version of it), politics becomes a professionalized and 
elitist activity. Although voters determine who will be the political authority, 
alternatives among those authorities are never determined by the voters themselves 
(MacIntyre 2006d: 153-4). Political reasoning in these societies is reasoning about 
what political party would be more advantageous for me, or at most for my family. In 
these societies, MacIntyre argues, the good of the individual is separated from the 
good of the community. Likewise, goods internal to practices are separated from the 
goods of society. MacIntyre describes this separation as ‘compartmentalization’.  
Compartmentalization is a sociological condition in which politics of common good 
cannot be pursued and hence, goods cannot be ordered in such a way that practices can 
flourish in long periods of time. To elucidate this, I need to elaborate more on 
MacIntyre’s notion of compartmentalization. Compartmentalization is a condition in 
which different sets of rules, goods, and norms are followed in different social 
settings. As he puts it: 
 
Individuals as they move between spheres of activity, changing one role for 
another and one set of standards for their practical reasoning for another, 
become to some important extend dissolved into their various roles, playing 
one part in the life of family, quite another in the work place, yet a third as 
a member of a sports club, and a forth as a military reservist (MacIntyre 
2006e: 197). 
   
MacIntyre is not simply pointing out that we are being a father, a friend and a 
professional within a usual day. This is something that exists in every form of society 
where there is a relatively complex division of labour – and hence it is unavoidable. 
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Through the concept of compartmentalization he points out the ways in which what is 
good and bad changes to an important extent in between our social roles. What is right 
and good in the work place, for instance, ceases to be good in family life, and what is 
good in friendship turns out to be wrong as a member of a club. The large gap between 
these areas of our social lives with respect to what is taken to be good is what 
MacIntyre is trying point out by the concept of compartmentalization.  
What is more important to note is that in a compartmentalized social life there can be 
no overall good or goods that goes beyond our different social roles and practices. 
There are only goods relative to a particular context. For MacIntyre, the politics of the 
liberal nation-state (including the New Liberal type of politics) only functions as the 
ordering of these compartmentalized units of social life through contracts, rights and 
utility (MacIntyre 1998d: 223). And lack of institutions whereby individuals can 
practice shared rational deliberation makes it almost impossible to develop a politics 
that has as its main purpose the formation and achievement of the highest good that 
could prevent compartmentalization of social life.  
In such a compartmentalized life, the presupposition of practices regarding human 
beings turns out to have different meanings within different roles and different social 
contexts. This in turn leads neoliberals and the proponents of NPM to presuppose that 
human beings are essentially preference maximisers. Since individuals prefer 
fundamentally different goods in different social settings, they must, on a neoliberal 
and NPM account only aim at preference maximisation. Thus, what appears to be a 
result of the political context of the liberal nation-state turns out to be a presupposition 
about the nature of human beings in neoliberal governmentality and NPM 
management methods. However, at least from an Aristotelian view, this is not the 
nature of human beings and indeed this is not how practices work. And in fact, there 
are still practices whereby human beings are presuppose to aim at different kind of a 
good than preference maximisation. However, in the absence of a politics of local 
community, what turns out to be the case in a liberal nations-state is that when 
practitioners become the users of the services of other practices they might seek 
preference maximisation instead of wellbeing understood as the life of virtues.  
Now, although practitioners in the New Liberal framework had the autonomy to 
pursue goods internal to their practices without conflicting with the institutions in 
which they operate, the politics of New Liberalism failed to develop the kind of 
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institutions through which individuals could deliberate and learn their highest good 
and the ways in which it can be achieved. As a result of this, although wellbeing is 
presupposed to be the highest good to which human beings aim at both by practices 
and institutions within the New Liberal type of nation-state, what constituted 
wellbeing and how particular practices were supposed to contribute to this remained 
unclear. Each practice, social role and social sphere turned out to have distinct 
standards in which what is good changed without there being a criterion which enables 
goods to be judged beyond their particular practices. Instead of institutions of shared 
rational deliberation, the centralized welfare-state happened to be main institution who 
decided what the good and the common good is. As a result the centralized nation-
state of New liberalism aimed to pursue the highest and the common good through 
highly complicated laws, administrative apparatuses and economic policies. In this 
context, neoliberal governmentality took the easy route to associate preference 
maximisation with the good of human beings. In the absence of a genuine practice of 
politics, that is to say, neoliberalism relocated the traditional liberal self-understanding 
as homo economicus at the centre of governance and institutions.   
Thus, my argument turns out to be this: partly due to the lack of institutions of shared 
rational deliberation and the inability to prevent compartmentalization, the politics of 
New Liberalism has given way to neoliberal governmentality which enforces 
preference maximisation as the ethos of practices through the disciplinary power of 
NPM. This, however, has created a condition in which it is difficult for practices to 
operate on the basis of their presupposition and the kind of ethos such presupposition 
requires regarding the relationship between practices and users of their services. 
Whereas practices had sufficient autonomy to operate on their presupposition and 
goods internal to their practices, NPM regime no longer allows such autonomy. This is 
the main reason for the conflict in the public sector.  
I argue that this conflict leads to a crisis because the conflict reached to a point, 
whereby neither practices can flourish (with their full capacity) nor institutions can 
fully control practices. This condition is similar to a disease that reached a turning 
point whereby the patient will either die or survive. 'The turning point in the disease' 
stands for the conflict and 'the patient' for the practices under the NPM regime. If 
practices are going to survive and flourish after this turning point, NPM regime needs 
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to be removed. And if it is not removed, practices will cease to exist in the way that 
MacIntyre understands practices. This is why the public sector is in a state of crisis.  
Whether practices will die out after this crisis depends upon the kind of politics that 
will be developed. That is a politics of the local community in which institutions of 
shared rational deliberation can be established and a certain understanding about the 
highest good of human beings can be formed and strived for. This would generate a 
kind of politics that goes beyond the particular practices and regulates practices on the 
basis of the highest good learned through shared rational deliberation. Although this 
kind of a politics does not necessarily require the abolition of the liberal nation-state as 
such, it does require, at least, a parallel politics of the local community. This is not to 
say that MacIntyrean politics can be reduced to another vibrant of liberalism. This is to 
say that it is possible for certain institutions and practice to work in a way that 
practices can flourish. Circuses are one example of this possibility. The BBC can be 
another example, if the crisis results in the removal of the influence of NPM regime. 
But unless the neoliberal governmentality and NPM is removed from the public sector 
institution practices are in danger of losing their essential future of aiming towards 
goods internal to practices.  
It is worth noting before I end this chapter that one of the most influential and recent 
proponents of bureaucracy, namely, du Gay (2000), also criticizes NPM and neoliberal 
governmentality, just like the MacIntyrean and Foucauldian accounts I have developed 
so far. However, du Gay’s criticism is based on his claim that NPM distances public 
sector from bureaucracy. Thus, this kind of criticism is quite different and even rival to 
the MacIntyrean criticisms. Likewise he criticizes both the MacIntyrean and the 
Foucauldian accounts of bureaucracy for failing to recognize the benefits of 
impersonality, rules, regulations and the procedural justice that follows from them. Du 
Gay (2000) claims that bureaucracy is not only about formal rationality, as portrayed 
by MacIntyrean critiques, but also about an ethics of responsibility for impersonality 
of rules and regulations that brings about procedural justice. Regardless of whether his 
criticism of NPM is right, what is missing from du Gay’s criticism is the ways in 
which NPM prevents practices from flourishing through enforcement of its 
presupposition regarding human beings. Du Gay cannot recognize this aspect of NPM 
simply because he has no normative theory of practices and goods. In fact, du Gay not 
only does not have such a theory, but also seems not to understand MacIntyre’s, and as 
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a result misunderstands MacIntyrean alternatives to bureaucracy, NPM and neoliberal 
governmentality. He suggests that MacIntyre is proposing a homogeneous, anti-
pluralist and fundamentalist alternative (du Gay, 2000: 30-33). However, as I have 
shown above, MacIntyre is not suggesting such an alternative29. Instead, he is in 
favour of local communities whereby shared rational deliberation is institutionalized 
and individuals can learn and develop what their particular goods are as well as what 
their ultimate good is. And in doing so, they can overcome the damaging effects of 
NPM and neoliberal governmentality on the practices situated within the public sector. 
Thus, although MacIntyre might be open to charges for dismissing the kind of 
procedural justice bureaucracies bring   about, du Gay type of criticisms of NPM and 
neoliberal governmentality can learn from MacIntyrean accounts the ways in which 
NPM and neoliberal governmentality can effect public sector with respect to practices 
like medicine, education and broadcasting and their ethos regarding the beneficiaries 










                                                 
29 Note also that MacIntyre never argued in favour of a central nation-state promoting one conception of the 
human good. He believes that only local communities can do this, and in fact, it is dangerous for nations-state to 
do so (MacIntyre, 1998d). 
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Chapter IV: A Case Study in the Crisis of the Public Sector: 
the BBC 
 
He who prides himself on giving what the public wants is often creating a fictitious demand for lower 
standards which he himself will then satisfy 
John Reith30 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the case study of the BBC in more detail. I draw upon 
empirical research conducted on the BBC (together with some other studies) to 
support the main argument of the thesis: that there is a crisis in the public sector that 
results from a conflict between practices and institutions. It is the main argument of 
this section that once certain empirical studies are reconsidered from a MacIntyrean 
viewpoint in conjunction with a Foucauldian analysis of power, there appears to be a 
crisis in the BBC that can be considered as an instantiation of the crisis of the public 
sector I have outlined in the previous chapters. That is, the BBC is also at a turning 
point whereby the practice of programme making will either cease to exist as 
MacIntyre understands practices or survive and flourish. But for the practice to 
flourish with its full capacity, the influence of NPM regime has to be removed from 
the BBC. Unless this is done programme making as a practice will no longer be able to 
flourish.  
I develop this argument in two main stages. First, I argue that TV/radio programme 
making can be considered as a practice and the BBC as an institution in the way that 
MacIntyre understands practices and institutions. Second, I will focus on the ways in 
which the relationship between these two aspects of broadcasting turned into a conflict 
after the emergence of neoliberal governmentality and NPM within the BBC.  
While developing these two main stages of the argument, it will also become clear that 
TV/radio programme making within the BBC has been understood and managed 
within the frame of NPM since the early 1990s. That is, the BBC as an institution 
begun to presuppose that human beings are preference maximisers. As a result, 
managers of the organization began to consider preference maximisation as a highly 
viable basis for programme making and forced practitioners to reason and produce 
accordingly. Actual programme makers, however, act and think on the basis of a 
                                                 
30 Quoted in Scannell 1990:13 
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different presupposition to the mangers: like all practitioners they presuppose that 
human beings aim at wellbeing the achievement of which requires transforming 
preferences rather than just satisfying them. However, the BBC began to presuppose 
human beings as preference maximisers after 1990s. The new presupposition was not 
just a question of general outlook with little impact at grass root level, but was 
imposed on programme making. This in turn created an unresolvable conflict between 
the practice and the institution, because such enforcement is detrimental to the 
flourishing of the practice of programme making. It is detrimental because 
presupposing human beings as preference maximisers and enforcing the practice to 
work on that basis is contrary to the kind of virtues and practical rationality that are 
necessary for the achievement of goods internal to the practice. This conflict can be 
considered as a crisis because neither the tradition of practitioners succeed in 
achieving goods internal to programme making with their full capacity nor the 
institution can succeed in fully controlling the practice on the basis of its 
presupposition.  
4.1. TV/radio programme making as practice and the BBC as institution 
How, then, can programme making within the BBC be considered as a practice 
distinct from its institution in the sense that MacIntyre understands practices and 
institutions? I will answer this question by drawing upon Beadle’s (2008) suggestions 
that I have explained in the first chapter. That is, by showing that there is at least a 
good internal to programme making and there is specific life of programme makers to 
which that good is essentially related.  
I will illustrate that programme making is a practice with a good internal to it with 
reference to the history of the BBC31. A brief investigation into the history of the BBC 
will help identify a tradition of practitioners, who are motivated by making excellent 
programmes and a certain type of ethos regarding their relationship with the 
audiences. That is, an excellent programme needs to be capable of cultivating the 
habits and intellectual abilities of audiences. Motivation towards such ethos and 
excellent programme making is distinct from other aims and concerns that are related 
to goods external to the practice. Below I will analyse this motivation with reference 
                                                 
31 As the cooperative nature of programme-making is obvious, I will not attempt explain this aspect 
separately but just as a reminder I can note here that cooperative work is an important element of 
practices for MacIntyre and programme-making obviously has this element.   
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to the history of the BBC and try to illustrate the ways in which it indicates a good 
internal to the practice, and hence, a practice in sense that MacIntyre understand 
practices.   
To begin with, the BBC is a non-profit public corporation. It is the oldest of its kind 
and since its foundation under John Reith32 in 1927, its official ethos has been to 
inform, educate, and entertain the public through high quality and creative TV and 
radio programmes (Seaton 1997: 302-315). Once I develop the argument that 
programme making is a practice, I will specially focus on this ethos and the ways in 
which it has been historically supported by the institution of the BBC. I will focus on 
this ethos because it plays a key role with respect to the presuppositions of, and 
conflict between, the practice and the institution.  
First of all, programme making consists of various cooperative activities such as 
acting, scriptwriting, video editing, news reporting, research, presentation, camera 
operating and so on. All these activities cooperate, in other words, for the production 
of a program under a producer and often with the support of an institution (in our case 
the BBC). All these activities have their standards of excellence that are developed 
over time and known to the programme makers through experience and education. To 
be sure, some of these activities such as acting do exist in other practices too, but their 
standards of excellence change within programme making. Acting for a TV series, for 
instance, has different standards than acting in a play. While practitioners strive for the 
standards of excellence peculiar to activities, they may achieve a good internal to the 
practice. Making excellent programmes is such a good. It is only through participating 
in the practice of programme making and through striving towards standards of 
excellence in video editing, acting, research and so on that excellent TV/radio 
programmes can be made.  
The most authoritative ethnographic studies of the BBC indicate that programme 
making has generated, and to some extent sustained, a specific type of life in which 
making excellent programmes has been an indispensable good for those who are 
involved in programme making (Burns 1977; Küng 2000; Born 2004). This is to say 
that being part of programme making within the BBC is not only about bringing one’s 
technical skills into a certain productive work, but also about taking part of a culture in 
                                                 
32 Reith was also the first Director-General of the BBC.  
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which excellent programme making is valued beyond goods that can be achieved 
externally to the programme making. Tom Burns conducted two extensive 
ethnographic studies on the BBC, one in 1963 and the other one in 1973, and 
published the resulting work in 1977. His studies were the first to confirm (though 
with different concepts) that programme making within the BBC makes available a 
specific type of life for those programme makers, that Burns some time refers to as 
‘the BBC type’ people (Burns 82-7)33.  
According to Burns, one statement from a cameraman in one of his interviews is 
typical of the approach to programme making within the BBC: “I don’t think our skills 
are particularly technical. I wouldn’t call myself a technician. I call myself a 
programme maker” (1977: 270). This approach indicates a self-understanding to 
which making programmes is essentially linked to standards of excellence and the 
good internal to the practice. These kind of statements in the interviews led Burns to 
claim that although there are many activities involved in programme making that 
might appear to be detached and technical, they are put in the service of excellent 
programme making, which is considered to be more valuable than goods such as 
money.  
Now, although each activity has its own standards of excellence, there are some 
important excellences that are peculiar to all of them. Creativity is one of them. 
Throughout the history of the BBC, creativity is considered to be an important 
excellence in programme making. Programme makers are expected to be creative in 
their activities (be it camera recording, research or video editing). Impartiality in news 
and current affairs programmes, and often in documentaries, is another one. 
Universality (meaning: ability to reach all segments of society) have also been one of 
the main excellences that led to the achievement of the good internal to programme 
making (see also Scannell 1990; Briggs 1995; Born 2004; Carter and McKinlay 2013). 
Therefore, while striving towards such excellences practitioners may make excellent 
TV/radio programmes and in so doing they may achieve the good internal to 
programme making.  This is clearly indicative of a practice within the BBC, in the 
sense that MacIntyre understands practices.  
                                                 
33 More recent studies (Born, 2004; Küng, 2000) refer to the commitment of the programme makers to 
their work in terms of aiming at high standards and excellence. This commitment can also be considered 
as at least constitutive of a specific life in which making excellent programmes is essential.  
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The BBC, on the other hand, is an institution responsible for the commissioning of 
programmes, allocation of financial and material resources necessary for the 
programme making and acquisition of money. The BBC, in other words, is responsible 
for the acquisition and distribution of goods external to programme making. From its 
very beginning, it has played a crucial role in sustaining, and the flourishing of, the 
practice of programme making. It has played this role by convincing the government 
and the public that the organization is worth funding through the licence fee.  
To be sure, as Burns (1977: 144-5) shows, there have been discussions and disputes as 
to the purposes of the BBC. However, despite the discussions and differing views, a 
tradition that holds Reithian values of informing, educating and entertaining as the 
ethos of not only the BBC but also the programme making, managed to sustain itself 
within the BBC. Many studies and official documents confirm that from the executive 
side of the BBC to the programme making parts of the organization the Reithian ethos 
has long been thought as fundamental (BBC 2015; 2013; Carter and McKinlay 2013; 
Born 2004: 81; Ursell 2003; Briggs 1995; 1961). This is not to say, however, that the 
Reithian ethos is equivalent to the goods internal to the practice of programme 
making. This is simply because information, education and entertainment can also be 
achieved through other means than programme making. Yet this does not mean that 
they are not relevant to the practice in question. The Reithian ethos and the good 
internal to programme making are related in a particular way. The Reithian ethos 
represents the relationship excellent programmes have with their viewers. An excellent 
programme that exhibits creativity, impartiality and high standards assumed to inform, 
educate and entertain the public. This is to say that achieving the good internal to the 
practice of programme making amounts also to striving to fulfil the Reithian ethos that 
is shared by the institution too.  
4.2. Presuppositions of programme making and the early BBC 
What has been stated in the last section about the relationship between good internal to 
the practice and the Reithian ethos is related to the argument of this study in two ways. 
One is related to presuppositions and the other is to the ethos that follows from them. I 
argue that the good internal to programme making (that is, making excellent 
programmes) and the Reithian ethos both presuppose that human beings pursue 
wellbeing the achievement of which requires cultivation of habits and intellectual 
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abilities. It is presupposed by the practice that making excellent programmes help 
practitioners achieve their wellbeing by cultivating their habits and intellectual 
abilities through education and experience. Although in different ways, it is also 
presupposed by the practice that making excellent programmes help the viewers to 
achieve their good. That is, an excellent programme serves the good of the viewers. 
The Reithian ethos also presupposes that excellent programmes help individuals 
achieve their good through cultivating their habits and intellectual abilities.34  
How then do TV and radio programmes do this? How do they cultivate the viewers, 
when goods internal to them are achieved? To be sure the formal and easy answer to 
this question is that they do this by informing, educating and entertaining the viewers. 
However, BBC and the TV and Radio programmes are not courses or music bands that 
obviously do all these. How, then do they educate, entertain and inform the viewers so 
that they help them to achieve wellbeing? Mepham (1990) develops a very good 
answer to this question, without using MacIntyrean terms – but in a quite MacIntyrean 
way. He develops his account with reference to stories. Excellent stories, he claims, 
help us to ask questions like ‘what is my good?’, ‘what would be my good in such and 
such circumstances?’, ‘what would I do in such and such context?’ (1990). Mepham 
argues that films, dramas, TV-series and so on (not News and Current Affairs 
programmes) need to be considered and evaluated in terms of stories. Stories that help 
people form and modify their identities, moral characters and social relations (1990: 
60). He claims, as MacIntyre (1998a: 142) does, that by provoking these kinds of 
questions, stories are one of the major sources that help us to make sense of our lives 
in terms of narratives. Stories, in other words, help us to make our actions and 
decisions intelligible to us, and, in so doing, they also help us to form our identities 
and moral characters. Mepham suggests that TV programmes needs to be thought in 
these terms; that is, in terms of stories (1990: 61). It follows from this that, according 
to Mepham, an excellent programme needs to provide viewers with resources to form 
their identity and moral character and to make their actions intelligible to viewers. To 
be sure, this is not to say that all excellent programmes are moral and intellectual 
courses. This is to say that excellent programmes provide the viewers with at least 
                                                 
34It should be noted here that such relation between making excellent programmes and the viewers, does 
not mean that the viewers and the practitioners agree on what wellbeing consists of. They need only to 
agree that an excellent programme would contribute to the wellbeing of viewers by informing, 
educating and entertaining them. 
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some resources through good stories to develop their moral character and identity. TV 
and radio programmes are, of course, not the only source for this, but they can be 
considered as an important one. Thus, when practitioners achieve the good internal to 
the practice, they educate, inform and entertain the viewers in the sense of providing 
them resources in the form of stories to form their moral character and identity.  
To be sure, not all genres of programmes can be considered in these terms. Excellent 
News and Current Affairs programmes and documentaries contribute to the good of 
the viewers in rather different ways that the other programmes. Excellent News and 
Current Affairs programs inform the viewers and listeners about the important issues 
within the society in an objective way. As will be explained below too, when viewers 
and listeners are informed objectively about the important issues surrounding them, 
they will be able to better form their opinions about their society and community. 
Having objective information about such issues and forming opinions on the basis of 
such information, in turn, contribute to the good of the viewers and listeners as 
citizens. Objectivity, in the case of News and Current Affairs and documentary 
programmes, that is to say, is the key that helps viewers to achieve their good as 
citizens.  
Therefore, programme making, like medicine and education, presupposes as a practice 
that when the good internal to the programme making is achieved by the practitioners, 
this contributes to the wellbeing of the viewers and listeners too. My main argument in 
this chapter is that until the 1990s, the BBC shared this presupposition with that of the 
practice, but after that it gradually shifted to the presupposition I have associated with 
the institutions that adopted NPM. I will begin developing this argument with the 
history of the development of the Reithian ethos. First of all, the development of this 
ethos is related to Reith’s and the early programme makers’ understandings of the 
individual and society. Reith, as the first director general and founder of the 
organization, together with the early programme makers strongly believed in the 
potential and necessity of every adult citizen to be cultivated into morally and 
intellectually better persons within society (Seaton 1997:151-2). TV/radio 
programmes they believed to have the ethos of helping individuals in this respect. 
They were of the view that TV/radio programmes had the potential to be viewed on a 
mass scale, and hence, to help citizens to become morally and intellectually better 
persons (Scannell 1990; Briggs 1961). Furthermore, it was also a shared belief among 
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the programme makers and the managers of the BBC that through high quality 
creative programmes an informed public opinion about political, social, economic and 
cultural affairs can be formed (Born 2004: 28-30; Briggs 1961). Such informed 
opinion would then in turn help develop a politically, culturally and economically 
better society. Information, knowledge and culture that were once only available to a 
limited amount of people in society could be made available to the whole of society 
through programmes produced within the BBC (Born 2004: 28-9). That is, programme 
making had been considered as an important means to developing a good society and a 
morally good individual life, both by the institution (The BBC) and by the programme 
makers in its early periods – and to some extent up to today (see BBC 2015).  
It should be noted that although Reith and the early programme makers did not declare 
themselves as New Liberals, their understandings of the individual, the society and the 
ethos of programme making resemble the views of New liberals. That is, Reith and the 
early programme makers thought that the good of the individual (or the wellbeing of 
the individual) is the development of his or her moral character through cultivation of 
habits and intellectual abilities (Seaton 1997: 151). This good, they thought, cannot be 
separated from the good of society. That is, society can become good through moral 
development of individuals and this requires public institutions to support individuals 
in achieving such development such as the BBC. Thus, the BBC and programme 
making shared the presupposition that human beings aim at wellbeing the achievement 
of which requires cultivation of habits and intellectual abilities.  
Furthermore, not only the BBC and the practice shared this presupposition. There are 
some indications that it was also a shared presupposition beyond that of programme 
makers and the administrators of the organization. In 1960, the government 
established a committee to investigate the future of broadcasting in the UK. The 
committee is known as the Pilkington Committee. It was responsible for developing a 
recommendation “on the services which should in future be provided in the United 
Kingdom by the BBC and the ITA and to recommend whether additional services 
should be provided by any other organisation” (Briggs 1995: 159). One of the other 
main reasons for establishing this committee was the upcoming renewal of the BBC 
Charter in 1964. Note that the BBC secures its funding through this Charter and for 
this reason it is related to the acquisition of external goods. The report was also 
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responsible for analysing the private TV organizations, mainly ITV, and making 
recommendations regarding the future of these organizations.  
The report identified a tendency towards populism and a departure from the traditional 
aims of broadcasting. This trend was criticised from the perspective of the Reithian 
ethos as opposed to such tendencies in programme making. The report manifested and 
supported the tradition of programme making in the BBC which aims at high quality 
and innovative programme making, as distinct from popularity and ratings. The report 
can also be considered as an early initiation of another debate regarding the ethos of 
programme making named as the ‘dumbing down’ debate. It points out a concern 
about the lowering down of standards and quality in programmes. The report refers 
directly to the issue of whether it is better to give the public what it wants or whether it 
is better to aim to cultivate and change those wants. A lengthy quote from the report 
illustrates all these points: 
 
To give the public what it wants is a misleading phrase: misleading because 
as commonly used it has the appearance of an appeal to democratic 
principle but the appearance is deceptive. It is, in fact, patronising and 
arrogant, in that it claims to know what the public is, but defines it as no 
more than the mass audience; and in that it claims to know what it wants but 
limits its choice to the average of experience. In this sense, we reject it 
utterly… The subject matter of television is to be found in the whole scope 
and variety of human awareness and experience. If viewers are thought of as 
“the mass audience” they will be offered only the average of common 
experience and awareness; the “ordinary”; the commonplace. They will be 
kept unaware of what lies beyond the average of experience. In time they 
may come to like only what they know. But it will always be true that, had 
they been offered a wider range from which to choose, they might have 
chosen otherwise, and with greater enjoyment (Pilkington 1962: 17).   
 
 
This quote makes it clear that, together with the institution (BBC) and programme 
makers, the Pilkington Committee also shared the same presupposition about human 
beings and a notion of the role of programme making with respect to that 
presupposition. The constant emphasis of the report on the limitations of popularity 
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and ratings as the only ethos for the relationship between programmes and their users 
entails that programmes are not there just to satisfy, but to enhance and cultivate habits 
and intellectual abilities of the viewers. Attaching such a purpose to the programmes, 
however, requires one to presuppose that individuals should aim at wellbeing the 
achievement of which goes beyond that of preference maximisation – even though 
individuals might not be aware of this.35  
Although the government of the time did not implement all of the recommendations 
made by the report, it was taken seriously (Jeffrey 2009). After the report, the BBC 
was granted a new license fee, enabling it to open another channel (BBC 2). Some 
policies regarding the populism of the commercial TV channel of the time (ITV) were 
also developed after the report. The fact that the report was taken seriously by the 
government is an implication that the presupposition of programme making and the 
institutions of that time were, at least to some extent, shared by the government until 
the 1960s.  
Now, sharing this presupposition allowed practices and institutions to form a 
relationship, in which the good internal to programme making was linked to the 
institutional mission. This link was not superficial. It was a link whereby the 
institution became instrumental to the achievement of the goods internal to programme 
making. Note that in the previous chapter, this was claimed to be one of the most 
important conditions for flourishing of practices. When the institution worked as an 
instrument to excellent programme making, the practice had more autonomy to define 
what quality and good performance is on the basis of the standards of excellence that 
are peculiar to the activities of the practitioners. Hence, the fundamental difference 
between the practice and the institution (a difference related to the kind of goods they 
pursue) did not turn into a conflict within the BBC. And this partly helped practices to 
flourish.  
Another way in which this shared presupposition allowed the practice to flourish is 
related to the transforming dimension of practices that I have explained in the first and 
the third chapter. As mentioned above, just as practices such as medicine and those 
situated within the educational institutions, programme making aims to transform the 
                                                 
35 Note also that the report pointed out several times that “by its nature broadcasting must be in a 
constant and sensitive relationship with the moral condition of society” (Pilkington 1962: 15).  This 
moral condition has not been clearly defined in the report, but it is implied that quality TV programmes 
are an essential part of it. 
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preferences of both the practitioners and the viewers. That is, a programme, which 
satisfies the standards of excellence and achieves the internal good of the practice, is 
traditionally considered to have a transforming impact not only on practitioners but 
also on the viewers through informing and educating them in the ways that explained 
above with reference to Mepham and MacIntyre. Such a kind of a relationship 
between the practice and the institution allows practitioners to execute the kind of 
practical syllogism (explained in the previous chapter) that results in virtuous actions. 
That is practitioners can be habituated in a way that wellbeing and internal goods can 
take the place of the major premise in practical syllogism. And this would not conflict 
with the institutional concerns as those concerns stand instrumental to wellbeing and 
internal goods too. These conditions, however, changed beginning from the 1970s and 
increasingly in the 1990s. Below, I will turn to this change.   
4.3. Challenge to the presupposition and the beginning of the conflict 
I begin this section with an elaboration on the early challenge to the presupposition 
and the response of the institution and the practice. This will help further illustrate the 
role of the presupposition regarding wellbeing and human beings, and the ways in 
which it has been replaced with the other presupposition on an institutional level, and 
how this led to the conflict between the practice and the institution. Although it was 
not until the early 1990s that the institution accepted the challenge and began to hold 
another presupposition, the challenge first came about in the early periods of the BBC. 
It can be observed through a longstanding discussion, namely, the discussion about 
whether the BBC programmes need to give the individuals (or the public) what public 
want (or prefer), or aim to transform those preferences or wants (Scannell 1990; Ursell 
2003; Harris and Wegg-Prosser 2007). This initial challenge (which survives till now) 
relied on the claim that the BBC is an elitist organization that is detached from the 
public concerns and hence is unaccountable. Serving the public, it was argued, is 
giving the public what they want – which in turn amounts to investing more effort into 
understanding of what public wants and aiming at the highest number of viewers. 
Programme makers are considered, from this point of view, as imposing their own 
values onto the people and in so doing as being undemocratic and elitist.36  
                                                 
36 Due to the advantage of the BBC being a publicly funded organization, an opportunity is created for 
such an elitism that is not beneficial to the public. 
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The initial response to this challenge was that aiming at the highest number of 
audiences would lower the standards and hence prevent both the practice and 
organization from achieving their telos. Reith’s initial stand on the debate clearly 
vindicates this: “he who prides himself on giving what the public wants is often 
creating a fictitious demand for lower standards which he himself will then satisfy” 
(Reith, quoted in Scannell 1990:13). Reith made this statement not only because he 
thought it would be impossible to know exactly what the public exactly wants, but also 
because the ethos of the BBC for him was not about satisfying wants. He did not 
consider the organization as a business through which a certain demand and supply 
chain could be established. He thought that for programmes to be educative and 
informative they need to make a change in the viewers. That is, viewers’ preferences 
need to be changed through viewing the programmes if the BBC is going to achieve its 
telos. It should also be noted that this stand was not restricted to Reith and the 
managerial side of the organization. It was also adopted by programme makers until 
long after Reith himself resigned (see Küng 2000: 145-55; Born 2003; Born 2004: 81; 
McQueen 2011; Carter and McKinlay 2013).  
One of the latest challenges to the shared presupposition of programme making and 
the BBC can be observed in what can be named as the “dumbing down” debate.37 The 
dumbing down debate began in the 1990s in academia, press and within the BBC. Like 
the earlier debate mentioned above, this is also about the quality and standards of the 
programmes and the role of the BBC as a public service institution. Here again we 
have similar views and responses to the ones mentioned above. This time, on the one 
side of the spectrum, there are those who are concerned with the possible loss of the 
Reithian ethos and the possibility of the flourishing of the practice. On the other, there 
are those who are concerned with the accountability of the institution, and relatedly, 
the number of viewers of the programmes (see Barnett 1998). Those who have been 
concerned with the loss of the ethos and the possibility of flourishing of the practice 
claim that programmes are no longer aiming to the good internal to the practice and 
relatedly to educate and inform, but only to satisfying consumer preferences in terms 
of entertainment.  
                                                 
37 This is an important debate to refer to not only because it is an indication of programme-making 
being a practice in a MacIntyrean sense, but also because the debate emerges when the NPM and 
neoliberal governmentality begun to be effective within the BBC – that is, in the 1990s. I will elaborate 
on this side of the debate more extensively in the next section. 
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In 2008, for instance, a poll conducted among 4,000 past employees of the BBC 
pointed out that the BBC TV and Radio programmes were ‘dumbing down’ and the 
ratings were gaining more importance than high quality programme making. The poll 
concluded that the veteran programme makers were concerned that "[the BBC] is 
losing its identity and what it is essentially there for" (Bingham 2008). Born’s study 
(2004: 81; see also McQueen 2011: 686) also indicates that there has been such a 
concern among the programme makers until very recently. Reconsidering this concern 
from a MacIntyrean point of view entails that there are programme makers who are of 
the view that excellent programme making (the standards of which are peculiar to the 
practice) and the Reithian ethos is important to pursue, but also in danger of being 
lost38. They had this concern because, since Reith, it has been believed that too much 
emphasis on popularity and ratings would eventually lower the standards of excellence 
and quality and as a result programme making would fail to flourish.  
What has been stated above implies that a tradition of programme making made a 
distinction between the standards of excellence peculiar to their activities and the 
ratings. To be sure, programme makers have always aimed at reaching as wide 
audiences as possible, but the size of audiences has never been the main criterion for 
quality and high standards. More important has been the content of the programmes. 
Popularity and ratings, in other words, could help a programme to achieve Reithian 
ethos if that programme also achieves the good internal to programme making. Here 
again this distinction between an excellent programme and popularity is based on the 
presupposition that human beings should aim at wellbeing the achievement of which 
requires cultivation. Excellent programmes help viewers to act and think in different 
ways than viewers would otherwise do. In so doing, excellent programmes also help 
viewers to achieve their wellbeing.  
The other side of the ‘dumbing down’ debate do not seem to share this presupposition 
with the programme making. It suggests popularity or ratings as an aim that is above 
others, and in so doing makes a different presupposition. It holds the presupposition 
that I have claimed in the first and the second chapter to be held by neoliberalism. 
That is, human beings are preference maximisers. It is on the basis of this 
presupposition that programmes are expected to give the public what it prefers. This, 
                                                 
38 This is the claim until the early 2000s, but since there is no empirical study that directly indicates this 
I cannot claim that it still exists up until today.   
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however, does not require transforming preferences through cultivation. Preference 
maximisation turns out to be a good in itself. As a result of this change, ratings and 
popularity began to be more and more important in the acquisition of goods external to 
the practice. This is to say that the challenge I have explained above with reference to 
the ‘dumbing down’ debate presupposes that human beings are preference maximisers.  
As explained in the first chapter this presupposition gained effect within the public 
sector beginning from the New Right. I argue that as a result of this, the BBC (as 
institution) also began to hold the same presupposition. As a result ratings and 
popularity became equivalent to the acquisition of goods external to the practice. As 
explained in the first chapter, it is the role of institutions to achieve these goods and 
hence to secure sustainability for practices. Since the BBC is a publicly funded 
institution, to achieve such goods the institution needs to convince the public, and 
more importantly the politicians, that it has an important value in society, otherwise it 
will not secure the necessary external goods. How, then, is the BBC going to convince 
the government of this?  
Put simply, once the kind of politics that is strictly related to the acquisition of goods 
external to the practice presupposes human beings as preference maximisers, then the 
main way of acquiring external goods will be making popular programmes. And this is 
what happened regarding the BBC since the late 1980s. Although both the government 
and the institution claim to value not only ratings but also the quality and standards 
peculiar to the activities involved in programme making, as I show below, ratings and 
popularity of programmes turns out to be the main guarantor of external goods (see 
also Collings 2007: 67; Born 2003; Scannell 1990: 22; Ongun, 2015). Thus, once 
individuals are presupposed as preference maximisers within the larger political 
context, then in order to secure funding, the programmes are forced to aim at high 
numbers of viewers; or, to put it differently at popularity. Therefore, “dumbing down” 
and the earlier debates about the role and ethos of TV/radio programme making 
indicate that there are practitioners who are concerned about the possible 
subordination of internal goods to the external ones. This concern of the practitioners 
also implies that not only there is a change with respect to the presupposition of the 
institution but also there is a change in terms of the expectation from what 
programmes should aim at and enforcement of this aim.  
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In the next section, I develop the argument that we can observe a certain kind of 
disciplinary power exerted over the practices in the early 1970s. Although this power 
created a tension between the practice and the institution, it was not until the 1990s 
that the tension turns into an intense conflict between the practice and the institution 
that can be named as a crisis. As I will argue below, when neoliberal governmentality 
and NPM emerged in the public sector, this power has been intensified on the basis of 
the presupposition that human beings are preference maximisers and turned into a 
crisis.  
4.4 The conflict between the practice and the institution 
I will begin elaborating on this enforcement through Burns’ (1977) account of the 
BBC. Burns conducted two set of interviews, first in 1963 and the other in 1973. 
Burns’ early interviews illustrate a condition in which the practice and the institution 
had a relationship that is conducive to the flourishing of the practice. However, by the 
early 1970s, an obvious tension between programme makers and the management 
emerged. For Burns, this was due to the reconstruction of the organization, which “had 
been prompted largely by the need for a corporate strategy directed towards improving 
and maintaining cost-effectiveness” (Burns 1997: 211). One important effect of this 
change on the programme makers, as Burns puts it, were the “disgruntlement 
displayed with the superiors and with what was called ‘the management’” (Burns 
1977: 211). Although management of programme making always aimed to control 
certain elements of the practice, in the 1970s control began to take a different shape. It 
has become more of a disciplinary kind in the sense that Foucault understands 
disciplinary power. I argue that this initiated the conflict between the practice and the 
institution but the conflict did not turn into a crisis until NPM was applied to the 
organization in the 1990s.   
Burns begins elaborating on the differences between 1963 and 1973 first by pointing 
out what he names as a traditional distinction between the creative and administrative 
side of the BBC. It is important to note this distinction. For Burns, programme making 
has been thought as the ‘creative side’ of the organization which is essentially 
different from the administrative side. Burns underlines an important aspect of 
programme making that I have already mentioned above with different concepts. That 
is, he is pointing out that innovative quality programmes have been one of the 
standards peculiar to the activities of the programme makers. He also indicates, again 
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with different concepts, that the ends of programme making are thought to be achieved 
by the commitment of programme makers to those standards (Burns 1977: 269-71). 
Burns’ study, in other words, makes it clear that whereas programme making aims at 
creativity and quality, the administration (until the 1960s) aims at helping programme 
makers to achieve this by relieving the practitioners from administrative burdens. 
Although Burns does not use terms like goods internal and external to practices, what 
he means by administrative burdens do involve dealing with goods such as money and 
status (and MacIntyre too thinks that Burns’ point here can be put in those terms)39.  
Burns’ study also discusses another important aspect of the history of the BBC. He 
notes that in 1963 the administrative part of the organization was more concerned 
about the flourishing of the ‘creative side’ than it was in 1973. One administrator in 
one of the 1963 interviews, for instance, said that “one is always frightened, in 
administration, of stopping something. You know, preach the gospel, that we’re only 
here to help” (quoted in Burns 1977: 252). Another senior administrator (in 1963) 
says, “my job is to encourage attitudes which will pull out of the staff more than you 
could justify getting out of them by any usual criteria which exist in say the business 
world” (Burns 1977: 260). Burns states that these kinds of attitudes were quite 
common among the administrators until the 1960s and claims that such attitudes 
indicate that the administrative side of programme making (which corresponds to the 
institution in MacIntyrean terms), has been thought both by the programme makers 
and the administrators themselves as instrumental to the achievement of goods internal 
to programme making. And for this reason the administrative side of the organization 
had allowed a considerable amount of autonomy to the programme makers in order to 
pursue the standards that are peculiar to their activities. However, Burns discovers that 
by the 1970s this had begun to change.  
As I have clarified above, programme making originally presupposed that individuals 
(or potential viewers) aim at wellbeing the achievement of which requires cultivation 
of preferences. Following this the achievement of the good internal to programme 
making helps viewers to achieve wellbeing. Considering the autonomy given to the 
practice that Burns points out (as well as from the debates I have mentioned above), it 
is clear that this presupposition is shared by the institution too at least until the 1970s.  
                                                 
39 MacIntyre, 2011 (personal conversation) 
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By 1973, both the political and the institutional context began to change. As 
mentioned above, during this period the cost-effectiveness of the organization 
becomes a hot issue both within and outside of the organization. The debates resulted 
in the commissioning of management consultants from McKinsey and Company, Inc. 
This was the first time in the history of the BBC that professional management 
consultants were commissioned to change the organization. This is why the change 
during the 1970s was also called ‘McKinsey reorganization’. McKinsey reorganization 
resulted in a new management regime, which aimed to improve cost-effectiveness in 
the BBC (Burns 1977: 211). It has significantly increased the power managers have 
over the finances of the organization.  
As Burns notes such power did not limit itself to the controlling of costs. It also began 
to control the activities of programme makers in general rather just the ones related to 
finances. As Burns put it, “it became increasingly clear with succeeding interviews 
that there was a much stronger sense of managerial control than had obtained in 1963” 
(Burns 1977: 254). According to Burns, rather than an instrumental relation, the 
institution began to have a different type of relationship with that of the practice. The 
institution began to control the practice with aims distinct from those of the 
programme makers. The institution was no longer concerned about providing the 
necessary freedom for practitioners to pursue the standards that are peculiar to their 
activities. Instead, the institution began to be concerned about how and what kinds of 
programmes are to be made on the basis of cost-effectiveness. ‘McKinsey 
reorganization’, therefore, marks the early implementation of a certain form of 
disciplinary power over the practice.  
The level of surveillance by the managers increased during the McKinsey 
reorganization. New managerial structures and processes were introduced for 
examination (documenting the performances, finances and programming procedures). 
More importantly normalization that has been attached to surveillance and 
examination was based on cost-effectiveness. The institution (administrative side) 
began to take cost-effectiveness as the main norm on the basis of which interventions 
could be made regarding programme making. Foucault’s disciplinary power was 
introduced to the BBC with the normalizing effect of cost-effectiveness. This, 




Burns notes that whereas conflicts before the 1970s were between different 
departments, such as Current Affairs and Drama, by 1970s, it was between the 
managers and the programme-makers. Until the 1960s, within a department such as 
drama and documentary, there was no apparent conflict between what Burns named as 
the ‘creative’ and ‘administrative’ sides of the organization. By the 1970s, this had 
changed. Almost all the interviews he made in the 1970s indicated that the conflict 
occurred between the programmes makers and the managers. Indeed, some interviews 
led Burns to claim that the conflict between management and the programme makers 
generated “a situation in which intelligent, sensitive, and hard-working people … can 
speak of feeling ‘slightly paranoid’ about the BBC management” (Burns 1977: 256). 
The paranoia comes no doubt from a system of management that is no longer only 
about financial control but also about the very processes of programme making. 
Before the 1970s, the management side of the organization did not look for detailed 
documentation of new programme proposals. Nor were there any performance review 
and evaluation documentations. After the McKinsey reorganisation, a disciplinary 
power regime began to be put into place whereby documentation of programming and 
performance became increasingly important. This is how Burns summarises the 
context: 
 
What seems to have happened, then, is that having, between 1963 and 1973, 
entered a totally changed financial situation, the Director General, with the 
Board of Management and the senior officials immediately subordinate to 
them, all backed – or prompted – by the Board of Governors, responded by 
carrying through a reorganization of the administrative structure designed to 
give it more direct financial control, and, in consequence, more direct 
overall operational control, but in the process lost touch with, and the 
confidence of, sizeable sections of the staff (Burns 1977: 256).   
 
Losing touch with, and the confidence of, staff entails losing touch with what 
practitioners take as the goals of programme making too. The institution, that is to say, 
began to be concerned not with enabling practitioners to strive for standards of 
excellence but instead controlling them with reference to cost-effectiveness. This, in 
turn, became one of the main sources of the conflict between the institution and the 
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practice. However, until the emergence of neoliberal governmentality in the 1980s and 
the NPM in 1990s the conflict was not serious enough that the organization could be 
described as being in a state of crisis. After the neoliberal governmentality and the 
NPM, however, disciplinary power (which as I show below intensified in the 1990s) 
began to function as enforcement of the presupposition that human beings aim at 
preference maximisation. The ways in which this happened can be illustrated with 
reference to another ethnographic study of the BBC. That is, Georgina Born’s (2004) 
Uncertain Vision: Birt, Dyke and the reinvention of the BBC.40 Like Burns’, Born's 
study is also considered to be one of the most authoritative and extensive ethnographic 
studies of the organization. Born illustrates that in the 1990s the NPM model was 
widely implemented within the BBC. ‘Producer Choice’ was the official name of this 
process. I will argue that it was mainly through this process that the flourishing of 
programme making began to be prevented and the conflict between the practice and 
the institution intensified into a crisis.  
4.5. Producer Choice: NPM and disciplinary power 
In some respects, the Producer Choice and its required reorganization resembled the 
reorganization of the 1970s (see Wegg-Prosser 2001). However, as I show below, this 
time reorganization had a more extensive impact on the practice of programme 
making. I argue that with Producer Choice the institution began to hold the 
presupposition of NPM; namely, presupposing human beings as preference 
maximisers. Indeed, as I will demonstrate, Producer Choice not only marks a 
difference with respect to presuppositions but also with respect to the enforcement of 
preference maximisation as the major premise of practical rationality within the 
practice of programme making.  
Producer Choice was introduced by John Birt (director general at that time) in 
response to criticism from the New Right. The government claimed that the BBC, like 
other public institutions, was ineffectively managed and had become unaccountable 
and inefficient. Public money, the New Right believed, was wasted within the 
bureaucracy of the BBC (Harris and Wegg-Prosser 2007). As mentioned in the first 
chapter this was a typical criticism of the public sector developed by the New Right 
                                                 
40 It is worth to note that Borns’ and Burns’ studies are the two main most extensive and authoritative 
ethnographic studies of the BBC. So, although I refer to other studies too, none of these studies are as 
extensive as studies by Burns (1977) and Born (2004).    
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politics. As a result of these kinds of criticisms, cost-effectiveness, efficiency and 
accountability became a hot issue once again 20 years after the 1970s. As I have also 
illustrated in previous chapters, the solution the New Right offered to these alleged 
problems was NPM - to which the Citizen’s Charter, quality management and auditing 
have been central. As a public institution, the BBC could not stay detached from such 
a transformation of the public sector (Ongun, 2015). Birt himself stated that Producer 
Choice is an attack on the old-style public bureaucracy with the use of high-quality 
management methods and information (Wegg-Prosser 2001:12). A White Paper issued 
by the government in 1994, entitled ‘The Future of the BBC’, also confirmed this new 
approach. There it was suggested that “the BBC should operate its public services 
according to the principles of the Citizen’s Charter” (quoted in Born 2004: 214). 
Having explained what it means for a public organization to operate in line with the 
principles of the CC in the first chapter, the statement in ‘The Future of the BBC’ 
indicates two main changes. 
First, users of the services are no longer understood as citizens pursuing wellbeing, but 
instead, as consumers pursuing preference maximisation. Assuming what has been 
argued about the NPM in the previous chapters is right, this would mean that 
practitioners and the users of the services of the BBC will be understood in terms of 
homo economicus. The second implication of managing the BBC with purposes of CC 
is that homo economicus and preference maximisation is going to be enforced – 
through disciplinary power techniques such as surveillance, normalization and 
examination – as the ultimate aim for the practice of programme making.  
Let me begin elaborating on these two aspects of managing the BBC within the 
framework of CC by noting that like the reorganization of the 1970s, the new regime 
also required management consultancy. This time, John Birt, director-general of the 
BBC from 1992-2000 and the main architect of Producer Choice, drew on the 
assistance of five management consultancies — Deloitte, Coopers & Lybrand, 
PriceWaterhouse, Ernst & Young, and Kinsley Lord (Born 2004: 100). Birt thought 
such consultation necessary because he was well aware of the kind of resistance his 
Producer Choice would face within the BBC. That is, he did not contract this many 
consultants just to draw out a reorganization plan, but also to help him implement 
Producer Choice despite the resistance from practitioners.   
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Together with the consultants, Producer Choice first integrated a system in which 
programme producers were allowed to buy services from in-house departments or 
outside suppliers. That is, for the first time, an internal market was introduced to the 
BBC, in order to bring about financial discipline and accountability to the 
organization.  Producers (or the programme making side), for the first time in the 
history of the BBC, are now the buyers and sellers of services ranging from acting to 
video editing. This was the initial stage in which programme makers began to be 
viewed in terms of homo economicus; that is, preference maximising buyers and 
sellers (see Carter and McKinlay 2013: 1234). However, the internal market is not the 
only or most important aspect of Producer choice, although it has often been portrayed 
as such by the many academic analyses of Producer Choice.  
More important than the introduction of internal markets is the widespread application 
of the notion of ‘consumer sovereignty’ and the relevant quality management and 
auditing techniques used in the governance activities of the organization after 
Producer Choice (Born 2003: 66).  In the case of the BBC, consumer sovereignty 
implies that the institution no longer shares the same presupposition with the practice 
of programme making. To put this in a rather different way, when consumer 
sovereignty is considered to be the basis of programme making, then, preference 
maximisation needs also to be enforced over the practice as an ethos regarding the 
relationship between programmes and the viewers. That is, preference maximisation of 
the viewers needs to be imposed over the practices as their main aim. This ethos need 
be enforced because, as explained above, practice is traditionally motivated by the 
achievement of goods internal to their practice, and such achievement requires 
transformation of the preferences of the viewers instead of merely satisfying them.  
Although adoption of consumer sovereignty was initiated by the White Paper 
mentioned above, the idea can be traced back to the ‘Peacock Report on the Financing 
of the BBC’ in 1986. This report was initiated by the Conservative government and it 
has been the basis of Producer Choice (Ursell 2003: 35). It supports values that are the 
reverse of those defended in the Pilkington Report and in so doing supports a different 
presupposition regarding human beings. The striking difference that interests us here is 
that the report suggested that “British broadcasting should move towards a 
sophisticated system based on consumer sovereignty. That is a system which 
recognizes that viewers and listeners are the best ultimate judges of their own 
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interests” (Peacock 1986: para 592, my emphasis; see also Ongun, 2015)). The 
Peacock Report, that is to say, rejects any superior judgement on the quality of 
programmes over that of audiences themselves (see also Peacock 2004). This entails 
that the quality of a programme is to be judged by the viewers and listeners rather by 
practitioners themselves. This corresponds to the understanding of quality that is 
imposed through the methods of TQM. As explained in the first and the second 
chapters, through this method of management quality is quantified and defined by the 
managers in terms of preference maximisation. Just in education and health, in the 
BBC too, consumer sovereignty and the relevant TQM methods ignore the 
transforming aspect of the practice, and hence prevent it from flourishing.  
Although it is loosely implied, in the report and elsewhere (2004), Peacock suggests 
that even though the BBC is a public institution, market principles need to be applied 
to the organization (2004). Like other NPM type policies, such principles are 
suggested as the best tool to bring about effectiveness and efficiency to the public 
sector. But if we are to ask ‘what purpose effectiveness and efficiency will serve 
within the BBC?’, the answer would be consumer satisfaction. That is, effectiveness 
and efficiency serves the preference maximisation ethos that is attached to the 
practices by the NPM regimes. This is because, as explained in the first chapter, 
consumer satisfaction is the basis of the market principles and such principles 
presuppose that human beings aim at preference maximisation. Once this is 
presupposed, however, satisfaction of consumer preferences (whatever they happen to 
be) becomes the main expectation of the institution from the programmes.  
To realize such expectations, however, the institution requires enforcement through 
various techniques of power such as TQM and performance management through 
auditing. In the BBC, all these techniques of power were implemented and they 
entailed very different understanding of quality and performance than the traditional 
understanding of the programme makers. What followed from such changes is that 
compared to the previous period of the organization (before Producer Choice), ratings 
and audience research began to have more impact on the commissioning, sustainability 
and the nature of programmes. This kind of an evaluation of programmes was not 
completely new to the organization. In the Reithian period too audience ratings and 
audience research were conducted and taken seriously (Burns, 1977: 55; 165). 
However, they were not considered so important as to challenge the authority of 
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programme makers, as it is in the NPM regime. That is, audience preferences and 
ratings were not often used in a way that is contrary to the traditional understanding of 
good quality and performance within programme making. It was used mostly to 
understand for comparing the organization with that of the private organizations in 
terms of their outreach (Burns 1977: 55). With the arrival of NPM, however, audience 
research and ratings turned out to be the main tools for intervention to, and 
redefinition of, quality and performance within the practice (Born, 2003).Quality and 
performance of practitioner begun to be evaluated more on the basis of rating and 
audience research. Ratings and audience research, that is to say, has been one of the 
main tools to shift the authority from practitioners to the viewers (understood as 
preference maximisers) during the NPM. As Born (2004: 254-88) demonstrates with 
extensive ethnographic evidence, rising importance of audience research and ratings 
within the BBC since the NPM, allowed constant interventions in the activities of the 
programme makers on a scale that was unimaginable before Producer Choice.  
Born (2004: 225-41; 2002) shows, again with extensive ethnographic evidence, that 
the intervention took the path of auditing (which is, as explained in previous chapters, 
typical of NPM). Key performance indicators, annual and daily performance measures 
and reviews have all proliferated since Producer Choice. Once autonomous in their 
activities, programme makers now need to develop quantitative performance 
indicators, and to write and be subjected to reviews about how effective they are in 
achieving those indicators. As Seaton puts it, “what had been a producers’ 
programme-led hierarchy became a management-led power structure [in the 1990s]” 
(Seaton 1997: 223). As one director of Strategy and Channel Management sums it up: 
 
There’s a real need for KPIs [Key Performance Indicators] or performance 
measurement statistics, and the real test for most managers is, does this help 
you in running the business? Across the BBC there is huge amount of 
interest in very detailed performance indicators collected quite often on a 
daily basis. For instance…the overnight ratings which are sent round 
electronically every morning… tell us how well the previous evening’s 
television schedule has done, how we’ve done in audience share terms 
compared with our main competitors, and increasingly we’re looking at 
particular target audience groups as well as the total audience. We also have 
166 
 
some continuing financial performance indicators and some operational 
indicators which managers need just to run the business (In Born 2004: 
225).   
 
Through these kinds of methods of examination and normalization, performance and 
quality have been subjected to an intense quantification process. The above quote 
explains the process of Producer Choice in the eyes of the management. But it is also a 
quote that summarizes the ways in which NPM, in the form of disciplinary power, was 
integrated into the BBC through Producer Choice.  
Understanding the Producer Choice with reference to disciplinary power amounts to a 
crucial dimension of Producer Choice in the transformation of the BBC that seems to 
be lacking in both Born’s and other accounts of the BBC. That is, changes with respect 
to the criteria of evaluating quality and performance of programmes and programme 
makers are not only mere interventions through which new working conditions are 
created for programme making. Changes with regard to such criteria are also a way of 
establishing power relationships between different segments of the organization, 
namely, between the practice and institution. Whereas traditionally, programme 
makers have been striving to achieve the good internal to their practice, and so doing 
helping viewers to cultivate themselves and achieve their wellbeing, now, on an 
increasingly frequent basis, programme makers happen to be the ones who need to be 
educated by the institutions and audiences. One executive in one of the interviews, for 
instance, said that “the aim of [the audience] research is to educate producers about 
what the audience might want” (quoted in Born 2004: 255). This, I argue, illustrates 
how ratings, and what the viewers want, turned out to be also tools, through which the 
institution exerts power over the practice on the basis of a presupposition that is rival 
to and different from the presupposition of the practice.   
What has been stated above does not entail that the practice and practitioners are 
coerced or oppressed by the institution. The ways in which ratings becomes a tool of 
power within the BBC is related to the productive nature of power that Foucault 
identifies. Thus, it is through creating new understandings and norms regarding what 
quality and good performance mean that the institution exercises power over the 
practice. What is also missing from Born's and other accounts of the BBC is the 
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conceptual scheme to understand that such power relationships are detrimental to the 
flourishing of the practice of programme making. Assuming what I have argued 
regarding the conditions in which practices can flourish is right, then the Producer 
Choice and the kind of power relations it brings about is detrimental to the flourishing 
of the practice. This is mainly because such power relations are not conducive of the 
kind of practical rationality necessary for the exercise of the virtues.  The institution 
imposes the importance of ratings as the major premise of practical reasoning of 
programme makers, without a concern for excellence. However, to produce an 
excellent programme and hence to achieve the good internal to programme making, 
practitioners need to be habituated into the life of the virtues, and then, those excellent 
programmes produced by the practice need to transform the viewers in a way that 
viewers can achieve their wellbeing. The disciplinary power of NPM introduced to the 
BBC by the Producer Choice, however, fails to provide the condition in which 
practitioners can become virtuous and produce excellent programmes to help viewers 
cultivate themselves and achieve their wellbeing. Producer Choice instead, aims to 
regulate practices in a way that they can satisfy as much consumer as possible.    
The management front of the organization, of course, asserts this form of power under 
the pressure of government. And management is under this kind of pressure because 
this is the only way they can secure goods external to the practice of programme 
making – that is, through making it explicit that they are performing well with respect 
to the ratings and effectiveness. The crucial point that cannot be neglected here is the 
ways in which political power takes effectiveness and ratings as the major criteria for 
the value of the organization. The political context in which the BBC is operating is a 
neoliberal political context whereby human beings (or citizens) are preference 
maximisers. As explained in the previous chapter, within such context the role of the 
public institutions is to address this aim and in the case of the BBC increasing ratings 
in the most effective way is considered to be the only way to do this. Thus, in this 
context, the BBC is, to an extent, condemned to exert disciplinary power over the 
practice, if it is to survive. And this is why the institution is in a crisis: because while it 
exerts power on the basis of a certain presupposition, there exists another 
presupposition that is different and rival to that presupposition. On the basis of this 
different presupposition practitioners resist but neither practices can flourish to a full 
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extent nor the institution can fully control the practice. One of them will have to 
abandon from their essential features if the conflict is going to be resolved.  
Producers, for instance, tend to think that the new management of the BBC generated 
a kind of programme making culture in which 
 
the more you make stupid products, the more you create audiences. The 
more you pander to unsophisticated taste, the more that taste becomes 
unsophisticated … I believe in the craft and I respect the popular audience, 
and the problem is that so many people who work here in TV don’t respect 
the audiences. What they care about is numbers (In Born 2004: 85).  
 
This quote represents the tradition of practitioners who strive for the good internal to 
their practice. The quote also indicates the existence of standards, which would 
differentiate an excellent programme from a stupid one. Programme makers, in other 
words, tend to think that respecting audiences is not simply to make them watch 
whatever happens to be on the TV, but instead educating and informing them through 
achievement of the good internal to programme making. However, practitioners are 
also of the view that what the managers are interested in is contrary to what they are 
supposed to be striving for while making programmes. As explained above, the 
tradition of programme makers tends to believe that it is important to transform 
audiences by informing and educating them. The audience research, ratings, 
performance indicators and reviews often fails to evaluate such transformation, and in 
fact through auditing often forces practitioners to simply aim at satisfying the 
preferences of viewers. 
To transform preferences of viewers requires programme makers to excel in their 
activities and achieve the good internal to the practice. However, such achievement 
involves the risk of having fewer audiences than one would have through making low-
quality programmes. And for practitioners, taking such risks is not  as much as before 
by the management structures and processes of the BBC, because of their excessive 
concern with effectiveness, efficiency and consumer satisfaction. As another former 
BBC drama producer notes “[In the 1970s] the BBC could afford to allow you to 
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experiment, to fail. It doesn’t seem able to do that now; the amount of drama is much 
less, and drama is used pretty much to get the ratings” (In Born 2004: 305). These 
kinds of responses in Born’s study led her to claim that Producer Choice turned out to 
result in “the erosion of the creative autonomy and confidence of BBC production” 
(ibid, 304). Born (like Burns) extensive study of the BBC illustrates that there are 
programme makers within the BBC who consider themselves in conflict with 
management. This is a conflict (like it is in other NPM type institutions) about who is 
going to define quality and performance within the organization. There are, on the one 
hand, the practitioners who strive for excellence and, on the other hand, managers who 
are concerned about the sustainability of the BBC, but at the same time aiming to have 
power over the definition of quality and performance through disciplinary power.  
From a MacIntyrean point of view, therefore, from the 1990s onwards there is an 
ongoing conflict between practitioners aiming at excellence and the good internal to 
the practice, and the institutional settings of their activity, aiming at goods external to 
the institution. A finance executive’s statement, in 1996, is typical of this conflict: 
 
what was supposed to be a creative process [within the BBC] was 
incredibly inefficient … the BBC was a production-led, boffin-led 
organization; now it’s marketing-led. It’s like a lot of British industries: 
they used to make toys without thinking what kids like to play with! (In 
Born, 2004: 306).  
 
But what does it mean for the BBC to be marketing-led? It basically means the BBC 
as an institution is motivated by knowing what the viewers prefer and by satisfying 
those preferences. Furthermore it means that the quality and performance is going to 
be defined with reference to the demand (or preferences) in the market. That is, a 
programme would be considered to have quality if it satisfies the demand in the 
market. Likewise, performance of a practitioner would be considered as good if it is 
efficient and effective in satisfying such demand. However, this blurs the traditional 
difference between excellence of the programmes and the demands of the public. As 
explained above the relation between the two is traditionally constructed in a way that 
the programmes aims to have an effect on the demand rather than simply satisfying it. 
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Related to this, a marketing-led BBC also ignores (if not tries to diminish) the 
qualitative nature of excellence in programme making. As explained above, standards 
of excellence develop over time and experience. While practitioners strive towards 
these standards, they may achieve goods internal to the practice, but this is not a 
quantifiable achievement, and hence cannot be evaluated through quantitative ways. 
Evaluation of performance and quality with respect to the flourishing of programme 
making, that is to say, requires qualitative knowledge and experience of the 
practitioners. However, once viewers are considered as preference maximising 
consumers, and disciplinary power is exerted over the practitioners, then the way in 
which performance and quality is measured eventually takes a quantitative form – that 
is, evaluation on the basis of ratings.  
What has been stated above does not entail that programme makers can no longer 
make excellent programmes (or can no longer achieve goods internal to their practice). 
In fact through resistance excellent programmes are made and for this reason 
evaluation of performance and quality is still considered to be a problematic element 
by the institution. Another interesting remark by a senior BBC strategist also 
highlights this problem:  
 
In any ordinary business you’ve got a financial year-end where you weigh 
things up. Performance Review was an attempt to do that, but it foundered 
partly because of … the difficulty of defining objectives and measuring 
performance because of the BBC’s nature as a PSB [public service 
broadcaster] rather than a profit-maximising entity. That‘s a problem that 
continues to exist for the BBC (In Born, 2004: 226). 
 
The problem identified above implies a special type of conflict between the practice 
and the institution; a conflict that is not fully recognized by Born’s study. Born 
consistently cites these types of statements from her interviews and demonstrates that 
neither programme makers nor managers think that they are being successful in their 
attempts to achieve goods internal to programme making and to control practices 
under the NPM regime. Both sides of the organization (that is, practitioners and 
managers) constantly complain about each other. I argue that when we evaluate these 
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complains from the theoretical viewpoint I have developed in the previous chapters, it 
becomes clear that complains are clear indications of a conflict between disciplinary 
power of the institution and the good internal to the practice. Complains of the 
practitioners implies first that institutions are enforcing something contrary to their 
own understandings and motivation, and second, practitioners are resisting to such 
understandings and motivations. Complains from the managers imply that there is an 
attempt to control practices on the basis of goods that are external to programme 
making. However, the mere existence of this conflict is not the crisis of the public 
sector that is instantiated in the BBC. 
There is a crisis because this conflict reached to a turning point. The resolution of the 
conflict requires either the practice to cease to exist in the way that MacIntyre 
understand practices or the institution to abandon from the NPM regime. This is to say 
that if the influence of NPM regime continues, programme making within the BBC is 
likely to turn into a productive activity the only purpose of which is to match the 
supply of the programmes with that of the demand of preference maximising 
individuals. This kind of an activity would become similar to one of fishing crew 
examples of MacIntyre, in which the activities of the crew are motivated by goods 
external to fishing. However, if the BBC removes the influence of NPM regime over 
the practice, then the practice can become similar to the other fishing crew example of 
MacIntyre, in which the main motivation is still the good internal to the practice, and 
hence there is still the possibility for the practice to survive and flourish.  
Therefore, the BBC can be considered as a case where NPM regime generates a 
conflict between practices and institutions of the public sector and yields to a crisis. 
The BBC is a case which (once analysed through a MacIntyrean and Foucauldian 
framework) illustrates that NPM intensifies the disciplinary power within the public 
sector through auditing and management of performance and quality. It is also a case 
that demonstrates the ways in which neoliberal presupposition about human beings 
and the relevant ethos attached to the services of the practices is enforced through the 
disciplinary power relationships. But the BBC is also a case that clearly indicates that 
the tradition of practitioners have different presuppositions and motivations regarding 
themselves and the ones they serve than the neoliberal presuppositions and 
motivations. The BBC in short is a case that supports the argument of this study that 





This study developed the argument that public sector in a state of crisis. This crisis 
results from a conflict between practices and institutions of the public sector. The 
conflict, as I have demonstrated with reference to Foucault’s theory of power, and 
with reference to MacIntyrean concepts of practices, goods, and institutions, emerges 
out of different and rival understandings of human beings, of the role of practices 
within public sector, of quality and performance and the ways in which different goods 
need to be ordered within public sector institutions. Whereas, on the one hand, there 
are the practices with their own presupposition, on the other, there are the institutions 
that have different and rival presupposition about human beings. It is the 
presupposition of practices that human beings aim at wellbeing the achievement of 
which requires cultivation of habit and intellectual abilities.  
Institutions, however, presuppose that human beings aim at preference maximisation. 
These two different presuppositions entail two different and rival ethoi regarding the 
relationship between practices and the users of their services. Thus, there is no shared 
understanding about what practices and institutions need to aim at.  In the absence of 
such shared understanding, institutions enforce their own understandings upon 
practices and practices resist such enforcement. In particular institutions impose an 
understanding of practitioners and citizens as homo economicus, the primary aim of 
whom is to maximise preferences. NPM, it has been argued, is a form of disciplinary 
power through which such imposition is actualized. However, this does not entail that 
NPM succeeds in imposing such understanding over the practices. Insofar as 
practitioners’ actions and decisions are informed by goods internal to their practices, 
institutions will not be fully successful in enforcing their own understandings to the 
practices.  
Nevertheless, under the NPM regime practices cannot flourish with their full capacity, 
and the primary aim of the institutions becomes the conservation of themselves rather 
than enabling medicine, programme making, arts and sciences to flourish. What 
becomes important, that is to say, is the survival of the universities, the NHS, the state 
schools and the BBC; flourishing of medicine, research, arts and programme making 
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loses its value. Within this context, preference maximisation turns out to be the main 
criterion appealing to which institutions of the public sector can preserve themselves. 
For the sake of preserving the institutions, however, they prevent practices from 
flourishing. They prevent practices from flourishing because the conditions that are 
necessary for the exercise of virtues and practical rationality are not provided. Indeed, 
the meaning of performance and quality services is redefined through disciplinary 
power on the basis of preference maximisation. This attempt results in an institutional 
framework whereby virtues and practical rationality (that are necessary for the 
flourishing of practices) are ignored and marginalized. Practitioners, whose actions are 
informed by goods internal to practices, resist and conflict with the disciplinary power 
of NPM primarily for this ignorance and marginalization.  
As for the limitations of the study, although the study is a philosophical analysis, it 
relied on archival and secondary sources in making its empirical claims. As with other 
studies using secondary resources, this study is also open to charge of selective use of 
evidence. I aimed to overcome this problem by referring to the most authoritative 
empirical and ethnographic studies related to the subject matter, but direct 
ethnographic evidence collected with the theoretical framework developed in this 
study would further overcome this limitation. For this reason, further ethnographic 
studies using the theoretical content of this study need to be conducted to enhance the 
literature to a further level than this study did.  
In what ways does this thesis advance the literature? The first way in which this thesis 
contributes to the literature is related to MacIntyrean studies. Main commentators such 
as Knight (2007; 2009) have reconsidered MacIntyre’s philosophy with respect to 
political theory; Beadle (as has been referred to in the first and the third chapters) 
applied MacIntyre’s philosophy to organization studies. Others also applied 
MacIntyre’s work to areas as such as journalism and business (Salter, 2008; Moore 
and Beadle, 2006). As mentioned previously, Overeem and Tholen (2011) apply 
MacIntyre’s philosophy to public administration and NPM too. This study extends this 
application in two main ways. First, it extends the claim that NPM neglects internal 
goods and overemphasises external goods, by providing a more detailed analysis of 
the management methods and policies associated with NPM. This detailed analysis is 
supported by the notions of presuppositions, governmentality and disciplinary power. 
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Secondly, it extends the argument that MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism is important for 
public administration studies. In applying MacIntyre’s philosophy to the public sector, 
the study also illustrates, like Overeem and Tholen (2011), the ways in which scholars 
working within the public management literature can benefit from MacIntyre’s 
philosophy. As Ovreem and Tholen (2011) argues, within such literature, the public 
sector is often analysed and discussed in a dominantly politico-economic and 
administrative form. The public sector, that is to say, has been a concern of scholars 
and policy makers as part of discussions and analyses related to effectiveness, fiscal 
policy, privatization processes, organizational change, administration, and various 
kinds of management structures. Within the mainstream literature there is no in-depth 
analysis of NPM with reference to their telos and goods. Almost all analyses focus on 
the effectiveness and efficiency of institutions and changes related to management 
methods and structures. There is almost no substantive discussion about the goods 
management structures, methods, effectiveness and efficiency are supposed to serve. 
In not sufficiently dealing with different types of goods, the literature failed to 
recognize that NPM was not new only because it introduced new management 
methods and structures to the public sector, but also because it introduced a new 
presupposition with regard to the practices and a new ethos with regards to the 
relationship between practices and users of their services.  
Overeem and Tholen (2011) evaluate NPM in a way that is different from the 
mainstream accounts of it, however, they do not analyse the ways in which 
presuppositions of institutions change and how such a change lead to conflict between 
practices and institutions. In developing an account of such conflict this study 
extended Overeem and Tholen (2011). When I analysed those very same methods and 
structures identified within the mainstream literature with reference to MacIntyre’s 
notions of goods, practices and institutions, and also with reference the notion of 
presuppositions, another dimension of change was revealed. Institutions of the public 
sector no longer presuppose that citizens aim at a good the achievement of which 
requires cultivation of habits and intellectual abilities. Auditing, TQM, internal 
markets and performance indicators as the main management methods of NPM all 
assume that the users of services aim at preference maximisation. In fact, they not only 
assume this, but also enforce practices to aim at this. This enforcement on the basis of 
a presupposition that is different from and rival to that of the presupposition of 
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practices, leads to conflict between practices and institutions of the public sector. 
Unveiling this conflict with reference to MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism and and Foucault 
extends the study of Ovreem and Tholen, because it makes it clear that MacIntyre’s 
Aristotelianism can help us to understand the kind of conflict NPM creates within the 
public sector on the basis of different and rival presuppositions of practices and 
institutions.  
When the management methods of NPM is analysed from a Foucauldian point of 
view, it becomes apparent that NPM is not a neutral mechanism of management that 
aims at effectiveness and efficiency. Within the mainstream literature, proponents of 
NPM consider the new management methods as neutral and scientific tools that would 
bring effectiveness and efficiency to the public sector by liberating it from 
bureaucracy. However, with the help of Foucault’s account of modern power 
relationships, this study demonstrated that NPM brings about an intensified 
disciplinary regime that stems out of a new governmental power. From such point of 
view, NPM is neither a liberation of public organizations from bureaucracy, as its 
proponent have been arguing, nor is it a departure from bureaucracy.  
The critical side of the mainstream literature does refer to NPM as a form of power, 
but it fails to understand what kind of power NPM is and what kind of changes it 
generated within the public sector. For the critical side, NPM is a mere application of 
‘business-like’ management methods to the public sector and this is considered as 
application of a political ideology (e.g. Farrel and Morris 200; Dent and Barry 2004; 
Ackroyd et al 2007; O’Reilly and Reed 2011). It has been argued in this study that 
NPM is a form of power relationship that aims to change the relationship between 
practices and institutions on the bases of certain presuppositions and techniques of 
power. This argument goes beyond the claim that NPM is simply an application of 
New Right ideology. Without getting into the discussion of whether NPM is an 
application of ideology, it is argued that NPM is an application of the presupposition 
of neoliberal governmentality to the public sector that neglects virtue and internal 
goods and creates conflict between practices and institutions. That is, this study 
extends to arguments that NPM is an application of neoliberalism and New Right 
ideology through understanding NPM with reference to governmentality, disciplinary 
power and practices and institutions. To put this in a rather different way, although the 
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mainstream approaches to NPM do explain the political context in which the new 
management methods and structures were thought to be necessary (New Right, that is 
to say), due to their lack of a theory of practices, goods, presuppositions and power, 
they fail to understand how the New Right and its enactments and policies such as 
Citizen’s Charter and internal markets change the very notion of citizen and the role of 
practices with respect to citizens and institutions. As has been demonstrated, a 
conception of ‘citizen’ aiming at wellbeing was inherited from New Liberalism and 
turned into a conception of ‘citizen’ that is essentially a preference maximising 
consumer by the New Right and NPM regime. There are studies that elaborate on the 
shift from citizens to consumers (e.g. Clarke et al 2007: 27-9), but they do not consider 
this shift with reference to presuppositions, goods and practices too. For this reason 
they cannot recognize that the shift from citizens to consumers actually prevent 
practices from flourishing and turns into a crisis.  
Another way in which this study contributes to the mainstream literature is related to 
conflict. Within the critical side of the literature there are various studies indicating a 
conflict between different ‘professionals’ and ‘managers’ (Kirkpatrick and Ackyord 
2003; Thomas and Davies 2005; Ackyord et al 2007; Hughes 1994; McNulty and 
Ferlie 2004; Deem and Brehony 2005). However, these studies tend to understand the 
conflict simply in terms of the resistance of professionals to the changes NPM 
attempts to realize. They tend to argue that professionals effectively resist change, and 
for this reason NPM has been unsuccessful. Although these studies do reveal an actual 
conflict and resistance, they do not seem to explain the motivation behind the 
resistance and hence one of the main reasons why there is a conflict within the public 
sector.  
As has been argued in the second chapter, this is also the insufficiency of the 
Foucauldian accounts. They too cannot explain why there is resistance to power 
because Foucault excludes normative understanding of goods and practices from his 
philosophy. In doing so, he also excluded from his philosophy an explanation of how 
human beings react to certain forms of power. This study argued that there is 
resistance and conflict in the public sector, because, on the one hand, there are 
practitioners, whose actions are informed by goods internal to their practices, and on 
the other hand, there is the NPM regime that imposes techniques of power that that are 
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contrary to such actions. Once we understand resistance and conflict in this way, it 
becomes apparent that the conflict reached a turning point which will result either in 
the removal of the NPM regime from public sector or practices will no longer be 
practices in the sense that MacIntyre understand them. There seems to be no third way 
in which the conflict can be resolved. Therefore, in developing the argument of the 
crisis of the public sector, this study extends our knowledge of the conflict within the 
public sector in a way that cannot be done within the constraints of mainstream public 
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